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A B S T R A C T
By the beginning of the seventeenth century the
Kozaks were established as an anomalous military class of
freemen in the southeastern confines of the PolishLithuanian Commonwealth.

These Kozaks were predominantly

of the Rusin ethnic strain; Rusin being contemporary name
for Ukrainians.

To the Commonwealth these Kozaks were as

useful as they were dangerous, and its government tried
vigorously to subordinate them.

Pressured by the ruling

class to that end, the government finally resorted to
f
severe measures.

Following the Kczak pogroms in 1637 and

in 1638, it reduced the Kozaks to the status of serfs.

The

decade after 1638 was characterized by mounting crisis and
great dissatisfaction, when the Kozaks experienced intoler
able conditions of life.

At the same time the Rusin

people as a whole suffered religious persecution, economic
exploitation and varying degrees of social and political
oppression.
Emerging as the leader of the Kozaks in 1648, Bohdan
Khmelnytskyi provided a spark to this explosive combination
ii
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of issues which set off the greatest of all the Kozak rebel- .
lions in the Commonwealth.
irredentist p l a n s .

Initially Khmelnytskyi had no

He would have been satisfied with conces

sions to the Kozaks and to the Orthodox Church, and with the
establishment of an autonomous Kozak territory.

But the

Kozak victories moved the Rusin society into action.

Thus,

the Kozak rebellion soon became transformed into the national
struggle of liberation against the Commonwealth.

These deve

lopments, combined with fresh military successes and the
influence of the Rusin intellectual circles at Kiev., changed
Khmelnytskyi1s aims and plans.

He now visualized himself as

the leader of the Rusin people and set before himself two main
goals: to liberate all the Rusin people within the Common
wealth;

and to erect a Rusin state on the ruins of the medieval

Kievan R u s .
Khmelnytskyi next convinced himself that the ruling
clsiss would not agree to any reforms.

He could not hope to

change the existing dual structure of the Polish-Lithuanian
Commonwealth into a trialist state in which the Rusin segment
would be guaranteed both equality and autonomy.

He was there

fore left with only one course of action: to establish an
independent state by severing all ties with the Commonwealth.
t

iii
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Since Khmelnytskyi decided that he could not defeat it with
his own resources, he resorted to the usual expedient of
political manipulations.

He played off the neighbouring

powers against one another and formed alliances with those
which he considered the least dangerous.

In August 1649

Khmelnytskyi was abandoned by his Tatar allies,
victory was within his grasp.

just when a

He then had to negotiate with

King Jan Kazimierz and to conclude the Treaty of Zboriv.
This treaty made great concessions to the Kozaks, but failed
to satisfy the expectations of the Rusin people as a whole.
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P R E F A C E
In the third and in the fourth decades of the seven
teenth century, the majority of the nobles of the PolishLithuanian Commonwealth boasted that the international posi
tion of their state was extremely favourable.

They pointed

out, on the one hand, that the neighbouring states were
either plagued by disastrous w a r s , or were weakened as the
result of participation in these wars, or in general, were
passing through crises in one form or another.

The Holy

Roman Empire was ruined by the Thirty Years W a r , which also
greatly undermined the military strength of Sweden.

Muscovy's

scars were still visible from the anarchy of the Time of
Troubles; moreover, it received fresh wounds during the
163 2-1634 war with the Commonwealth.

Similarly, the Ottoa.

man Empire was weakened by the recurrent dynastic uphevals,
and its military strength was sapped bv the conflicts with
Persia and Venice.

The Commonwealth, on the other hand,

enjoyed the times of "golden peac e " , stability and prosperity.
That great religious war which engulfed Western
Europe and the internal struggles within such countries as
England, France and Spain, only reaffirmed the faith of these
v
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nobles in the excellence of the political and the social
institutions of the Commonwealth.
terrible "Deluge" of wars in

It took the start of the

1648 not only to expose to them

the superficial strength of the Commonwealth, but also to
convince them that its domestic affairs w&re not in good
order.

Some of these nobles began to realize that their

chivalry, fighting spirit, prowess and even patriotism was
corrupted by their wealth and egotism.

The unexpected catas-

trophies and calamities revealed to them the facts that
their precious "golden liberties" rested on the deprivation
of the rights of other classes of population?

and that their

flourishing parliamentarianism made the executive impotent
and passed the real power to

the hands of the magnates.

Moreover, they also saw that

they were poor examples of that

"bastion of Christianity"

against the enemies of the Church;

that they were brought up in. the spirit of religious exclu
siveness and intolerance; and that the harmony among the
VEirious ethnic groups of the Commonwealth did not exist.
Finally, as the Kozak "Hydra" reared its heads again in
1648, it became obvious to most of the gentry that repres
sion and serfdom did not solve the overall Kozak problem
in 1638.
vi
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In 1648 Bohdan Khmelnytskyi provided a spark to the
explosive combination of issues, which first set off a Kozak
rebellion and then spread rapidly into a great fire of
national liberation of the Rusin people.

The aim of this

monograph is to give an all-sided description and analysis
of events during this struggle within the Polish-Lithuanian
Commonwealth, in the period 1648-1649.
The broad subject area of this monograph occupies a
prominent —

frequently controversial —

Russian and Ukrainian historiography.

position in Polish,
But in the English-

speaking world, this subject matter did not receive the
deserving attention of scholars.

«
This monograph therefore

also attempts to contribute to this relatively unexplored
topic in the English language historiography.

vii
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E X P L A N A T O R Y

N O T E

In this monograph the spelling of Muscovite (Russian),
Rusin (Ukrainian)

and Belorusin (Byelorussian or White

Russian) names follows the now common English transliteration
of the Cyrillic alphabet, which is more or less adapted to
correct pronunciation.

I have used the system of transli

teration as prescribed by the United States Library of Cong
ress, omitting only such minor details as apostophes, dia
critical marks and ligatures.

Thus, for example, I use

Bohdan Khmelnytskyi, Aleksei Mikhailovich Lvov and Syluian
(

Muzhylovskyi; instead of Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi, Aleksei
Mikhailovich L 'vov and Syluian Muzhylovs'kyi.

In the Polish

proper names, since the Poles use a Latin alphabet, I have
retained the original Polish spelling (or as it appeared in
edited documentary collections), but without the diacritical
marks.

This rule also applies to other languages which use

a Latin alphabet.
Usage has made a completely consistent spelling of
proper names impossible.

In an attempt to solve this diffi

cult problem, I have adopted the following system:
I.

Generally I have endeavoured to retain the
xi
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contemporary Ukraine, i.e., Ukrainian Soviet Socialist
Republic.

Additional explanation of these terms follow on

pp. 1-2 of the text and in Appendix III.
III.

I have based the spelling of most place names

located within the 1648 boundaries of the Commonwealth
largely on its four main ethnic divisions: Polish, Lithuanism, Rusin and Belorus.in (see map following p. 1).

Thus,

for example, I have used the following: Krakow, Vilnius,
Chernivhiv and Smalensk.
persons.

This rule also applies to names o

But, in cases where I have found some difficulty

in determining the ethnic origin of persons, I have spelled
I
their names in Polish.
In other cases where persons were
of an ethnic origin other than Polish, but they were best
known by the Polonized versions of their names, I have also
spelled their names in Polish.

Thus, for example, I have

spelled Jeremi Wisniowiecki, rather than Iieremia Vyshnevetskyi

(Ukrainian).
IV.

There is one principal departure from the method

described in section III above.

It concerns place names

which have acquired forms now firmly established in English
Such names as Warsaw, Moscow, Kiev and Dnieper are less con
fusing than Warszawa, Moskva, Kyiv and Dnipro.

Thus, some

xiii
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nomenclature of the seventeenth century.

'For this reason I

have used the older terminology in this monograph;

for

example, Muscovy instead of Russia; and Crown instead of
Poland.

The expression "Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth"

comes nearer to the official term Rzeczpospolita than any
other term given to the specific land area.

When it is

necessary to distinguish the two component parts of the
Commonwealth, the terms "Crown" and "Grand Duchy" are used
for Polish and Lithuanian territories respectively.
II.

The meaning and use of the following terms in this

monograph: Rusin and Ukraine, deserve a special clarification
and attention.

The term Rusin has been deliberately chosen

and employed throughout this monograph to denote both the
particular ethnic group within the Commonwealth and the par
ticular qualities, and even certain specific territory inha
bited by these people.

In the second half of the nineteenth

century the descendants of these people adopted another name
for themselves —

Ukrainians.

The term Ukraine, as used in

this monograph, does not denote the name of the territory
inhabited by all the R u si n s , but only a specific area inha
bited by some of them.

The Ukraine of the middle of the

seventeenth century also should not be confused with
xii
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well-known place names retain the form now generally
accepted in English usage.
V.

The spelling of proper names other than within the

1648 boundaries of the Commonwealth varies with location.
T i m s , I have used the Russian spelling for Muscovy, the
German spelling for Prussia, etc.

I have generally followed

the system adopted by the editors of the Encyclopaedia of
Islam regarding the spelling of Tatar and Turkish n a m e s .
VI.

Because of the length of some titles, to save time

and space, I have adopted the following system for footnotes:
(a).

After citing the first two or three words of a
C

title, I have added etc for the rest of that title.

Each

of such shortened titles is entered in full in the biblio
graphy.
(b).

I have dispensed with citing the names of compilers,

editors, publishers and translators, since they are entered
in the bibliography.

The names of publishers, however, are

not listed in bibliography if books are over a hundred years
old.
(c).

I have adopted the following order when citing

correspondence (as well as generally other documents):
ncimes of both the addresser and the addressee; place from
xiv
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where the letter was sent

(but omitting such words as "near",

"in the camp near", etc); and the date of the letter.

For

the sake of uniformity, all dates are adjusted to the
Gregorian, or the New Style, calendar, which in the seven
teenth century was ten days in advance of the Julian or the
Old Style, calendar.
(d).

Stipulations in sections

(a) and (b) above do not

apply to a title which is not listed in the bibliography.
Each such title will be listed in full in the initial foot
note.
(e).

Since the bibliography contains most titles in

the Slavic languages, I have also translated each title from
Slavic into English.

Titles, as well as words and phrases
»

in French and Latin, are not translated into English.

I

have purposely avoided long quotations in these languages.
I also saw no reason to retain the Latin of the so-called
"macaronism", i.e., sentences with the mixture of Latin and
Polish.

In the footnotes, I have translated only the titles

which are not listed in the bibliography.
Finally, Appendix II offers a selective index of the
names of persons of importance, or of those frequently
referred to in this monograph during the years 1648-1649.
xv

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

In the same index I have listed the names of all the contem
porary authors whose works appear in the bibliography of
this monograph.

The glossary (Appendix III) is for the

purpose of further amplifying certain names and terms used
in this monograph.

The two maps are for the purpose of

clarifying the historical geography of the Polish-Lithuanian
Commonwealth in the middle of the seventeenth century.

xv i
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CHAPTER I

THE SOCIAL, LEGAL AND RELIGIOUS CONDITIONS OF THE KOZAKS IN
THE POLISH-LITHUANIAN COMMONWEALTH TO THE THIRD DECADE OF
THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY

I
In 1569 the Act of the Union of Lublin fused the
Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania into one
confederate state called the Commonwealth.

As a result of

this new political arrangement, the remnant of the medieval
principalities of the Kievan Rus hitherto under the direct
control of Lithuania, was incorporated into the Polish part
of the confederation.

The territories along both banks of

the middle Dnieper River, comprising the southeastern
borderlands of the Commonwealth, were called Ukraine.

1

The

southernmost extremities of Ukraine's settled life extended
to the beginning of the steppes, while still further
south stretched vast tracts of "wilderness" which were
almost void of population.

The suzerainty of the

•^-The name Ukraine (Ukraina) literally means "border
land" . As used in this monograph, the name Ukraine is
applied to the area comprising the Palatinates of Kiev and
Bratslav (from 1569) and Chernihiv (from 1635).
1
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2

Polish Crown over these areas was only nominal.
—

the land beyond the cataracts of the Dnieper —

Wild Plains were in reality a no man's land.

Zaporozhe
and the

The steppes

ended at the shores of the Black Sea; here began the Tatar
world.
Various ethnic groups and people of heterogenous
origin inhabited the newly-acquired territories of the
Crown.

The main elements among them were the following;

Rusins, Belorusins

(sic) , Poles, Lithuanians, Muscovites

and Tatar-Turk admixtures.

2

The Rusins, who formed the

bulk of the population in these areas, also constituted the
dominant ethnic strain in other soutfiern palatinates of the
Commonwealth.

They were the descendants of the various

peoples who at one time had occupied the territories of the
2

In this monograph the name Rusin(s ), used as an adjec
tive and as a noun, is applied to that ethnic group which
lived in the south-eastern palatinates of the Commonwealth.
The vast majority of these people inhabited the Crown's
Province of Little Poland (from the Palatinate of Rus in
the west to the Palatinate of Kiev in the east). Variations
of this name found in various monographs and works include
the following:
Russian(s), Little Russian(s), Ruthenian(s)
and Ukrainian(s). The name Belorusin(s) is applied to that
ethnic group which during the same time inhabited most of
Grand Duchy of Lithuania (excluding the northern palati
nates) . The most common variations of this name are the
following: Byelorussian(s) and White Russian(s).
As used
in this monograph, the noun form Rus refers to the terri
tory inhabited by Rusins; and Belorus to the territory inha
bited by Belorus ins.
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Kievan Rus.

They possessed a distinctive language and

culture, and most of them were Orthodox Christians.
social and military element, known as the Kozaks,

3

The
was also

closely related to and identified with the Rusins.
The origin and development of the Kozaks within the
Polish-Lithuanian state was an organic outcome of the pecu
liar conditions of life along the borders of the steppes in
close proximity to the T a t a r s .

The frontier regions were

virtually unprotected against the lightning strikes of the
Tatar hordes from the northern shores of the Black Sea or
those from Crimea.

The aim of these Tatar raids was not

only to spread destruction by means of fire and sword among
the Christian "infidels", but also to gather plunder and to
sieze human merchandise for the slave markets of Kaffa.
Under these circumstances the settlers of the borderlands
were unable to pursue their normal cultural and economic
activities.

On the whole, their lives and occupations were

radically conditioned by the existence of the Tatar menace.
Left primarily on their own resources, these people learned
3

Kozak and Cossack are synonymous terms.
The former
term is used throughout this monograph.
The West European
form, Cossack, according to Barthold, is the result of
Little Russian (i.e., Ukrainian) and Polish*pronunciation
of the Turkish word Kaza k , which means robber, disturber of
peace and adventurer.
See W. Barthold, "Kazak", Encyclo
paedia of Islam, II (1927), 836.
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4

how to live with a sword by imitating their enemies.

From

the Tatars they adopted their way of life, methods of waging
war, distinctive dress and even their name —

Kozaks.

4

In this way began the evolution of a distinctive
group of people within the Commonwealth.

Already at the

close of the fifteenth century the Kozaks formed certain
types of "hordes", which differed little from the hordes of
their deadly Tatar enemies.

Throughout the sixteenth cen

tury this process of evolution continued, and it was chara
cterized by the coalescence of multifarious social and
ethnic elements.

By the beginning of the seventeenth cen

tury, due to the rapid increase in the numbers of the
Kozaks, their social and ethnic backgrounds still resem
bled a mosaic.

Notwithstanding this development, the

Kozaks as a whole were at this time established as a defi
nite class of unique military freemen, and the Rusin
element became the dominant ethnic strain among them.

5

^See Aleksander Jablonowski, Pisma Aleksandra Jablonowskiego [The Works of Aleksander Jablonowski] , 7 vols
(Warsaw; E. Wende, 1910), II, 12-13.
5

See Wladyslaw Tomkiewicz, "O skladzie spolecznym l
etnicznym Kozaczyzny Ukrainnej na przelomie XVI i XVII
wieku" [On the Social and the Ethnic Composition of the
Kozaks of Ukraine at the Turn of the XVI and on the Begin
ning of the XVII Centuries], Przeglad Historyczny [Histo
rical Review], XXXVI (no. 1, 1948), 249-60.
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5

The shifting boundaries and the political instabi
lity of the borderlands freed the Kozaks from the respon
sibilities and restraints borne by the burgesses and the
serfs.

The majority of these Kozaks had no permanent

homes or avocations.
the towns of Ukraine.

Some of them found seasonal work in
Others used the steppe "wilderness"

for various occupations: fishing, hunting, trapping, bee
keeping and the like.

Still others were engaged in steppe

trade, or became, after a Tatar fashion, wild steppe herds
men.

With the approach of w i n t e r , these men gathered the

fruits of their labour, returned to the inhabited areas of
Ukraine and settled in various towns, particularly in
those towns close to the steppes.
But the "Kozaks'
such peaceful pursuits.

life" was not limited only to
Adventurous men formed bands and

took part in various exploits: attacks on Tatar herdsmen
and seizure of their flocks of sheep and herds of cattle or
horses.

They robbed Armenian and Turkish caravans and

carried out military expeditions against the Tatars by land.
They also plundered Muslim towns, freed Christians from
the slavery of the "infidels", and destroyed Turkish
galleys during their sea-raids on the Crimean coasts and
on the shores of Asia Minor.
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These Kozak military freemen formed an anomalous
fourth class within the social structure of the PolishLithuanian state.

The nobles, burgesses and serfs cons

tituted the only three legally-recognized social classes
of the Commonwealth.

For the time being,, the Common

wealth's government simply tolerated the existence and
growth of this Kozak anomaly, and left its status undefined
and uncertain.

The primary concern of the government was

to curb the activities of the Kozaks.

Since the govern

mental policies made for this purpose were often charac
terized by curious indecisiveness, lack of initiative and
imagination, the control of the Kozaks proved to be a
matter of extreme difficulty.

Furthermore, by neglecting

the affairs and the needs of the far-removed frontier
regions, the government not only made possible for the
anomalous Kozak military class to exist and to develop, but
also by its inertia helped to create grave problems for
the Commonwealth.
By handling the affairs and needs of the farremoved borderlands with certain disinterest, the govern
ment failed to provide for them sound systems of defense
and administration.

The destruction of the Tatar nest in

Crimea was never seriously considered in Warsaw; while the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

7

other alternative, the building of a chain of fortresses
and the stationing of a strong regular array along the
frontier, was thought to be too costly.

The government

was content more or less to abandon the claims to the
lower Dnieper region and to leave it to the contest of
arms between the Kozaks and the Tatars.

It was also satis

fied with the existing arrangement, whereby the defense and
the administration of the border areas was left almost
totally in the hands of royal officials known as sheriffs.
Since the government supplied insufficient funds and
troops to them, these officials were charged with a herculean task.

In order to forestall cr to retalliate A the

frequent Tatar incursions, the sheriffs had no choice but
to thrust the burdens of defense upon the local population
and to call the Kozaks to the colours.

Certain warlike

sheriffs also enlisted the Kozaks into their own contin
gents and for the sake of their own ends, carried out
military "expeditions" into the Muslim world.
Since these officials were in a position to obey
orders from Warsaw phlegmatically, or to ignore them
completely, their administration was characterized by fre
quent disorder.

Under these circumstances, the frontier

areas were open to the Tatar raids and were kept continually
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aflame by guerilla warfare; their administration was
chaotic; and the authority of the government in them, was
also non-existent.

By leaving the borderlands without

sound systems of defense and administration, the govern
ment not only provided for the Kozaks a firm basis for the
existence, but also created for them ideal conditions for
their development and growth.

The colonization policy of

the government was still another factor which contributed
to this evolutionary process of the Kozaks.

Furthermore,

it was also largely responsible for making the Kozaks
become a problem for the Commonwealth.
Prior to 1569, as long as Ukraine belonged to the
Grand Duchy of Lithuania, no outsiders had the right to
acquire landed estates there.

This obstacle was abolished

when the south-eastern territories were incorporated with
the Crown.

Thus, soon after the Union of Lublin took

place, Ukraine, "the promised land" which "flowed with
[ rivers of] milk and hon e y " ,
Polish and Rusin lords.

became the spoil of great

With little guidance and restriction

As described by the sixteenth-century French traveller,
Blaise de Vigenere, in L a description du Royaume de Pologne
(Paris, 1573).
Cited by Leszek Podhorodecki, Sicz Zaporoska
[ Zaporozhian Sich]
(Warsaw: Ksiazka i Wiedza, 1960),
p. 5.
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from the government, these magnates soon carved out the
south-eastern palatinates into immense 1atifundiae.

In

securing land monopoly, the new owners also gained control
of the highest administrative offices.

Furthermore, they

introduced serfdom in a land without a landlord, and their
swarms of rapacious officials began a system of economic
exploitation.

Since the Kozaks presented a problem not

only to the expansionist policies of these "kinglets", but
also to the system of manorialism in general, these poten
tates attempted to reduce the Kozaks into serfs.

In this

way, apart from the Tatars, the Kozaks encountered a new
brand of enemies in the borderlands, who threatened to
destroy their status of military freemen.

The Kozaks had

little choice but to oppose the new order.
Even though the officials accused the Kozaks of
"unsubmissiveness and rebellion", or called them "disobe
dient", this did not mean lawlessness in all cases.

Some

of the Kozaks preferred the shelter of the borderland for
tresses.

They attempted to gain the rights of the landed

gentry and to free themselves from the jurisdiction of
sheriffs and their deputies.

Living side by side with

Polish or Rusin petty gentry, these Kozaks fared as well as
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these neighbours of theirs who possessed coat-of-arms.
These petty squires frequently tilled the soil with their
own hands and suffered,

just like the Kozaks, under the

heavy hands of the officials.

If an oligarch showed desire

for their land, he was in a position to acquire it either
by "law" or by "lawlessness".

Because of all of these

circumstances, the Kozaks cared little for the honours of
ennoblement.
On the other hand, the Kozak malcontents who pre
ferred to face the extremes of climate and Tatar danger,
rather than to bear the ever-increasing impositions thrust
upon them by the authorities, fled to Zaporozhe.

There

they established themselves as a military-monastic community.
Operating from their fortified island camp -- Sich —
beyond the rapids of the Dnieper, they feared neither the
threats of the Crimean Khan and the Turkish sultan, nor
obeyed the fiats of the Polish king.

The Sich, formed as

a reaction to the borderland officials and the Tatar
danger, became the centre for all dissatisfied elements.
This illegal "commonwealth" produced warriors who not
only dared to take up arms against their suzerain, but who
also carried out fantastic land and sea exploits in the
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Muslim world.
Both the governments of the Commonwealth and of the
Ottoman Empire sought to reduce the power and the
attraction of the Sich.

The former could not ignore the

activities of an illegal "state", which hatched rebels,
received foreign envoys, formed alliances and carried out
fire and sword into the neighbouring countries.

To the

latter, the Sich was a nest of pirates, who plundered and
destroyed its Anatolian and Crimean possessions.

But

neither’ of the two powers was able to destroy the Sich
completely.

The Zaporosliian "knights" had no problem in

f
finding recruits to fill their ranks.

To them came adven

turous men, outcasts of society and those who thirsted
glory and feats of arms.

There were also mass flights of

fugitive serfs who searched for the Kozak fairyland.
Following each campaign of the Zaporozhians, the
High Porte issued threats of war to the Commonwealth.
7
See [Mustafa] Naima, "Zatargi z Ottomanami z powodu
Kozakow i Dziennik Wyprawy Chocimskiey z Rocznikow Naima
Efendi" [Conflicts with the Ottomans on Account of the
Kozaks and the Journal of the Khotyn Campaign from the
Annals of Naima Effendi] , in J. J. S. Sekowski, ed. and
t r ., Collectanea z Dziejopisow Tureckich Rzeczy do Historyi
Polskiey Sluzacych [Collectanea of Events from Turkish
Historiographers Pertaining to Polish History], 2 vols
(Warsaw, 1824), I, 126-27, 177-82.
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Ultimatums sent from Constantinopole to Warsaw left two
choices: the Kozaks as a military organization, must be
destroyed, or the Kozak piratical habits must be effec
tively curbed.

The predicament of the Commonwealth became

a "very hard knar, a knot strangely twisted", for which it
required "not the sword of Alexander the Great . . . but
g
the wisdorft of Solomon".

The main reason for this diffi

culty was in the fact that the Commonwealth had no desire
to become involved in an armed confrontation with the
Muslim world; yet, it was in no position to carry out the
demands sent from Constantinopole.
destroy the Kozaks —

On the one hand, to

even if that was possible —

for the

sake of pleasing the infidels, also meant to destroy the
only real defense against the Tatars.

On the other, all

efforts to subordinate the Kozaks failed to produce results.
The steps taken thereafter by the government of
the Commonwealth amounted only to a series of inconsistent
policies, which had the effect of actually intensifying
g

Evaluation of the Kozak problem by Krzysztof Palczowski in his pamphlet 0 Kozakach, jezeli ich zniesc, czyli
nie — Discurs
[On the Kozaks: Should they or should they
not be done away with? A Discourse] (Krakow, 1618).
Cited
by Jablonowski, op. c i t ., II, 200.
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the difficulties of the state.

On the one hand, the Tatar

raids of the borderlands were considered by the government
as an unavoidable evil for which there existed no solution.
The government1s envoys were instructed to make formal
protests before the sultan, even though i't was common
knowledge that these fell on deaf ears.

The Khan of Crimea

was bought off by the payment of "presents", a thinlydisguised humiliating tribute.

Solemn pledges of friend

ship were renewed with the sultan and his vassal, and
assurances were given to them that all Kozak offenders
would be suitably punished.
futile.

Such policies proved to be

Since the Zaporozhians were out of the reach of

the government, their piratical sea-raids continued.

The

"presents" also failed to stop the incessant Tatar depre
dations .
On the other hand, equally futile were the steps
taken by the government to bring the Kozaks under discip
line.

Given a definite status and organization, the

Kozaks could have brought incalculable advantages to the
Commonwealth.

As excellent soldiers and sailors, the

Kozaks could have extended the boundaries of the PolishLithuanian state to the shores of the Black Sea and
protected them against the Tatars and th j Turks:

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

14

The Counsels of Poland were in’ a great errour,
when they resolved to change the life, and alter
the humour of the warlike people, which being
protected by their Priviledges, and encouraged in
their Wars, would at all times, as occasion served,
have been ready to have ejected great numbers of
good souldiers into the Ottoman Territories, and
might have conserved to balance the Ppwer of the
Tatars, which now daily infest and ruine the Borders
of Poland. These people were like ill humors, which
being vomited out into the Dominions of the Turk,
eased and made healthy the Body politick of Poland;
but being conserved within the stomach, caused
Syncopes, Convulsions, and such Commotions, as have of
late years shaken the whole Body of the Polish Kingdom.
The government of the Commonwealth, however, failed
to recognize such a positive significance of the Kozaks to
the state.

Under the pressure of the magnates the govern

ment pursued a blind course of action, by seeking to
repress and to reduce the Kozaks to the status of serfs.
Since it was still unable to cope with Kozak power, it
resorted to various short-term measures.

These measures,

often contradictory, were in most cases never executed.
They also served as a source which nurtured the warlike
characteristics of the Kozaks.

The overall result of these

actions of the government was that it only succeeded in
alienating the Kozaks and caused them to rebel.

^P. Rycaut, The History etc
(Italics in the original).

(London, 1680) , [1] , p. 68.
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II
One of the ways by which the government attempted
to bring the Kozaks under its control was the establish
ment of the registered Kozaks.

Although this was a step

in the right direction, it was too inadequate to solve
the overall Kozak problem or even to subordinate all Kozaks
under the authority of the government.
The Kozak register accentuated the divisions of the
Kozaks into camps of opposing interests, and caused anta
gonisms and conflicts between them.

However, the advent

of the register brought about the clearer emergence of
three general groups:
Zaporozhian outlaws;

the loyal registered Kozaks; the

and the mass of common Kozaks, who

gravitated between the two extremes.

Even though this rift

among the Kozaks was advantageous to the government, its
frequent contradictory policies minimized the successful
use of the stratagem of divide et impera.
The registered Kozaks were in a far more advan
tageous position than the Zaporozhians or the common Kozaks.
From a small percentage of Kozaks the register created
officially-recognized Kozak regulars -- His Royal Majesty's
Zaporozhian Army.

This Kozak Army was divided into
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regiments and attached to designated towns of Ukraine.

The

main tasks of the registered Kozaks were to keep order in
Ukraine, to prevent the sea-raids of their Zaporozhian
brethern and to protect the frontier against the Tatar in
roads .
Because the registered Kozaks performed military
service for the state, the government granted them certain
privileges.

These were the basis for the evolution, espe

cially among the officer-class, of a Kozak "aristocracy",
or a comparatively wealthy military elite.

Their views on

property were the same as those of the privileged classes
t

of the Commonwealth.

Since the vacancies in the Kozak

register were rigidly controlled and restricted to persons
whose loyalty was beyond question, the registered Kozaks
were thereby inclined to favour the established order and
to live on good terms with the authorities.
The basis for the legal status of the registered
Kozaks within the Commonwealth rested on their "rights and
privileges" which were recognized by the government.

No

such basis existed for the clear definition of the legal
status of the vast majority of the non-registered, or
common Kozaks.

Yet, these common Kozaks not only regarded

themselves as f'reemen, but in many cases also claimed the
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privileged status of the registered Kozaks as their own.
The main reason for this development was the failure of
the government to define clearly their status.
The common Kozaks who lived in
Ukraine, were bound by the impositions

the border areas of
of serfdom if they

settled on private estates of the nobles.
burdens existed for them if they chose
lands.

But no such

to live on crown

Thus, as the government sought to subject all the

common Kozaks to all the l a w s ,regulations and customs that
were imposed on the serfs at the same time, it also acknow
ledged that these Kozaks were freemen.

These contradictory

governmental policies caused the common Kozaks to vacilliate between law and lawlessness.
Even the legal status of those Kozaks who were
enticed into the Sich was not clearly defined.

On the one

hemd, the government regarded those Kozaks who lived out
side the pale of the law more or less as fugitive serfs,
who must be suppressed and whose servile status must be
re-established.

On the other hand, the government freque

ntly looked upon these Kozaks as a collection of dregs from
various countries, and who were not even the subjects of
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the King of P o l a n d . ^
The registered Kozaks were unable to carry out
their duties, not only because they lacked sufficient
strength, but also because the government failed to give
them its full support.

Only a small force of the regis

tered Kozaks was kept by the government; therefore, in
addition, it was forced to enlist common Kozaks whenever a
war broke out.

On occasions, even some of the Zaporozhians

were "rehabilitated" and induced to serve alongside the
registered Kozaks.

In this way thousands of Kozaks and

Zaporozhians could find their way into the elite of the
Kozak Army.

Once a campaign ended, however, the same

thousands were expected to return to "peaceful" occupations.
Such governmental practices resulted in the loss of
prestige associated with the register and in the under
mining of the authority of the registered Kozaks.

The

common Kozaks were provided with an opportunity to clamour
for the "rights and privileges" enjoyed by the registered
Kozaks.

By enlisting the Zaporozhians the government also

gave a kind of silent approval of the illegal activities

■^See M. Hrushevskyi, Istoriia Ukrainy-Rusy, 10 vols
(New York, 1956)^11,325; and Tomkiewicz, op. c i t . , pp.
255-57.
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and independent actions carried out by those remaining at
Zaporozhe.

In this way, the frequent governmental rever

sals of policy degraded the registered Kozaks, provided
the basis for the claims of the common Kozaks and enhanced
the power of the lawless elements represented by the S i c h .
Various other contradictory policies of the govern
ment, as well as the malversations ot its officials, under
mined the loyalty of the registered Kozaks, erased sharp
distinctions among all Kozaks and made possible greater
co-operation among them.

The chronic lack of funds in the

exchequer meant that the registered Koz aks were frequently
C

not paid for their services.

For this reason many of them

fell under the spell of the S i c h , and together with the
Zaporozhians, endeavoured to find plunder in the Ottoman
Empire.

In the same way, the too frequent reductions of

the quota of the registered Kozaks and the rapacity of the
officials, drove others to support the causes of their mal
content brethern during rebellions.

In 1638, when the

government abolished most of the rights and privileges of
the Kozak Army, it succeeded in completely alienating the
registered Kozaks, and thereby set the stage for the hos
tilities of a decade later.
Both the government and the vast majority of the
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nobles underestimated the role and the value of the Kozaks
as a whole to the Commonwealth.

The Kozaks were tolerated

by the ruling class because it was neither able to find a
suitable place for them within the organism of the state,
to bring them under discipline, to crush their power com
pletely, nor to reduce them to the status of serfs.
Because of these circumstances, the Kozaks were able to
continue their existence and growth as an anomalous fourth
stratum within the three legally-recognized social strata
of the Commonwealth.
The Kozaks constituted a definite class of freemen.
Since the Kozaks had no political rights and could hold no
public office, they did not enjoy the rights and privileges
of the nobles.

However, by the fact that they possessed

personal rights, could own land and were free from many of
the restrictions and obligations borne by the burgesses and
the serfs of the Commonwealth, the Kozaks thereby somewhat
resembled the privileged status of the nobles.

The Kozaks

also considered themselves to be "men of knightly ran k " ,
even though this distinction legally belonged only to the
nobles.

The Kozak claims to knighthood were never offi

cially confirmed by the government.

Nevertheless, on

occasions when the Kozak services were needed for war, writs
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issued by the royal chancery to the Kozaks frequently
stressed their knightly characteristics.

Furthermore, the

same writs addressed the Kozaks by titles only proper to
the nobility

The Kozaks therefore resembled in many

ways the status of nobles, the highest estate of the
Commonwealth.
One of the most obvious solutions for the overall
Kozak problem was the extension of all the rights of the
nobles to the Kozaks.

The nobles, however, were decidedly

opposed to any plan by which they would have to share their
"golden liberties" with the Kozaks.

This very issue was

raised at the Convocation Diet of 1632.

The delegates of

the Kozak Army argued, that as men of knightly rank the
Kozaks formed part of the Commonwealth's body politic, and
as such they should have the right to participate in the
election of a new king.

Since this was a demand for politi

cal rights, the representatives of the Commonwealth's
ruling class found no reason to initiate any dangerous pre
cedents.

The Senate issued a statement to the effect that

the Kozaks were simply commoners and had no right to make

■^See K. Szajnocha, Dwa lata dziejow naszych 1646.
1 6 4 8 ., 2 vols (Warsaw, 1900), I, 1, 62-64; and Tomkiewicz,
op. cit., p. 253.
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such demands.

The Chamber of Deputies acknowledged that

the Kozaks were part of the Commonwealth's body —

but only

as hair and nails which had to be cut off if they grew too
long.

12

Thus ended this far-reaching Kozak proposal which

aimed to transform the Kozaks into a stratum equal to that
of the nobility.
By rejecting the plan which would extend political
rights to the Kozaks, the government failed once again to
take advantage of a possible solution to the pressing
Kozak problem and also created more difficulties for it
self.

One serious consequence of the governmental failure

to settle the Kozak affairs was the entanglement of the
already thorny Kozak problem with the grievances and the
aspirations of the Rusin people.

As a result of this

development, the government was unable to deal with the
Kozak problem solely on the basis of satisfying the
interests of the Kozaks alone.
The Kozaks were not an isolated class of people,
but an integral part of the Rusin society.

The Kozaks

12

See Zbigniew Wojcik, Dzikie Pola w o g n i u . 0 Kozaczyznie w dawnej Rzeczypospolitej
[Wild Plains in Flames.
On the Kozaks of the Old Commonwealth] , 2nd ed (Warsaw;
Wiedza Powszechna, 1961), pp. 114-15; and Hrushevskyi,
op. c i t ., VIII, 1, 150-51.
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thereby not only expressed the desires of the "dissatis
fied" Rusin elements within their ranks.

They also shared

the aspirations of all the Rusin people.

Among all these

aspirations, those affecting the Rusin Orthodox faith were
extremely significant.

Orthodoxy provided a common cause

for all the Rusin people and thereby was able to foster
Rusin nationalism.

In this way the Kozaks were drawn into

the crucial religious struggle between the Orthodox and the
Uniates within the Commonwealth.

Ill
The religious conflict between the Orthodox and
the Uniate Churches began following the Union of Brest.

In

1596 a church council was summoned to Brest-Litovsk to pro
claim the union of the Commonwealth's Orthodox Church with
Rome.

The church union was supported by a majority of the

Orthodox hierarchy, including the Metropolitan of Kiev.
Two bishops, together with a large number of delegates from
the monasteries and the parish clergy, as well as with
representatives of the laity, desired to remain members of
the Orthodox Church.

The two sides among the Orthodox

failed to reach an agreement on the question of union, and
concluded their deliberations by excommunicating and
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anathematizing each other.
Only the decisions of the Roman party at the
Council of Brest were recognized by the government.

There

fore, it sanctioned the existence of the new Uniate Church,
making it the sole representative Of all the Orthodox
Rusin and Belorusin people, and treated the Orthodox Church
as legally non-existent.

The result of this governmental

policy was' the persecution of the Orthodox: churches ,
monasteries and church lands were siezed and given to the
Uriiates; church services were suppressed; and many of those
who remained Orthodox lost their civil and political
rights
Twenty-five years after the Union of Brest the
Uniate Church possessed twice the number of churches the
Orthodox Church had; yet, according to a report of a papal
nuncio, the Unrate Church remained "almost without fold".
Thus, an absurd situation evolved and prevailed:

14

the

13

See the speech of the Orthodox deputy from Volynia,
Lcivrentyi Drevynskyi, at the Diet of 1620, in Hrushevskyi,
op. c i t ., VII, 445-47.
■^Instruction to Msgr. Lancellotti (1622). Cited by
Jozef Tretiak, Historja wojny chocimskiej (1621) [History
of the Khotyn War (1621)] , new rev. ed. (Krakow: Krakowska
Spolka Wydawnicza, 1921), p. 85.
*
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Uniates had a hierarchy, many empty churches and a small
flock of faithful; while the Orthodox "Schismatics" had
one bishop, very few churches and a countless number of the
faithful.
It was through the actions of these faithful that
the Orthodox Church managed to respond to the challenges
of its Uniate rival.

Although the Eastern Church was

abandoned by most of the Rusin aristocracy, it found other
able leaders in its monasteries and in the ranks of its
vigorous laity, chiefly composed of lesser Rusin nobles
and of Rusin burgesses.

They prevented the Orthodox Church

from falling into a deeper state of degeneration and its
ecclesiastical affairs from becoming more disorganized.
They took up the challenge of its regeneration.

The Rusin

serfs only played a passive role by being tenaciously
attached to their traditional faith.

The incalculable

contributions of still one more segment of the Rusin
society, the Kozaks, made possible for the Orthodox Church
to redouble its missionary activities and to organize its
own defense in depth against all "Latinist encroachments".
The Kozaks were not always the staunch supporters
of Orthodoxy or the irreconcilable enemies of Uniatism.
Even as late as the close of the sixteenth century their
.4
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religiousness could only be measured by the antithesis
with the world of Islam.

15

Many Kozaks paid little

attention to the solemn pronouncements at the Council of
Brest.

They were unconcerned about the religious polemics

between the Orthodox and the Uniates and even about the
plight of the Orthodox Church.

For this reason they were

considered to be men "without religion" and religious
"rebels" even by the most enlightened representatives of
the Eastern C h u r c h . ^

Nevertheless, by the second decade

of the seventeenth century the Kozaks as a whole assumed
an active role in the affairs of the Orthodox Church.

One

I
factor responsible for this change of direction was the
revival of the influence of Kiev, which attracted Kozak
support.

Another major reason why the Kozaks began to

support the Orthodox Church was because in their ranks were
found many Rusins who experienced persecution for their
faith.
15

See Jablonowski, op. c i t ., II, 23.

•'■^These were the opinions of the Orthodox magnate, Adam
Kysil, and the Orthodox Metropolitan Bishop of Kiev, Petro
Mohyla.
According to the views of the Ukrainian historian
P.A. Kulish, the role of the Kozaks in religious matters was
negligible.
He remarked that their part in religious affairs
differed little from that of the bandits of all times and of
all nations.
See Jablonowski, op. cit . , II, 37, 101.
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From 1610, when the Kozaks made the first major
public manifestation of their support for the Orthodox
Church, they continued to play a vital role in the church
affairs.

The Kozaks helped to restore the Orthodox hier

archy and thereby secured the continuity of the life of
the church.

They acted as arbitrators between the quarrel

ling Orthodox factions; they cooperated with the Orthodox
clergy, nobles and burgesses and championed before the
government for the rights of the Eastern Church; and they
were prepared to draw their swords in defense of their
faith.

Because of their protection Kiev became the center

from which radiated Rusin cultural, religious and national
life.

17

The Kozaks were therefore no longer mere adven

turers, but doughty exponents and preservers of the
traditions of the Kievan Rus:
[The Kozaks] are the sons of the glorious Rusin people,
from the seed of Japheth, who waged war against the
Greek Tsardom [i.e., Byzantium] both on the Black Sea
and on the land. This host is [ a descendant] of that
generation which during |the reign of] Oleh, the
Rusin monarch, . . . attacked Constantinopole.
They
[are the descendants of those, who] during [the
reign of] Volodymyr, the sainted Rusin monarch, waged
17

x,See W. L i p m s k i , Stanislaw Michal Krzyczewski etc
(Krakow, 1912), pp. 46-54.
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war against Greece, Macedonia and Illyria.
Their
ancestors, together with Volodymyr, were baptized,
accepting the Christian faith from the Church of
Constantinopole, and even to this day are born,
live and die in this faith.
Because the Kozaks were so involved in the affairs
of the Orthodox Church, they were partly responsible for
its gains in 1632 from the newly-elected King Wladyslaw
IV.

One of the most significant concessions to the Ortho

dox was the legalization of their hierarchy and the desig
nation for it a number of episcopal sees.

In the years that

followed the Orthodox Metropolitan of Kiev, Petro Mohyla,
a prelate of high birth, superior character and great
I
learning, inaugurated a period of rapid growth for the
Orthodox Church.

Even under these circumstances its free

development was hampered by various restrictions.
Some of the Orthodox faithful considered that they
suffered greater oppression than the Orthodox Christians
under Islam, because their churches have been taken over
by the Uniates; they did not have the freedom of worship;
and because they were denied sacraments and even public
burials.

Other intolerable conditions included the leasing

of the Orthodox churches to the J e w s , who collected fees

•^Memorandum of the Orthodox hierarchy to the Common
wealth's goverrnent in 1620.
Cited by Hrushevskyi, op. c i t . ,
VII, 3 91.
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for batisms, marriages, and even for opening of the churches
on Sundays and holy days.

19

Under these circumstances, all

efforts to create a meaningful union of churches within
the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth failed to produce
results.

20

"The union", wrote the Lithuanian Chancellor to

the Uniate Archbishop of Polatsk, "has not produced joy,
but only discord, quarrels and disturbances.

It would

•^Travelling through Ukraine in the 1650's the Arch
deacon Paul of Aleppo, no doubt reflected the typical
Orthodox attitude, when he wrote in his diary:
[The
accursed Poles] have shewn themselves more debased and
wicked than the corrupt worshippers of idols, by their
cjruel conduct to Christians, thinking to abolish the very
name of Orthodox.
God perpetuate the Empire of the Turks
for ever and ever! for they take their impost, and enter
into no account of religion, be their subject Christians or
Nazarines, Jews or Samarians: Whereas these accursed Poles
were not content with taxes and tithes from the brethern of
Christ, though willing to serve them; but, . . . they sub
jected them to the authority of the enemies of Christ, the
tyrannical. J e w s , who did not even permit them to build
churches, nor leave them any Priests that knew the mysteries
of their faith; but, on the contrary, violated their wives
and daughters, if they at all appeared abroad in the public
exercise of their religion".
Paul of Aleppo, The Travels
etc., 2 vols (London, 1831), 1, 2, 165.
70

.

King Wladyslaw IV endeavoured to create, m place of
the Union of Brest, a lasting union of churches.
One of his
far-reaching plans was to affect a religious compromise
between the Orthodox and the Uniates and to create for them
a separate patriarchate within the Commonwealth.
On the
background and issues see Mikolaj Andrusiak, "Sprawa patryjarchatu kijowskiego za Wladyslawa IV " [The Question of the
Kievan Patriarchate During the Reign of Wladyslaw IV], in
Prace historyczne etc (Lviv, 1934), 269-85.
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have been better if it never existed".
The results of the overall religious struggle between
the Orthodox and the Uniates and the persecution of the
Orthodox faithful were extremely significant.

Those who

attached the Orthodox Church were actually contributing to
the solidification of all segments of the Rusin society.
The cultural, social and ethnic cleavages, which existed
between Polish or Polonized ruling class and the majority
of the Rusin people, were further deepened b y religious
differences.

The religious cleavage caused a pronounced

Polish-Rusin antithesis.

The attempts to force Uniatism

on the Orthodox Rusin population awakened its national
consciousness and hastened the formation of the Rusin
nationality.
Since the religious and the national aspirations of
the Rusins were fused with the Kozak problem, the Kozaks
became the representatives of the Rusin society as a whole.
In the Kozak ranks one definitely found Rusin nobles, bur
gesses and serfs; and on the whole the Kozaks received
support of the Orthodox clergy.

Furthermore, through the

21L. Sapieha's letter to I. Kuntsevych, Warsaw, April
13, 1622.
Cited by Valerian Krasinski, Sketch of the Reli
gious History of the Slavonic Nations, 2nd ed (Edinburgh,
1851), p. 205.
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Kozaks —

these heirs of the Kievan Rus, the armed represen

tatives of the Rusin people and the faithful members of the
Orthodox Church —

the most enlightened Rusin circles

attempted to re-establish the severed political and national
traditions of the old Kievan state.

T h u s 'cemented, the

"alliance" of the Kozaks with the Orthodox Church posed new
problems for the Commonwealth.
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CHAPTER II

THE NEW STATUS OF THE KOZAKS, AND THE OPPRESSED CONDITION
OF THE KOZAKS AND OF THE RUSIN PEOPLE IN THE COMMONWEALTH,
1638-1648

I
The repercussion of the Kozak "alliance" with the
Orthodox Church was felt by the Commonwealth both in its
foreign relations and in its domestic affairs.

Religious

conflicts within the Commonwealth provided the Ottoman
Empire and Muscovy, as well as other powers, with opporI
tunities to agitate the Kozaks and the Orthodox in order to
carry out their own designs.'*'

For this purpose the High

Porte used various high-ranking Orthodox clergymen, or
simply ordered its pawn, the Patriarch of Constantinopole,
to follow its bidding.

Even though the Patriarch of

Constantinopole, who exercised jurisdiction over the
Commonwealth's Orthodox faithful, was physically the subject
of the Turkish sultan, he was spiritually the subject of
%

■^This aspect is well treated in Franciszek Suwara,
Przyczyny i skutki kleski cecorskiej 1620 r [Causes and
Effects of the Defeat at Tsetsora in 1620] (Krakow:
Gebethner and Wolff, 1930).
32
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the Muscovite tsar.

2

Since the Patriarch of Moscow was

also becoming the instrument of the tsar, and since the
Muscovite Patriarchate served as a magnet for the whole
Orthodox world, the influence of Muscovy was much more
dangerous for the Commonwealth.
The Commonwealth's government used various means to
counteract the influences of these hostile powers.
placed high hopes in the Union of Brest.

It

The religious

Union of Brest would both supplement the political Union
of Lublin, and would create more stable foundations for
the coexistence of all four main ethnic groups within the
I
Commonwealth — Poles, Lithuanians, Busins and Belorusins.
These expectations of the government failed to materialize.
The religious union damaged the political union.
It also created a deeper rift between the Roman Catholic
Poles and Lithuanians, and the Orthodox Rusins and Belo
rusins.

Furthermore, during the religious conflicts

between the Orthodox and the Uniates, the Kozaks became a
formidable weapon of the Eastern Church.

Under the

direction of the Orthodox clergy the Kozaks began to
2

See Wladyslaw Konopczynski., Dzieje Polski nowozytnej
[History of Modern Poland] , 2 v o l s . , 2nd ed (London:
B.
Swiderski, 1958), I, 190.
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gravitate closer to Muscovy.

Both, the clergy and the

Kozaks began to send their representatives to Moscow and
appealed to the Orthodox tsar to extend his protection over
them and over the persecuted Orthodox within the Common
wealth .^
These contacts facilitated for Muscovy the attain
ment of its religious and political aims at the expense of
the Commonwealth.

On the one hand, Moscow, the "Third

Rome", could carry out its messianic role of dispensing
Orthodoxy throughout the Commonwealth.

On the other hand,

Muscovy was provided with an opportunity to fulfill the
"testament" of Tsar Ivan I "Kalita" -- to consolidate all
lands of the Kievan Rus which were part of the Common
wealth .
The involvement of the Kozaks into the religious
conflicts on the side of the Orthodox Church also caused
serious domestic problems for the Commonwealth.

By the

1630's the Kozak rebellions became more frequent than in
former years.

One of the main reasons for this

3
See K. G. Guslistyi, "Istoricheskxe sviazx Ukraxny s
Rossiei do osvoboditelnoi voiny 1648-1654 gg" [ Historical
Ties of Ukraine with Russia Prior to the 1648-1654 War of
Liberation], in A. I. Baranovich et a l . ed s ., Vossoedinenie etc (Moscow, 1954), pp. 36-41.
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development was in the fact that the Kozaks made good use
of their "alliance" with the Orthodox Church.

In order to

secure more support from the Orthodox people during their
rebellions, the Kozaks began to use religious slogans.
Typical of such slogans were those used by the Kozaks their
rebellions of 1637 and 1638.

In their proclamations, the

Kozak rebels claimed of taking up arms, not only in the
defense of their "golden liberties", but also in the
4
defense of their "Christian faith".
Such Kozak slogans as "against these adversaries of
our Greek [ Orthodox]
a whole into action.

faith"

5

stirred the Rusin society as

These calls were answered by Ortho

dox priests, monks and even n u n s , who then fomented revolt
among the Rusins.

Both the burgesses and the nobles of

"Greek [Orthodox] faith" provided war materials to the
Kozaks and participated in the rebellions.

The Rusin serfs

needed little encouragement to rise against "their own

^Manifesto of Pavliuk But to the Kozaks, Moshny,
December 15, 1637, in Szymon Okolski, Dyaryusz transackcyi
wojennej mledzy wojskiem koronnem i zaporoskiem w r. 1637
[ i w r . 1638] [A Diary of the Hostilities Between Crown and
Zaporozhian Armies in 1637 and 1638], ed. K. J. Turowski
(Krakow, 1858), pp. 46-47.
5
Manifestoes of Karpo Pavlovych Skydan to the Kozaks,
Chyhyryn, October 24, 1637; and Moshny, November 29, 1637,
in ibid., pp. 26-27.
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lords .

Furthermore, the Kozak rebels renewed their

contacts with Muscovy: they petitioned the tsar to become
their sovereign and to permit the Don Kozaks to aid them.^
Since the Kozaks succeeded, time after time, in
7

inciting "nearly all of Ukraine to rebellion",

the Common

wealth's government sanctioned severe measures against them.
Thus, in 1630 Crown Grand Hetman Stanislaw Koniecpolski
called on the loyal gentry of Ukraine "to extinguish [this
fire of revolt] with the blood of these serfs'1.^

In 1637

Koniecpolski permitted the officials to vent their fury on
the wives and children of the "scoundrels" who eluded
capture,

and even to raze their homes.

He reasoned that

it was "more preferable for nettle to grow on such sites,
than to have the traitors of His Royal Majesty and of the
9
Commonwealth multiply there".

To King Wladyslaw IV the

Kozak "lawlessness" merited "only that it be extirpated

6Ibid., pp. 14-15, 90.
7Instruction of King Zygmunt III for the Diet of 1631,
Warsaw, January 19, 1631, in Vossoedinenie Ukrainy etc., 3
vols (Moscow, 1954), I, 96.
g
Manifesto of S. Koniecpolski to the nobles of Volynia,
Bar, April 7, 1630, in ibid., I, 80.
^Manifesto of S. Koniecpolski to the officials of
Ukraine, Bar, September 3, 1637, in Okolski, op. c i t .,
p. 14.
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10
with the sword and every severity".
The Crown Army and the private armies of the
"kinglets" followed these guides and managed to suppress
all rebellions.

On the wake of the quellings came the

bloody "pacification" of Ukraine and the confiscation of
lands belonging to the rebels.

The final act was performed

by the Diet which passed ordinances to keep the rebels
under control.

The same steps were taken after the Kozak

progroms of 1637 and 1638.

At this time, however, the

severe ordinance, unlike all others, which for the most
part were not e x e c u t e d , ^ had the distinction of being the
first one to be brought to a successful conclusion.
The Ordinance of the Registered, Zaporozhian A r m y ,

12
in the service of the Commonwealth,
was the foundation

^Manifesto of King Wladyslaw IV to the officials of
Ukraine, Warsaw, December 1, 1637, in ibid., p. 63
■*"^Such constitutions or ordinances were passed by the
Diets in the years 1590, 1593, 1596, 1601, 1607, 1609, 1611,
1613, 1618, 1619, 1620, 1623, 1624, 1626 (two), 1627, 1628
and 1635.
For the summaries of these ordinances see A. K.
Zeglicki et a l . comps., Inwentarz nowy praw, statutow,
konstytucyi koronnych, y W. X. Litew: Znayduiacych sie w
Szesciu Tomach Voluminis Legum [A New Catalogue of Laws,
Statutes and Constitutions of the Crown and of the Grand
Duchy of Lithuania, Contained in Six Volumes of the
Volumina Legum] (Warsaw, 1754), pp. 257-60.
1p
For the text of this Ordinance of 1638 see Vossoedinenie Ukrainy etc.. I, 255-57.
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upon which rested the whole weight of the "final solution"
to the Commonwealth1s Kozak problem.

Passed by the Diet of

1638, this new Kozak Ordinance was practically a word-forword repetition of Koniecpolski1s earlier memorandum to the
government.

13

It reduced the quota of the registered

Kozaks to 6,000, formed into six regiments.

The former

Kozak "Elder" of the Army was replaced by an appointed
commissioner of gentle birth, an individual of considerable
military experience.

His chief task was to keep strict

discipline among the registered Kozaks and to administer
justice to them.

A special guard detachment was established

for his safety which consisted of non-Kozaks.

Polish or

Rusin nobles who were experienced in military matters and
who proved themselves to be men of "virtue and trust", could
be: appointed as senior-ranking officers in the Kozak Army.
The junior-ranking posts were available to the
Kozaks,

14

but only to those who had no blemish on their

13

See Wladyslaw Tomkiewicz, "Ograniczenie swobod
kozackich w roku 1638" [Restriction of Kozak Liberties in
1638], Kwartalnik Historyczny [Historical Quarterly], XLIV
(no. 1, 1930), 142-44, 146.
14

The only departure from the Ordinance, was the estab
lishment at a later date of the posts of six regimental
adjutants, one for each regiment.
These po^ts were avai
lable to the Kozaks.
See Okolski, op. c i t ., p. 194.
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records of service to the Commonwealth.

All six registered

Kozak regiments were assigned alternating tours of duty at
Zaporozhe.

Their chief task was to guard the frontier

against Tatar incursions.

They were also to prevent all

"lawless men" who would attempt to carry but sea-raids into
the Ottoman dominions.

No Kozaks were to venture into

Zaporozhe without the commissioner1s "passports".

Those

failing to comply with this regulation would be apprehended
and then executed by the "governor" of Kodak fortress.
Koniecpolski1s recommendations dealing with non
military matters were also accepted.

The registered Kozaks

were to suffer no ill-treatment from the civil authorities.
The Kozaks were forbidden to meddle in civil matters even
in those involving their own interests.

If disputes arose

between them, and the burgesses on crown lands , these
disputes were to be settled by both the military and the
civil authorities.

In order to prevent such disputes from

arising, a royal commission would define clearly the
boundaries of Kozak landholdings.
The commission of the Diet which draughted this
Kozak Ordinance added to Koniecpolski's recommendations
three major proposals of its own.

The burgesses were for

bidden to allow their sons to enter Kozak ranks and to give
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their daughters in marriage to Kozaks.

The Kozaks were not

permitted to settle in the more remote areas of Ukraine,
but only in the districts of Cherkasy, Chyhyryn and Korsun
of the Palatinate of Kiev.

The third proposal called for

the restoration of all land, "illegally" possessed by the
Kozaks, to the rightful owners.

The commission hoped that

these restrictions would eventually isolate the registered
Kozaks from their environment, create a separate caste out
of them, and thereby minimize chances of future rebellions.
This Kozak Ordinance a]so introduced two major
changes.

By abolishing the self-government of the Kozak

I
Army, this Ordinance completely altered the Army's chara
cter.

In 1G25 and in 1636 the government attempted to curb

the self-dependence of the Kozak Army, but there was no
governmental attempt to interfere in the Army's internal
organization.

The only exception was the intrusion of the

Crown Grand Hetman, who nominated or approved the appoint
ment of the commander of the Kozak Army.

All other senior

and junior officers were Kozaks who were elected by the
Kozak rank-and-file.
The Kozak Army heretofore was a closed organization
15

See Tomkiewxcz, op. c i t ., p. 146.
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which carried out its own affairs:

it had its own chancery,

court, ordinance officers and adjutants.

The government

provided the Kozaks with pay and uniforms; in return, they
performed military service for the Commonwealth.

Now, the

Ordinance of 1638 brought important innovations, for it
took away from the registered Kozaks the "rights and privi
leges" heretofore de facto possessed by them.
commissioner,

An appointed

a non-Kozak, replaced the elected "Elder" of

the Kozak Army; and all of its senior-ranking posts were
also filled by non-Kozak appointees.

Although the Kozaks

were permitted to hold junior-ranking posts in the Army,
these posts were non-elective and therefore were also
controlled by the Kozaks' superiors.

Finally, the judica

ture and the chancery of the Kozak Army was also
abolished.^
By abolishing the autonomy and the "democracy" of
the Kozak Army, this Ordinance took away from the regis
tered Kozaks their most precious privileges.

They still

possessed certain personal rights, but in reality, these
rights elevated them only a step higher than their enserfed
brethern.

The former Kozak "aristocracy", men who
I

l^See ibid., pp. 148-49.
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petitioned for the rights of the nobles in 1632, were now
reduced to common soldiers.

They had neither the personal

liberties, prestige nor the authority of the past y e a r s .
They were separated from their environment, restricted to
live only in certain areas, kept under strict discipline and
cut off from the Kozaks at Zaporozhe.

Under this arrange

ment the government expected to prevent future rebellions,
because neither the serfs would be able to rise without the
leadership of the registered Kozaks, nor the registered
Kozaks without the support of the serfs.

17

The second important change introduced by the
I
Ordinance of 1638 was the abolition of the personal rights
of all non-registered Kozaks.

All Kozaks not in the service

of the Commonwealth were thereby reduced to the status of
serfs.

The opening statement of this Ordinance emphasized

this change:
We deprive them for all times of all of their former
jurisdictions, seniorities, prerogatives, incomings
and other dignities acquired by their faithful service
from our forefathers, but now forfeited through this
rebellion, wishing to have those, whom the fortunes
of war left among the living, as commoners reduced
to serfs.^

-*-^See ibid. , pp. 150-51.
^-^Vossoedinenie Ukrainy etc., I, 255.
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If this new arrangement of the Ordinance of 1638
was to bear fruit, it had to be effectively implemented.
Little effort was spared by government to find men suitable
for such a task.

The appointed officers of the Kozak Army

were men who were guided b y the spirit of vengeance, repres
sion and excesses.

Their frequent acts of malpractice and

malfeasence caused their grip on the registered Kozaks to
become weaker.
At the same time the Kozak serfs were exploited by
the magnates or by their officials.

Both Kozak elements

were degraded, and living under intolerable conditions,
were hardly pacified.

Up to 1638 the government was able

to use, with some success, its policy of divide et impera.
The rift between the registered and common Kozaks was one
of the reasons why the Kozaks were largely unsuccessful
during their rebellions.

The effect of the Ordinance of

1638 was that it erased most of the distinctions which
formerly existed among the Kozaks, and fused them into one
group, making possible united action by them in the
future.
Furthermore, the innovations introduced by this
Ordinance were enforcible only if the Commonwealth
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maintained peace with its neighbours.

Peace enabled it to

dispense with Kozak services and to quarter Crown troops
in Ukraine to keep order among the Kozaks.
war would shatter these arrangements.

An outbreak of

Since the Crown Army

consisted of only some 4,000 men, many Kozak serfs would
have to be recalled to the colours.

They would be given an

opportunity to clamour for their "rights and privileges"
and for the repeal of the intolerable Ordi n a n c e .
Since the regulars would also have to be withdrawn
from the Kozak territories, there was always the possibility
that the remaining Kozak serfs would hatch a rebellion.

It

was therefore in the interest of the ruling class, which
busied itself with the economic exploitation of Ukraine, to
ensure that its times of "golden peace" prevailed.
Most of the nobles believed that the Ordinance of
1638 effectively cauterized the wounds of the decapitated
Kozak "Hydra".

According to their popular saying, the

Kozaks were finally driven to their burrows and there they
would remain.
exist.

19

The anomalous fourth class ceased to

The majority of Kozaks tilled the soil of their

masters' estates as serfs.

The fortress Kodak was

■*-^See K. Szajnocha, Dwa lata dziejow naszych.
1648., 2 vols (Warsaw, 1900), I, 1, 122,

1646.
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rebuilt

20

by the first cataract of the Dnieper and checked

21
both "Kozak lawlessness and Tatar incursions".

It made

possible rapid colonization of the borderlands, enabled the
ruling class to pursue its economic interests and guaranteed
for it the times of "golden peace".

22

Ukraine, formerly

characterized by chaos and violence, now became "as peace23
ful as any town within the Crown".

As far as the nobles

were concerned, the thorny Kozak problem was finally solved.
This proved to be only wishful thinking.

II
The metamorphosis of Kozak "aristocracy" to common

20

Kodak was built m 1635.
In the same year the Kozaks
under the leadership of Ivan Sulyma attacked it and razed
it to the ground.
21

.
Cited
by Aleksander Czolowski, "Kudak,, Przyczynki do
zalozenia i upadku twierdzy" [Causes for the Establishment
and for the Fall of the Fortress Kodak], Kwartalnik
Historyczny, XL (no. 2, 1926), 175.

22

See ib i d ., pp. 174-75.
See also Tomkiewicz, op. c i t .,
pp. 174-75; and Maryan Dubiecki, Kudak, twierdza kresowa i
jej okolice [The Borderland Fortress Kodak and its Environs],
rev. and enl. ed (Warsaw: Gebethner and Wolff, 1900), pp.
81-91.
23

Z. S. Koniecpolski, "Rodowod Domu Koniecpolskich,
herbu Pobog, to jest Krzyz na podkowie, pisany w roku 1651"
[Genealogy of the Koniecpolski Family of the Armorial
Bearings Pobog, or Cross over a Horseshoe, Written in 1651],
in Pamietniki o Koniecpolskich etc (Lviv, 1842), p. 179.
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soldiers and of Kozak "knights" to common tillers of soil,
paralleled other significant developments in Ukraine.
Following the successful progroms of the Kozaks in 16371638 and the passage of the severe Ordinance, the magnates
secured land monopoly, great wealth, unprecedented
influence and ominous power.

24

"To become absolute sove

reigns", claimed one contemporary, "they only want the
. .
25
privilege of coining".
The "states" of these "kinglets" transformed the
Commonwealth into a federation or conglomeration of many
pA

See I. P. Krypiakevych, BohdanfKhmelnytskyi (Kiev,
1954), pp. 14-22; and Stanislaw Sreniowski, "Panstwo polskie
w polowie XVII w.
Zagadnienia ekonomicznej i politycznej
wladzy oligarchow" [ Polish State in the Middle of the XVII
Century.
On the Problems of the Economic and of the
Political Power of the Oligarchy], in K. Leprzy e t . a l . e d s .,
Polska w okresie drugiej wojny polnocnej 1655-1660 ,[Poland
at the Time of the Second Northern War, 1655-1660], 2 vols
(Warsaw: Panstwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1957), I, 13-39.
See also the interpretation of Adam Kersten, "Problem
wladzy w Rzeczypospolitej czasu Wazow" [The Question of
Authority in The Commonwealth During the Times of the
Wazas] , in O naprawe Rzeczypospolitej etc. (Warsaw, 1965),
pp. 23-26.
9 R

.

Sieur de Beauplan, "A Description of Ukraine, Contain
ing several Provinces of the Kingdom of Poland, Lying
between the Confines of Muscovy, and the Borders of Transyl
vania.
Together with their customs, Manner of Life, and how
they manage their Wars", in A Collection etc., 6 vols., 3rd
ed (London, 1744), I, 477.
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republics and monarchies which existed side by side on the
principle of non-intervention.

26

They were largely respon

sible for the perpetuation of unique conditions which made
the Commonwealth a state where a lack of order prevailed;

27

and which served as a heaven for nobles, paradise for Jews,
purgatory for kings and hell for the serfs.

28

The rise of

this magnate class into the most prominent position within
the Commonwealth was accompanied by the increased oppression
of the Rusin people, especially of the unprivileged classes.
The magnates took advantage of the times of "golden
peace" to consolidate and to extend their landholdings in
Ukraine.

At the same time as they founded new settlements,

villages and towns, they also initiated an intensive
campaign of exploitation.

Their next step was to thrust

0

See Aleksander Jablonowski, Pisma Aleksandra Jablonowskiego, 7 vols (Warsaw: E. Wende, 1910), II, 90.
2^This state of affairs was especially noted by forei
gners. Typical of the critical remarks made by them were
those of John Barclay.
See Lukasz Opalinski, "Polonia
Defensa contra loan.
Barclaium, ubi, occasione ista, de
Regno Genteque Polonia multa narrantur, hactenus litteris
non traditia" (Gdansk, 1648), in Stanislaw Grzeszczuk e d . ,
Wybor pism [Selected Works] (Wroclaw: Zaklad Narodowy im.
Ossolinskich, 1959), pp. 125-232.
28

See Jan Ptasnik, Miasta i mieszczanstwo w dawnej
Polsce [Towns and Townspeople of Old Poland] (Krakow:
Polska Akademia Umiejetnosci, 1934), p. 376.
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the impositions of serfdom on the local population.

In the

western palatinates, where the ruling class was firmly
entrenched, the yoke of serfdom was the heaviest.
In Ukraine, the burdens were lighter.

29

The settlers

who were enticed by the magnates into the' frontier areas in
former years, were granted exemptions from tribute and
duties for long periods of time.

In return for these

concessions, the settlers were required to provide defense
against the Tatars.

After the periods of free-settlement

expired, they were obliged to pay only moderate tribute
and rents to their masters.

This was the state of affairs

even in the 1640's on the left bank of the Dnieper.

9Q

At the

The duties and the hardships of the serfs are vividly
illustrated in Krzysztof Opalinski's satire, "Na ciezary i
opressyja chlopska w Polszcze"
[On the Burdens and the
Oppression of Serfs in Poland], in Satyry (Wroclaw, 1953),
Book I, Satire 3, 11, 1-140, pp. 23-29.
Similarly, see the
various “inventories" of villages in the 1630's and the
1640's, in Vossoedinenie Ukrainy etc., I, 104-05, 168-69,
340-41, 395-96.
See also the following detailed studies.
Stanislaw Sreniowski, "Wies polska w polowie XVII w"
[Polish Village in the Middle of the XVII Century], in K.
Leprzy et a l . e d s ., Polska w okresie drugiej wojny
polnocnej 1655-1660, 2 vols (Warsaw: Panstwowe Wydawnictwo
Naukowe, 1957), I, 41-82; Edward Trzyna, Polozenie ludnosci
wiejskiej w krolewszczyznach wojewodztwa krakowskiego w
XVII wieku [The Situation of the Rural Population on the
Crown Lands of the Palatinate of Krakow in the XVII Century]
(Wroclaw: Zaklad Narodowy im. Ossolinskich, 1963),.pp. 22294; and Zbigniew Cwiek, Z dziejow wsi koronnej XVII wieku
[From the Times of a Crown Village in the XVII Century]
(Warsaw: Panstwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1966), pp. 136-81.
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same time however, conditions wors.ened for those living in
certain districts of the right bank of the Dnieper.

These

people were burdened not only with tribute and ren t s , but
also with labour and other special services.

30

In the 1640's more and more Rus ini people began to
feel the tentacles of serfdom.

The magnates leased certain

rural and urban areas of their estates to anyone who could
guarantee to them a specified annual income.

31

The mag

nates also appointed poor petty gentry as administrators
of their estates, and accepted Jews as their tenants, inter
mediaries and agents.

All these individuals had the task

of raising adequate revenue for the magnates.

At the same

time they sought to reap maximum profits for themselves.
In this way the magnates' officials and tenants began an
excessively heavy system of exploitation of the rural and
the urban population of Ukraine.

They exacted revenue from

every available source; and their"methods were often
30

See Krypiakevych, o p . c i t ., pp. 23-33.

-^See for example the following contracts: M. Kalinowski
and J. Dements, Liatychiv, July 9, 1638; S. Koniecpolski and
M. Dluski, Hadiach, November 15, 1643; M. Kalinowski and K.
Kozlowski, Vinnytsia, March 18, 1647; and J. Wisniowiecki
and A. Zamojski, Lokhvytsia, November 1, 1647, in
Vossoedinenie Ukrainy etc., I, 230-33, 359-62, 458-60,
477-79.
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nothing more than thinly-disguised lawlessness and violence.

32

Furthermore, apart from the rapacity of the mag

nates ' creatures who waged a "war" of economic plunder with
the inhabitants of Ukraine, the local population also
experienced periodical ravages from the undisciplined
soldiers of the Crown Army.

33

As the years of the "golden

peace" continued, the conditions of the Rusin people of
Ukraine were becoming unbearable:
The peasants there are very miserable, being obliged
to work three days a week, themselves and their horses,
for their lord; and to pay proportionately to the
land they hold, such a quantity of wheat, abundance
of capons, pullets, hens and goslins; that is at
Easter, Whitsontide and Christmas: besides all t h i s ,
to carry wood for the said lord, and a thousand other
jobs they ought not to do; besides the ready money
they exact from them, as also the tithe of their
sheep, swine, honey, and all sorts of fruit, and every
third year the third beef.
In short, they are obliged
to give their masters what they please to demand; so
32

For examples of the actions of various officials and
leaseholders in Ukraine and in other Rusin ethnic terri
tories during the 1530's and the late 1640's see Vossoedinenie Ukrainy etc., I, 115-15, 157-58, 161-62, 171-73,
287-89, 301-07, 322-25, 329-31, 339-40, 352-53, 369-74,
378-79, 383-84, 472, 475-77.
See also Krypiakevych,
op. c i t ., 21-34; Jablonowski, op. c i t . , II, 84-85; III,
242-43, 280, 309-10; and W. Lozinski, Prawem i lewem etc.,
2 vols., 4th ed (Lviv), 1931, I, 375-426.
33

See S. Koniecpolski1s letter to K. Odrzywolski, Brody,
October 24, 1643, in Pamietniki o Koniecpolskich etc., pp.
282-84; and M. Hrushevskyi, Istoriia Ukrainy-Rusy, 10 vols
(New York, 1956), VIII, 2, 127-28.
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that it is no wonder those poor wretches never lay
aside anything, being under such hard circumstances.
Yet this is not all, their lords have an absolute
power, not only over their goods, but their lives;
so great is the prerogative of the Polish nobility
(who live as if they were in heaven, and the peasants
in purgatory) so that it it happens that those
wretched peasants fall under the servitude of bad
lords, they are in a worse condition than galleyn
34
slaves.
During this period the conditions of the urban
population of Ukraine also worsened.

Due to various actions

and to restrictions of the magnates or their representatives,
the towns in Ukraine, rather than becoming centres of
commerce and industry, became merely centres of agricul
tural districts.

Apart from Kiev, the towns of Ukraine

made little contribution to the cultural, political or
social life.

There were many reasons for this curious

development.

The ruling class failed to recognize the

value of the towns for the state as a whole.

Many towns in

Ukraine claimed self-government under the Magdeburg Law, as
well as various privileges based on royal charters; yet,
these were often disregarded by the officials.
ses were often treated no better than serfs.

The burges
In many

districts of Ukraine, they were compelled to pay various
34

Beauplan, m
the original).

A Collection etc., I, 449.

(Italics m
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taxes and tribute, and even to perforin labour services.
Their treatment in the "private" towns of the "kinglets"
was even worse.

35

Apart from the serfs and tie burgesses, the mag
nates also oppressed their "brethern", or members of their
own class.

The often-repeated maxim about the equality

among the nobles —

a country squire, as poor as he may be,

is equal to a palatine —

never applied in practice.

The

magnates demonstrated by countless examples that they
regarded petty nobles merely as their pedestals.

If the

oligarchs were able to challenge their monarch, then the
country squires presented no obstacle for them.

It was

characteristic of the times that the strong gained their
ends by violence; only the weak had to resort to seek
justice in the courts.

It mattered little to a magnate

that a petty noble possessed a charter from the royal
chancery which confirmed his title to a certain estate.
35

For examples on the situation of the burgesses m
Ulcraine and in other Rus in ethnic territories during the
1630's and the 1640's see Vossoedinenie Ukrainy etc., I,
132-33, 135-37, 174, 291-92, 309, 345-46, 385-94, 404-05,
428-31, 468-70.
See also K. Opalinski, "O sposobach
pomnozenia miast i niezad w nich" [On the Ways of Increa
sing Towns and on the Disorder within Them], op. c i t ., Book
V, satire 1, 11. 1-338, pp. 231-45; Krypiakevych, op. c i t .,
pp. 34-42; Jablonowski, op. c i t ., III, 257-70; and Ptasnik,
op. c i t . . pp. 358-87.
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Unless the petty noble had the baching of some powerful
patron, the charter was merely a piece of paper.

In the

majority of cases a magnate was in a position to sieze the
property of a petty noble by force.

Moreover, he was able

to take even more drastic action against his weaker neigh
bour:

he could deny the squire's rights as a noble and

force him- to bear all the burdens and obligations imposed
*
36
on his serfs.

Thus, not only the Rusin serfs or even the Rusin
burgesses, but also the Rusin petty nobles, had various
reasons for hating the " absolute" rule of the magnates and
the rapacity of their creatures.

The emergence of the

magnate class into the prominent position of the Common
wealth also coincided with the severe oppression of the
Kozaks.

In this way, by the 1640's, the process of fusion

of the overall social, economic, religious and national
aspirations of the Rusin people, with, the issues of the
Kozaks, was complete.

The Kozaks were for some time a

^ S e e Lozinski, op. c i t ., I, 231-71, 297-99.
In his
Vol. II, subtitled "Wojny prywatne" [Private Wars] ,
Lozinski examined the armed clashes among the nobles in
great detail.
See also W. Lipinski, Stanislaw Michal
Krzyczewski etc (Krakow, 1912), pp. 64— 68; Krypiakevych,
op. c i t . , pp. 48-49; and Jablonowski, op. cj-t. , III,
317-18.
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kind of representative of the Rusin people as a whole.
From their ranks could come the most likely leadership;
and they were still in the best position to call the Rusins
to arms.

The Kozaks were themselves in a very difficult

predicament.

Yet, for the first time, they were also in

a position to fully appreciate the conditions under which
most of the Rusins lived.

Ill
Since the implementation of the Ordinance of 1638,
the registered Kozaks, as well as their enserfed brethern,
experienced intolerable conditions of life.

The posts of

commissioner and of senior regimental officers of the Kozak
Army were filled by nobles,and more and more Polish
soldiers appeared in its rank-and-file.

37

officers were men characterized by avarice.

The high-ranking
Commissioner

Jacek Szemberg, for example, paid 30,000 zloty for his
appointment.

In order to make his tenure a profitable one,

he "thought of unbearable lootings and extortions of the

37

Report of G. Kunakov to Muscovite Department of
Foreign Affairs (1649), in Akty otnosiashchiesia etc.,
15 vols (St. Petersburg, 1861), III, 280.
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38
Kozaks".

All junior-ranking posts in the Kozak Army were

sold for profit to the highest bidder.

39

The officers

began to regard the registered Kozaks more or less as their
servants and as objects of exploitation.

Furthermore, the

Kozaks did not only face "the avarice of the colonels and
40
their tyrannical treatment",
but also that of the civil
authorities.

The commissioner and the colonels, who were

bound by common class interests with the officials of
Ukraine, caused the Kozaks to fall prey to the autocracy
of the local administrative authorities.

They were

burdened by illegal taxes, restricted in their rights to
I
husbandry, their properties were confiscated and they were
saddled with many other oppressive measures.

41

There was an uninterrupted flow of Kozak grievances
to the military and the civil authorities.

In 1639, the

OQ

Report on the Death of Wladyslaw IV and on the Defeat
of the Crown Army, Warsaw, June 1, 1648. Cited by
Hrushevskyi, op. c i t ., VIII, 2, 131-32, n. 3.
39

See S. Grondski, Historia belli etc (Pest, 1789),

p. 31.
^ L . Miaskowski's letter to anonymous, Bar, April 3,
1648, in Jakuba Michalowskiego etc (Krakow, 1864), p. 10.
^ S e e the list of Kozak grievances prepared for
Wladyslaw IV, Bila Tserkva, June 12, 1648, in Dokumenty
Bohdana Khmelnytskoho etc (Kiev, 1961), pp. 36-37.
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Kozaks complained that their farms, meadows and properties
were confiscated by the authorities.

42'

When Crown Grand

Hetman Stanislaw Koniecpolski went on a tour of inspection
through Ukraine in 1643, he was forced to dismiss the
colonel of the Chyhyryn Regiment from his post for his
excesses.^

At the same time he saw the need to issue

strict orders to stop the harassment of the Kozaks by
undisciplined soldiers.
to the royal chancery.

44

45

Kozak complaints came frequently
Koniecpolski1s successor, Mikolaj

Potocki, received almost daily complaints about the excesses
46
of the administrative authorities.
Orders issued by the king or the hetman to curb
the excesses of officials fell on deaf ears.

In Ukraine

there was no power which could execute such commands.

4 2See Hrushevskyi, op. c i t ., VIII, 2, 138.
^ S e e Stanislaw Oswiecim, Stanislawa Oswiecima Dyaryusz
1643-1651 [The Diary of Stanislaw Oswiecim, 1643-1651], ed.
Wiktor Czermak (Krakow: Akademia Umiejetnosci, 1907), p. 15.
44

See S. Koniecpolski1s letter to K. Odryzywolski, Brody,
October 24, 1643, in Pamietniki o Koniecpolskich e t c ., p. 284.
^ S e e Wladyslaw IV's letter to A. Koniecpolski, Warsaw,
June 24, 1647, in L. Kubala, "Dodatki" [Appendices], Jerzy
Ossolinski, 2nd rev. ed (Lviv, 1924), p. 494.
46

See M. Potocki's letter to J. Ossolinski, Bar,
November 21, 1647.
Cited by Lipinski, op. c i t ., pp. 197-98.
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Potentates of the stature of Princ.e Jeremi Wisniowiecki
or Aleksander Koniecpolski ruled absolutely within their
"states” .
wczyks,

47

They "distributed Ukraine among the Laszczowho reduced the Kozaks, the meritorious servants

of the Commonwealth into serfs, robbed them, pulled their
48
beards and harnessed them into plows".

Too few of the

privileged class fully saw "the Kozaks oppressed more
49
than common serfs".

Too late came the realization that

the Kozaks would "venture even into hell itself in order
to cast off such bondage and oppression as the poor
50
wretches evidently experienced".

^ T h i s is a reference to the lawless nobles, named
after Samuel Laszcz. This individual was no less than a
bandit, having been sentenced by the courts .two hundred
seventy-three times.
Notwithstanding these sentences, he
managed to exist outside the pale of the law and to carry
out his terrioristic activities, chiefly because he enjoyed
the protection of one "kinglet" -- Crown Grand Hetman
Stanislaw Koniecpolski.
See J. Jerlicz, Latopisiec etc.,
2 vols (Warsaw, 1853), I, 49-51.
48

Journal of W. Miaskowski, Pereiaslav, February 20,
1649, in Vossoedinenie Ukrainy etc., II, 106.
49

A. Kysil's letters to M. Potocki, Kobyshiv, March 16,
1648, in Sprawy i rzeczy etc (Lviv, 1914), p. 83; and to
M. Lubienski [Hoshcha), May 31, 1648, in Vossoedinenie
Ukrainy etc., II, 26.
50 Speech of A. Kazanowski at the Convocation Diet,
Fourth Session, Warsaw, July 20, 1648, in Jakuba Michalowskiego etc., pp. 118-19.
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The registered Kozaks realized that the magnates 1
policy of repression and servitude threatened the very
existence of them as a military class.
justice produced little results.

Their appeals for

Seeing the impotence of

the king and the growing influence and power of the
"kinglets", they had little choice but to resort to arms.
The Kozak leaders seized an opportunity to initiate steps
for an uprising late in 1645.

Not trusting their own

strength to be sufficient for the task, they began to negotiate a military alliance with the Tatars.

51

The Kozak-

Tatar alliance failed to materialize, but in 1646 a better
(

opportunity arrived to win back their liberties.
In that year King Wladyslaw IV requested their aid
for his planned war with the Ottoman Empire.

52

The

delegates of the Kozak Army, who proceeded to confer with
the king in Warsaw, were somewhat doubtful of the whole
business.

The very secrecy in which the king conferred

with them suggested the weakness of his position.

He had

no power to annul the Ordinance of 1638 without consulting
51

• •
■
See Oswiecim, o p . c i t ., pp. 135-36.

52
‘See Wiktor Czermak, Plany wojny tureckiej Wladyslawa
IV [Wladyslaw IV's Plans of the Turkish War] (Krakow:
Akademia Umiejetnosci, 1895).
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the Diet; and the Diet would never consent to repeal the
Kozak restrictions.

Yet, if the king emerged a victor

from the war against the Muslim world, he would be in a
position to establish an absolute monarchy and thereby to
fulfill all his promises to the Kozaks.

Under these circum

stances the delegates of the Kozak Army agreed to carry out
the wishes of the king and pledged the support of all the
Kozaks.

Ivan Barabash was named the commander of the naval

expedition, while one Bohaan Khmelnytskyi received the post
of se c r e t a r y . ^
As a secretary, Khmelnytskyi was in charge of
54
preparing Kozak enlistments.
accomplish his task in secrecy.

He was hardly able to
Furthermore, the plans of

Wladyslaw became obvious once construction of sea vessels
and a general preparation for a naval campaign began.
Rumours began to circulate among the Kozaks that all posts
in the Kozak Army would be changed.

These grew in such an

intensity, that Potocki interpreted them as "sedition"
and "turbulence", and took steps to restore discipline.
53
54

55

See Kubala, op. c i t ., p. 258.
See ibid., p. 257.
t

55

.
M. Potocki's letter to B. Leszczynski [Bar, cai. May
31, 1646], in Szajnocha, "Zrodla" [Sources], op. cit., I
2, 403.
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The nobles saw the Kozak activities and their sudden
hostile attitude towards them as a conspiracy between the
Kozaks and the king against them.

They decided that all

adventures of the king must be stopped, for only fatal
consequences would follow.

Wladyslaw's defeat would be

disastrous to the Commonwealth; his victory would bring
grave danger to the precious liberties of the gentry.

56

The nobles thus waited impatiently for the October opening
of the Diet.

The Diet put an end to their fears.

By December, 1646, amid their preparations for war,
the Kozaks received unwelcome news:

the Diet forbade the

king to wage war with Turkey; he was compelled to demobilize
his mercenaries and to forbid the Kozaks to raid the shores
of the Black Sea.

57

The Kozaks thus lost all their confi

dence in the king, whose "power was not only limited, but
nearly taken away from h i m " .
56

The fears of the gentry are typically illustrated m
K. Opalinski's letter to L. Opalinski, Tuliszkow, October
3, 1646.
See Listy Krzysztofa Opalinskiego do brata
Lukasza 1641-1653 [Letters of Krzysztof Opalinski to his
Brother Lukasz, 1641-1653], Roman Poliak et a l . e d s .
(Wroclaw: Zaklad Narodowy im. Ossolinskich, 1957), p. 363.
^ S e e Volumina Legum etc (Warsaw, 1737), IV, 83-85.
~^G. Tiepolo's letter to the Venitian government in
1646.
Cited by Szajnocha, op. c i t ., I, 1, 377.
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After gaining victory over the king, the magnates
and their supporters began to vent their fury upon the
Kozaks.

The magnates declared themselves against the king

and his plans; therefore, they saw the need of destroying
the potential weapon of royal absolutism.

The Kozaks

were "king's men", and the chief instrument of king's
designs.

It was virtually impossible for Wladyslaw to esta

blish absolute monarchy i^ithout the support of the Kozaks.
For this reason the ruling class began treating Kozaks as
bondsmen, preparing for them conditions which were worse
than those of slaves on Turkish galleys and intending even
to eradicate the Kozak name itself.

59

Out of hundreds of

similar cases of injustice inflicted upon Kozaks during
this time, that of Bohdan Khmelnytskyi was typical.

59

See B. Khmelnytskyi's letter to Wladyslaw IV, Bila
Tserkva, June 12, 1648, in Dokumenty Bohdana Khmelnytskoho
e t c ., pp. 33-34.
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CHAPTER III

THE EMERGENCE OF BOHDAN KHMELNYTSKYI: HIS LEADERSHIP AND
AIMS IN THE INITIAL PERIOD OF CONFLICT

I
Bohdan Znovii Khmelnytskyi was typical of the half
noble and half-Kozak well-to-do landowning officer class,
serving in the Kozak Army.^

Khmelnytskyi was a Rusin

noble: he considered himself a noble by birth, used the
coat-of-arms of "Abdank" on his seal and professed himself
to be an Orthodox Christian.

Khmelnytskyi was also a

Kozak: he served in the Kozak Army; and was strongly bound
to the Kozak stratum by common ideals, langu-age, religion,

■*"The reconstruction of this biographical sketch of Bohdan
Khmelnytskyi to 1647 is primarily based on the following
sources:
(a) Letters; B. Khmelnytskyi1s letters to M. Potocki,
Zaporozhe, March 13, 1648; and to Jan Kazimierz, Zboriv,
August 15, 1649, in Dokumenty Bohdana Khmelnytskoho etc
(Kiev, 1961), pp. 23-26", 122-23.
(b) Charters: Charter of Wladyslaw IV confirming B.
Khmelnytskyi's title to Subotiv, Warsaw, July 22, 1646, in
Akty otnosiashchiesia etc., 15 vols (St. Petersburg, 1878),
X, 465-67.
Some historians question the authenticity of
this document.
See F. Rawita Gawronski, Bohdan Chmielnicki
etc., 2 vols (Lviv, 1906), I, 354-60.
(c) Reports: G. Kunakov's report to Muscovite
62
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class solidarity and family ties.
Bohdan, the son of a Rusin squire Mykhailo
Khmelnytskyi, was born approximately in 1595 and most

Department of Foreign Affairs (1649), in Akty otnosiashchiesia etc., Ill, 278-80; and H. Pinocci1s "Relatia o
Chmielnickim i rzeczach Kozackich" [Report on Khmelnytskyi
and on Kozak Matters] (1654) , in Oiczvste spominki etc.,
2 vols (Krakow, 1845), I, 138.
For a corrected version of
this document see W. Lipinski, Stanislaw Michal Krzyczewski
etc (Krakow, 1912), pp. 111-12, n. 1.
(d) Miscellanea: E. I. Chrzaszcz, "Pierwszy okres
buntu Chmielnickiego w oswietleniu uczestnika wyprawy
zoltowodzkiej i naocznego swiatka wypadkow", in Prace historyczne etc (Lviv, 1934), pp. 257-62; S. Grondski, Historia
belli etc (Pest, 1789); Natan Hannower, "Jawein Mecula
t.j. Bagno Glebokie.
Kronika zdazen z lat 1648-1652,
napisana przez Natana Hannowera z Zaslawia i wydana po raz
pierwszy w Wenecyi w r. 1656" [ laveip Metsula, that is, the
Deep Mire.
A Chronicle of Events During the Years 16481652, Written by Natan Hannower of Zaslav and Published for
the First Time in Venice in 1656], tr. and e d . , Majer
Balaban, in Sprawy i rzeczy etc
(Lviv, 1914), pp. 16-20;
V. Kochowski, A nnalium Poloniae etc (Krakow, 1683);
"Kratkaja Letopis o wojnach Polakow z Kozakami 1647-1656"
[ A Short Chronicle of the Wars of the Poles with the Kozaks,
1647-1656], in Pamiatniki etc., 3 vols., 2nd rev. ed (Kiev,
1898), I, 173-75; Szymon Okolski, Dyaryusz transakcyi
wojennej miedzy wojskiem koronnem i zaporoskiem w r. 1637
r i w r 1 6 3 8 1, ed. K. J. Turowski (Krakow, 1858); and
Zbigniew Swita.lski, "Nieznana wiadomosc z biografii Bohdana
Chmielnickiego przed 1648 rokiem" [ An Unknown Item from the
Biography of Bohdan Khmelnytskyi Prior to 1648], Kwartalnik
Historyczny [Historical Quarterly], LXVI (no. 3, 1959),
855-57.
Since the 1850's there appeared hundreds of biographies
and biographical sketches on Bohdan Khmelnytskyi, chiefly
in Polish, Russian and Ukrainian.
The latest biography was
written by the Ukrainian historian Ivan Krypiakevych,
Bohdan Khmelnytskyi (Kiev: Akademiia Nauk Ukrainskoi R.S.R.,
1954).
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likely in Chyhyryn.

Mykhailo endeavoured to give his son

an upbringing and an education befitting the status of a
noble.

Bohdan therefore first passed through a school of

one of the Orthodox brotherhoods; and later continued his
studies at a Jesuit college in Lviv.

Shortly after comp

leting his studies, Bohdan began his military career.

In

1620 he joined his father and took part in Crown Grand
Hetman Stanislaw Zolkiewski's disastrous
against the Turks.

Moldavian campaign

The elder Khmelnytskyi fell on the

fields of Tsetsora; the younger was taken prisoner.
After two years of captivity in the Muslim world
I
Bohdan returned to Subotiv, the estate acquired by his
father.

Soon after his arrival he enlisted as a registered

Kozak in the Chyhyryn Regiment.

Little is known about the

following years of his military service until 1637.

He

must have participated in the various campaigns of the
Kozak Army; proven himself to be a loyal, able and brave
soldier; and won promotions steadily.

At the time of

Pavliuk's rebellion in 1637 he was already a senior-ranking
officer, for he occupied the responsible administrative
post of a secretary of the Kozak Army.

In this capacity

he signed the Kozak capitulation to Crown Field Hetman
Mikolaj Potocki

in December 1637.
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The duties of a Kozak officer in peacetime were not
too demanding.

Bohdan was thus able to devote his attention

to his family and his estate.

He married Hanna Somko, a

girl of a good Kozak family, and began to raise a large
family.

Careful management of Subotiv and the adjacent

land he acquired brought him prosperity, so that b y the
1640's he became quite a wealthy country squire.

During

this time he identified himself with the loyal and conser
vative Kozak element —

the Kozak "aristocracy" —

which

sought to establish a modus vivendi with the government by
means other than the resort to arms.

By his own admission,
t

he "never took part in any rebellion".

His appointment to

a junior-ranking post in the Chyhyryn Regiment following
the progroms of Ostrianyn and Hunia in 1638 and his later
reinstatement to the secretaryship of the Kozak Army,
signified that the military authorities did not question
his loyalty.

Bohdan also enjoyed the confidence and favour

of King Wladyslaw IV and of Crown Grand Chancellor Jerzy
Ossolinski, who was one of the most influential men in the
Commonwealth.
By virtue of his rank in the Kozak Army, Khmelnyt
skyi was himself an individual of considerable influence
among the K o z a k ; and wielded authority among them.

He was
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frequently chosen to represent the interests of the Kozak
Army before the king and the government.

In September

1638, the Kozak Council held at Kiev elected him a member
of a delegation which proceeded to Warsaw early the follow
ing year and petitioned the king to either repeal or to
modify the Kozak Ordinance of 1638.

He was also included

in another delegation which brought similar petitions to
the Diet late in 1639.
Later on, it was a mark of distinction for Bohdan
to be called to serve in the mercenary Kozak unit hired by
the government of Cardinal Richelieu in 1645, which took
part in the operations against the Spaniards in Flanders
and in the siege of Dunkirk.

In April 1646 Bohdan was again

a delegate of the Kozak Army.

This time he took part in

the secret negotiations at Warsaw with King Wladyslaw IV,
when the latter solicited Kozak support for the war against
the Turks.

On this occasion Bohdan received a charter from

the king which confirmed his rights to Subotiv.

In 1647

he was contacted by Ossolinski, who revealed his secret
mission to Bohdan: the king requested him to prepare the
Kozaks for a naval expedition into the Ottoman dominions.
As a reward for his part in the royal schemes, the king
bestowed new honours on Bohdan.
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Khmelnytskyi was thus a man of substance, conser
vative in his outlooks, loyal to the state and an
individual who enjoyed the confidence of his superiors, and
even the king and of the chancellor.

But in contrast to

Bohdan's record and environment, his destiny also amply
illustrates the shortcoming of the "kinglet" rule in
Ukraine.
Following the passage of the Kozak Ordinance and
the Kozak progroms in 1638, and especially after the capi
tulation of the king before the hostile Diet of 1646 which
discovered his "conspiracy" with the Kozaks, even men like
Khmelnytskyi began to experience intolerable conditions of
life.

Khmelnytskyi himself became a victim of the law

lessness of Aleksander Koniecpolski, a typical borderland
magnate, and of his creatures.

They inflicted a series of

injustices upon him: he was materially ruined, made a
fugitive and finally was declared an enemy of the state.
These injustices caused Bohdan to take unprecedented steps,
the kind of which he avoided so carefully in the past
years.
Khmelnytskyi's misfortunes began at the time when
Aleksander Koniecpolski decided to increase*the size of his
own latifundiae.

Koniecpolski, as Sheriff of Korsun and
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Chyhyryn, controlled a vast territory in the heart of the
Kozak country.

Since greater landholdings made the owner

powerful and increased his revenue, Koniecpolski took
advantage of every opportunity to acquire more land.

The

case of Khmelnytskyi provided this magnate with such an
opportunity.

He was able to make gains at the expense of

his weaker neighbour both by law and lawlessness.
There were "legal" ways by which Koniecpolski could
come to possess Khmelnytskyi1s estate.

Owning land in the

Tiasmyn region, this magnate could claim Subotiv as part
of his Mliiv property.

A more effective method in dealing

with Khmelnytskyi was simply to declare him a nulle jure
possessor.

Koniecpolski discovered that Bohdan had no

proper documents to prove his title to the ownership of
Subotiv.

There were also no records to show that he regis

tered any formal deed which could prove his rights.

Under

these circumstances, even the charter of King Wladyslaw
proved to be worthless.

Koniecpolski, as Sheriff of

Chyhyryn, could therefore dispose of Subotiv as he pleased.
Koniecpolski was encouraged to take action in this
matter by two men: Zachariasz Sabilenki and Daniel
Czaplinski.
master.

Both men denounced Khmelnytskyi before their

The former, a wealthy Jew of Chyhyryn, attributed
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loss of business profits to his competition with
Khmelnytskyi; the latter, a Deputy Sheriff of Chyhyryn
coveted Subotiv for some time.

Furthermore, a bitter feud

began between Czaplinski and Khmelnytskyi over a woman of
questionable virtues, with w hom Bohdan lived after the death
of his wife.
By pledging to increase Koniecpolski's revenues,
Czaplinski induced his master to grant him the property
rights to Subotiv.

Having the support of such a powerful

"patron", this borderland firebrand then attempted to take
possession of Bohdan's estate.

This whole matter could
t

not be settled peacefully because Khmelnytskyi refused to
give up his rights to Subotiv for a paltry sum approportioned to him as compensation for the upkeep of the land.
When this method failed, Czaplinski and his hench
men tried more drastic steps: increasing the collection of
taxes, carrying out various requisitions, pillaging of
stocks, damaging the manor house and even by flogging
Bohdan's son.
mistress.

Czaplinski also pursued after his rival's

Eventually he succeeded in luring her from

Khmelnytskyi and subsequently married her.

When Khmelnyt

skyi still resisted his enemy, Czaplinski hired an assassin;
and when the latter failed to carry out his task, he
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continued to plot on Khmelnytskyi's life.

The final act

came when Czaplinski resorted to the usual violence of the
times: gathering an armed band he raided Subotiv, drove
Bohdan out and then forcibly siezed his land.
Khmelnytskyi was determined to defend his rights
through all legal means possible.

He made frequent comp

laints about the harassment and violence he suffered to his
superiors.

Koniecpolski, who permitted these outrages of

Czaplinski, simply ignored all complaints against his
servant.

Bohdan's appeals to Crown Grand Hetman Mikolaj

Potocki also proved futile.

Failing to obtain redress at

local courts, Bohdan journeyed to Warsaw and attempted to
seek justice there.
in his favour.

Here, again, the decisions were not

Finally, he appealed to the king.

Wladyslaw

IV was sympathetic to the complaints of outrage inflicted
upon his loyal servant, but even he was powerless to help.
The king was supposed to have given only a desperate advice
to Khmelnytskyi: violence must be fought with violence.
When all avenues to escape ruin failed, Bohdan
returned to Ukraine.

At this time dissatisfaction was

smouldering among the Kozaks, aggravated by the disappoint
ment in the king's schemes of war with the Turks.

That

dissatisfaction dould be easily fanned into an open
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rebellion.

Wladyslaw IV, whose thirst for military

conquest was not abetted, still did not relax his efforts
to gain the Kozak support for his cause.

It was for that

purpose that he sent Crown Grand Chancellor Jerzy Ossolinski
to Ukraine in Avigust 1647.
Ossolinski attempted to sway the Kozaks to start a
naval campaign in order to provoke hostilities with the
Turks.

He assured them that they should not fear any

reprisals from the authorities.

During this time he also

contacted Khmelnytskyi and handed over the insignia of a
commander of the entire expedition to him.
took a dimer view of the whole matter.
A

Bohdan, however,

He thanked the

chancellor for the royal favour, but refused to accept the
honours.

He told Ossolinski that many of the Kozaks would

be reluctant to act because they were kept under extremely
strict discipline by the military authorities.
would have to be carefully thought out.

All steps

The Kozaks would

have to be convinced of the feasability of such an under
taking.

Military supplies would have to be prepared.

Thus,

explained Khmelnytskyi, all this required considerable time
and effort.

He did promise, however, to carry out the

wishes of the king as best as he could.
It is uncertain whether Khmelnytskyi was responsible
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for the intense agitation which developed among the Kozaks
following Ossolinski's departure from Ukraine.

If he was

responsible, there is no evidence that his actions were
for the purpose of hatching a rebellion and not on behalf
Wladyslaw's plans.

It is also uncertain whether he was a

leader, organizer or even a member of that group of regis
tered Kozaks which planned a rebellion in October 1647.
To many of his contempraries, and especially to his
enemies, no one else but Khmelnytskyi was responsible.
Bohdan's energetic attempts to defend his rights
made him a suspect in many of the eyes of the nobles.
Hating him as a royalist, unable to get rid of him by legal
means or by attempts on his life, and having no knowledge
of Wladyslaw's renewed interest in war or Khmelnytskyi's
part in it, his enemies saw an opportunity to indict him
on political grounds.

Bohdan was accused of agitating the

Kozaks for a rebellion, plotting a sea-raid and even of
conspiring on the life of Koniecpolski, who at that time
was campaigning against the Tatars.

Koniecpolski ordered

Khmelnytskyi's arrest and demanded no less than capital
punishment for him.

Since Koniecpolski had no jurisdiction

over the registered Kozaks, he had to leave the accused and
his fate in the hands of a military trit tnal.
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Khmelnytskyi's friends vouched for his innocence.
The military authorities heeded their appeals and decided
to place Khmelnytskyi for the time being under the custody
of his commanding officer, Colonel Stanislav Krychevskyi
of the Chyhyryn Regiment.

Bohdan's position was desperate:

his life, or at least his liberty, was in danger.
Krychevskyi, however, proved to be a true

friend. After

hearing Bohdan's pleas, he allowed him to

escape. There

was only one road open to Bohdan Khmelnytskyi —
Zaporozhe.

to

There he fled at the close of 1647, accompanied

by a number of followers, to join the ranks of malcontents.
<

II
Early in January 1648, Bohdan Khmelnytskyi appeared
in Zaporozhe at the head of several hundred of his follo2

wers.

He then took immediate steps to capture the Sich

from the registered Kozaks.

The chief reason for these

hostile steps of Khmelnytskyi was because the Sich would

See M. Potocki's letter to Wladyslaw IV [Korsun], March
31, 1648; V. Unkovskii's report to the Muscovite government
(1650), in Vossoedinenie Ukrainy etc., 3 vols (Moscow,
1954), II, 15, 433; and A. Kysil's letter to I u . Dolgorukov,
Kobyzhcha, March 28, 1648, in Akty otnosiashchiesia etc.,
Ill, 166-67.
Concerning the correct place of issue and the
date of M. Potocki's letter, see K. Szajnocha, Dwa lata
dziejow naszych.1646. 1648., 2 vols (Warsaw, 1900), II,
I, 27.
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provide for him a firm foothold in Zaporozhe, as well as a
suitable base for his intended operations.

With this in

mind, he directed his followers to occupy one of the islands
on the Dnieper in close vicinity of the Sich, and instruc
ted them to fortify it.

Once the island was secure, he

sent several of his men to the Sich to agitate the garrison
of the registered Kozaks stationed there.
his emissaries were successful.

The efforts of

When the commandant of the

garrison saw that the registered Kozaks were on a verge of
mutiny, he assembled his guard detachment and made a hasty
flight.

Early in February Khmelnytskyi and his followers

took possession of the Sich without any opposition of the
3
registered Kozaks.
Following this initial bloodless victory, Khmelny
tskyi began to direct a campaign of intense agitation
throughout Zaporozhe and Ukraine.

One of the main reasons

for the success of this campaign was because Khmelnytskyi
carried it out under a cloak of "legality".

Even as

Khmelnytskyi arrived at Zaporozhe there were rumours among
the Kozaks that King Wladyslaw IV entrusted him with some
3

See L. Mxaskowski's letter to Anonymous, Balabanivka,
February 16, 1648, in Lipinski, "Annexa" [Appendices],
op. c i t ., p. 353; and Chrzaszcz, op. c i t . , p. 262.
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important commission.

Khmelnytskyi and his supporters also

spread other fantastic rumours of their own.

Some of

these rumours were to the effect that Wladyslaw commanded
Khmelnytskyi to organize a Kozak army; that the king was in
sympathy with the Kozak cause; that he was their ally
against the magnates; that he would not oppose the Kozaks
even if they took up arms to fight the "kinglets"

for their

lost liberties; and finalJ.y, that the king would embrace
Orthodoxy, and upon his arrival in Kiev, he would compel
4

all Poles to accept the "Christian

Orthodox faith".

4

Archdeacon Paul of Aleppo noted a typical rumour:
"Between him [Khmelnytskyi] and his friend the Cral [King
Wladyslaw I V ] a secret agreement was planned, that Akhmil
[Khmelnytskyi] should raise his head in rebellion, and that
the Cral should assist him with troops; in order to eradi
cate the Polish Grandees [magnates] one and all, and to
allow him to become king in his own right, who should rule,
and not be ruled by them",
See Paul of Aleppo, The Travels
etc., 2 vols (London, 1831), I, 2, 173.
For other versions of these rumours, see the reports of
G. Klimov (1648) and G. Kunakov (1649) to Muscovite Depart
ment of Foreign Affairs, in Akty otnosiashchiesia etc., Ill,
216, 279; and the letters of Voevoda F. Arsenev, S.
Bolkhovskii, Z. Leontev, I. Kobylskii, N. Nashchokin, N.
Pleshcheev and N. Meshcherskii (May to July, 1648) to
Muscovite Department of Defense, in Akty Muskovskago
gusodarstva, 3 vols (St. Petersburg, 1894), II, 218-20, 222,
227-28, 231-32; Sobieski's report to the Convocation Diet,
Fifth Session, Warsaw, July 21, 1648, in Jakuba Michalowskiego etc (Krakow, 1864), pp. 120-21; and B. Khmelnytskyi's
manifesto to the Rusin people, Bila Tserkva [£ a . , May 26 to
June 12], 1648, in Dokumenty Bohdana Khmelnytskoho etc., p.
648.
Concerning the correct date and the authenticity of
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These rumours and stories were the more credible to
the Kozaks and to the Rusin people because Khmelnytskyi
possessed the banner of King Wladyslaw and his "charters".

5

With such proof, Khmelnytskyi had little trouble in
convincing the Kozaks in Zaporozhe that they should enlist
t

under the'royal colours".

6

In turn, these Kozaks had no

this document see L. Kubala, Jerzy Ossolinski, 2nd rev. ed
(Lviv, 1924), p. 448, n. 57.
For a contrary evaluation see
Gawronski, op. c i t ., I, 213. These rumours are also
pointed out by M. Golinski, MS. Eiblioteki Zakladu Narodowego
im. Ossolinskich, Wroclaw, Poland, 189, f. 127 [Hereafter
cited as MS. B.Z,N.Ossol. ]; P. Chevalier, A Discourse
etc (London, 1672), p. 59-60; S. Temberski, Stanislawa
T emberskiego etc (Krakow, 1897), p. 101; and Grondski,
op. c i t ., p. 46.
I
C
This whole matter is shrouded with great uncertainty.
The contemporaries agree on two points: (a) Khmelnytskyi
possessed sorae kind of documents; (b) which he had stolen
from Ivan Barabash.
See for example Chrzaszcz, op. c i t .,
pp. 260, 262; and the Record of the Election Diet, TwentySixth Session, Warsaw, November 6 , 1648, in Ksiega pamietnicza etc., pp. 299-300.
There is no evidence that King
Wladyslaw IV issued any special "charters" to the Kozaks
which restored their liberties. Khmelnytskyi probably
possessed a letter or letters of the king, who wrote to the
Kozaks at the time he was preparing to launch his campaign
against Turkey.
The king probably solicited Kozak aid,
authorized new Kozak enlistments and ordered the constru
ction of sea-craft for a naval campaign on the Black Sea.
According to Kysil, Khmelnytskyi only pretended to have new
letters from the king.
He actually had the letters written
by Wladyslaw in 1646.
See the Record of the Convocation Diet,
Second Session, Warsaw, July 17, 1648, in Jakuba
M ichalowskiego etc., p. 105. This whole matter is discussed
at some length by Gawronski, op. c i t . , I, 118-125.
See L. Miaskowski's letter to Anonymous, Balabanivka,
February 16, 16 8 , in Lipinski, "Annexa", op. c i t ., p. 353.
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doubt that Khmelnytskyi enjoyed confidence and favour of
the king; thus, they formally elected him as their leader.
Furthermore, Khmelnytskyi's recruitment programme was also
carried out in Ukraine by his inflammatory manifestoes and
by his extremely able emissaries.

The effects of these

manifestoes and the accomplishments of these "conspirators
of all[the registered] Kozak regiments and of all [ the
O
people of] Ukraine" , can be best illustrated by the
following developments.
By the middle of February Crown Grand Hetman,
Mikolaj Potocki, distrusted the loyalty of all the registered Kozaks still under his command.

9

A month and a half

lciter, Potocki claimed that a "deadly fire" of rebellion
was ignited in Ukraine:

"there was neither a village nor

See the report of Iu. Mynevskyi and others at Muscovite
Department of Foreign Affairs (1657), in Akty otnosiashchisia e t c ., IV, 58.
0
M. Potocki1s letter to Wladyslaw IV[Korsun], March 31,
1648, in Vossoedinenie Ukrainy etc., p. 15. Typical of such
manifestoes is the one from Chyhyryn, early in 1648.
See
Dokumenty Bohdana Khmelnytskoho etc., pp. 625-26.
9
See L. Miaskowski's letter to Anonymous, B a l a b a m v k a ,
February 16, 1648, in Lipinski, "Annexa", o p . c i t ., p. 354.
This explains why the registered Kozaks had to take an oath
of loyalty before the beginning of the campaign in April.
See Chrzaszcz, o p . c i t ., p. 264.
*
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a town in which there were no cries for lawlessness"
Finally, while the serfs armed themselves and awaited for
the outbreak of hostilities, many "Kozaks, nobles and free
men" began to flock into Zaporozhe to Khmelnytskyi's aid."
Khmelnytskyi proceeded with extreme caution even
under these favourable circumstances.
to wage war.

He was not yet ready

On the one hand, he underestimated the

military preparedness and the potential of the Rusin people.
On the other hand, he decided that the troops under his
disposal were not strong enough to be matched against the
combined forces of the Crown Army and the private armies
(

of the magnates.

Khmelnytskyi therefore decided to seek

military aid from the neighbouring countries.

His appeals

to Muscovy, particularly for the aid of the Don Kozaks,
proved to be fruitless.

12

Khmelnytskyi, however, was more

successful in his dealings with Crimea.
sent his envoys to Khan Islam III.

In February, he

His appeals for military

aid coincided with a time when various circumstances pressed

■*"^M. Potocki's letter to Wladyslaw IV [Korsun] , March
31, 1648, in Vossoedinenie Ukrainy etc., p. 15.
■^G. Kunakov's report to Muscovite Department of Foreign
Affairs (1649), in Akty otnosiasnchiesia etc., Ill, 281.
12

See Krypiakevych, o p . cit ., pp. 122-23; and V. Golob u tskii, Diplom-.tlcheskaia istoriia etc (Kiev, 1962), p. 96.
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Tatars for war.
Moreover, Khmelnytskyi made another good use of the
"charters" of King Wladyslaw.

These documents which served

as an evidence of Wladyslaw's anti-Tatar designs, had the
effect of abetting the khan to war with the Commonwealth.
Khan Islam III realized that by supporting the Kozak rebel
lion, he would automatically paralyze the plans of the
Polish king.

It was in the khan's interest to give military

aid to the Kozaks, even though he would face grave conse
quences for it, because such action was expressly forbidden
by his Turkish suzerain.
defy the sultan.

The khan, therefore, decided to

He ordered a vanguard under Tuhay Bey to

march to Khmelnytskyi's aid as soon as possible, arid then
prepared to follow it at the head of the whole Tatar horde.
Thus came into being a Kozak-Tatar military alliance.
13

13

This

See B. Baranowski, "Geneza sojuszu kozacko-tatarskiego
z 1648 r " , Przeglad Historyczny, XXXVII (no. 1> 1648), 285-86;
0. Gorka, "Nieznana kronika tatarska lat 1644-50", Kwartalnik
Historyczny, LXII (no. 3, 1955), 113; and Golobutskii, o p .
c i t ., pp. 103-06. According to Naima, Khmelnytskyi himself
took part in the negotiations in Crimea.
See [Mustafa] Naima,
"Zatargi z Ottomanami z powodu Kozakow i Dziennik Wyprawy
Chocimskiey z Rocznikow Naima Efendi", in J. J. S. Sekowski,
ed. and t r . , Collectanea z Dziejopisow Tureckich Rzeczy do
Historyi Polskiey Sluzacych, 2 vols (Warsaw, 1824), I, 201-02.
All other sources point to the contrary.
See for example, T.
Buturlin's letter to Muscovite Department of Defense, Belgorod,
April 17, 1648, in Akty Muskovskago gosudarstva, II, 201; and
A. Trubetskoi and others to A. Kysil, Moscow, April 20, 1648,
in Akty otnosiashchiesia etc., Ill, 180.
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Tatar military aid would bring incalculable advantages, as
dis

well as great m a n y Aadvantages, to Khmelnytskyi.
During the first three months of 1648, if
Khmelnytskyi was unsuccessful in concealing his aims from
the authorities, he was successful in confusing these aims
for them.

One way in which he achieved his goal was by

writing letters to various persons of importance.

In these

letters he listed his personal grievances and the hardships
of the Kozaks, and then justified his and their actions.
Khmelnytskyi emphasized that neither he nor his companions
in Zaporozhe wanted bloodshed.

They came to Zaporozhe not

«
to indulge in lawlessness of any sort; on the contrary,they
were driven there by the injustices of various officials
a.nd by the intolerable conditions of life they had to lead
in Ukraine.

They had but one aim: to send a delegation to

Warsaw with a petition to have their former rights and
liberties restored to them.

14

It therefore, appeared that

14

See the following letters of B. Khmelnytskyx from
Zaporozhe: to J. Szemberg, January 6 , 1648; to M. Potocki,
January 8 , 1648; to A. Koniecpolski, January 9, 1648; to M.
Potocki, March 13, 1648 (and another letter to him on the
same date written in the name of the Kozak army), in
Dokumenty Bohdana Khmelnytskoho etc., pp. 23-26, 28-30,
640-44.
In the opinion of the editors of this documentary
collection, Khmelnytskyi was not the author of the first
three letters.
These were most likely composed by the
chronicler Samiilo Velychko.
See p. 640, n. 1.
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Khmelnytskyi attempted to quiet the apprehensions of the
authorities and to win back their confidence in him.
But the real purpose of Khmelnytskyi1s letter
writing was more than that; he played for time.
became obvious to the gentry of Ukraine.

15

This

These nobles

recognized unmistakable signs of another rebellion, and
sent frantic appeals to Potocki "to extinguish the deadly
fire" before it was too l a t e , ^

But the king and other

influential individuals interpreted Khmelnytskyi's
actions as the initial step in the war against the Tatars
and the Turks.

17

Moreover, the v a c i l l a t i o n of Potocki

between the pressure of panicky nobles and the pressure of
those who counted on war with the Muslim world, only helped
Khmelnytskyi to gain time to further his plans.
Potocki did not attach any special significance
15 See the anonymous letter from Cherkasy, April 2, 1648,
in Jakuba Michalowskiego e t c ., p . 9
1 f)
See M. Potocki's letter to Wladyslaw IV [Korsun ],
March 31, 1648 in Vossoedinenie Ukrainy etc., II, 15.
17

Kysil warned Muscovite officials that Khmelnytskyi
might attempt to lure the Don Kozaks to carry out a sea-raid
against the Turks.
See A. Kysil's letter to Iu. Dolgorukov,
Kobyzhcha, March 28, 1648, in Akty otnosiashchiesia etc.,
Ill, 167.
As late as c_a. , April 2.0, 1648 King Wladyslaw IV
issued an order to Potocki not to take any hostile steps'
against the Kozaks, and even sent part of the pay due to the
registered Kozaks.
See Gawronski, op. c i t ., pp. 263, 266-67.
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to Khmelnytskyi's flight to Zaporozhe at the close of
1647.

18

He became more concerned with the activities of

Khmelnytskyi at the beginning of February, 1648.

By this

time the first mutiny of the registered Kozaks took place;
Khmelnytskyi was in control of the Sich; and there were
also definite signs of unrest among the Rusin people in
Ukraine.

Potocki decided to solve matters by ordering the

regiment of the registered Kozaks stationed nearest
Zaporozhe to sieze Khmelnytskyi, to disperse his followers
and to reoccupy the Sic h .

But another unexpected event

took place: these registered Kozaks mutinied and joined the
19
ranks of their disaffected comrades-xn-arms.
Similar orders were then issued by Potocki to other
regiments of registered Kozaks,

20

but again, apart from

fresh deflections to Khmelnytsky, his orders were not
carried out.

Potocki then attempted to induce those in

18

In the important letter of M. Potocki to M. Ostrorog,
Bar, December 24, 1648, cited by Lipinski, op. c i t ., p. 221,
n. 2, there is no reference to Khmelnytskyi.
19
L. Miaskowski1s letter to Anonymous, Balabanivka,
February 16, 1648, in Lipinski, "Annexa", op. c i t ., pp.
353-54.
20

See M. Potocki1s letter to the Colonel of the Kaniv
Regiment, Verbych, February 13, 1648.
Cited by M.
Hrushevskyi, Istoriia Ukrainy-Rusy 10 vols (New York, 1956),
VIII, 2, 180, n. 1.
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Zaporozhe to abandon Khmelnytskyi by threats of serious
reprisals on their families, and on destruction and confiscation of their properties and lands.

21

When this stern

manifesto failed to make any impression on the Kozaks,
Potocki then reversed to kindness and concessions.

He

promised to them that he would remove from their posts the
commissioner and all the colonels against whom the Kozaks
had any just grievances; to take severe action against
those tenants by whom they were oppressed; and to insure
that they would have a free access to their steppe occu
pations.

He also tried to lure Khmelnytskyi out of
I
Zaporozhe with offers of safe conduct, forgiveness for his
actions and restoration of his estate.

Both the Kozaks and

Khmelnytskyi, however, turned down his offers. 22
One of the serious mistakes made by Potocki was
that he paid too little attention to the Kozak-Tatar
contacts, even though he knew about them in February.

He

21

See M. Potocki's manifesto to the Kozaks at Zaporozhe,
Korsun, February 20, 1648.
Ibid.
22

See M. Potocki1s letter to Wladyslaw IV [Korsun],
March 31, 1648, in Vossoedinenie Ukrainy etc., II, pp. 15-16;
and Chrzaszcz, op. c i t ., p. 263.
no

See the anonymous diary in Pamiatrnki etc., 2nd rev.
e d . , I , 175.
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dismissed all nev/s of the Kozak-Tatar alliance as rumours,
preferring to believe various reports that Sultan Ibrahim
I would not permit the Tatars to invade the Commonwealth.

2‘

After he received official confirmation that the Tatars
would support the Kozaks,

25

the aim of Khmelnytskyi's

delaying tactics became obvious to him.

The Kozaks were

not planning a naval raid into the Ottoman dominions;
instead, they were prepared to march into Ukraine and with
the Tatar help to fight for their demands.

At the close

of March, Potocki already received these demands from
Khmelnytskyi: withdrawal of the Crown Army from Ukraine;
removal of the colonels from their posts; disbanding of
their guard detachments; and the restoration of all former
Kozak liberties by repealing the Ordinance of 1638.

26

Potocki still underestimated the role of the
24

See V. Lupul's letter to L. Miaskowski, Iasi, February
1, 1648, in Lipinski, "Annexa", op. c i t ., p. 354; and A.
Kysil's letters to Iu. Dolgorukov, Kobyzhcha, January 24
and February 23, 1648, in Akty otnosiashchesia etc., Ill,
109, 142-53.
25

Muscovite officials informed Kysil that the KozakTatar military alliance was concluded on March 15th.
See
the letter of A. Trubetskoi and others to A. Kysil, Moscow,
April 20, 1648, in Akty otnosiashchiesia etc., Ill, 180.
Potocki knew about this development before the end of March.
2^See Potocki's letter to Wladyslaw IV [Korsun], March
31, 1648, in Vossoedinenie Ukrainy etc., II, 16.
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Tatars.

Moreover, he was induced .by the friendly overtures

of the khan into believing that the Tatars wanted peace.

27

Not expecting Tatar intervention, Potocki decided to march
against the rebels and crush them.

By taking this step

he ignored the orders of the king and the advice of others,
who were decidedly against such a risky step. 28

Potocki

reasoned, however, that he had to crush the rebels before
they managed to enter the settled areas of Ukraine.
visualized the rising of the serfs;

He

with the influx of

serfs into the rebel Kozak ranks, Khmelnytskyi's "three
97
See B. K. Maskiewicz, "Pamietniki Boguslawa
Kazimierza Maskiewicza" [ Memoirs of Boguslaw Kazimierz
Maskiewicz], in Pamietniki etc (Wroclaw, 1961) 237-38; and
A. Kysil's letters to A. Trubetskoi and others, Kobyzhcha,
Mnrch 31 and April 3, 1648, in Akty otnosiashchiesia etc.,
Ill, 169-71.
See also Kubala, op. c i t ., p. 265; and
Tomkiewicz, Jeremi Wisniowiecki (1612-1651) (Warsaw, 1933),
pp. 181-83.
9R
M. Potocki's letter to Wladyslaw IV [Korsun], March
31, 1648, in Vossoedinenie Ukrainy etc., II, 15-17 shows
clearly that the king ordered Potocki not to initiate
hostilities against the Kozaks.
The letters of B. Khmelny
tskyi to Wladyslaw IV, A. Kazanowski and W. Zaslawski, Bila
Tserkva, June 12, 1648, and to Z. Czerny, Korsun, May 27,
1.648, in Dokumenty Bohdana Khmelnytskoho et c . , pp. 34, 40,
42, 31 also show that Potocki acted against the orders of
the king.
From the following letters there is additional
evidence that other individuals were against Potocki1s
plans; M. Ostrorog to J. Ossolinski, Lviv, May 26, 1648 and
A. Kysil to Wladyslaw IV, Hoshcha, May 27, 1648, in
Szajnocha, "Zrodla", op. c i t ., II, 2, 378, 382; and A. Kysil
to M. Lubienski, [Hoshcha], May 31, 1648, in Vossoedinenie
Ukrainy etc., II, 26.
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thousand men would quickly become one hundred thousand".
If the Kozak rebels were defeated the serfs would not dare
to rise. 29
He planned to deal with Khmelnytskyi's rebels in
Zaporozhe.

Potocki considered that his task would be

accomplished without bloodshed.

The rebels would be over

awed with his show of strength and be compelled to capitu
late.

He was so confident of success that he refused to

wait for the arrival of the magnate private armies and he
appointed his son Stefan to lead a vanguard into Zaporozhe.
Late in April one detachment of the vanguard, comprising
mainly still loyal registered Kozaks, sailed down the
Dn^iper by boats; the other, commanded by young Potocki,
proceeded south by land.

Both detachments were to combine

at Kodak fortress, and then the vanguard would begin its
operations against the rebels.

The main body of the Crown

Army was concentrated near Korsun and it would aid the
vanguard if it became necessary.
Khmelnytskyi was informed about the movements of
the Crown Army.

He acted before the rendezvous of the

^ S e e M. Potocki1s letter to Wladyslaw IV [Korsun],
March 31, 1648, in Vossoedinenie Ukrainy etc., II, 15-16.
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vanguard took place.

At Zhovti Vody he surrounded the

detachment of Stefan Potocki.

Once this was accomplished

he was concentrating on the movements of the flotilla of
the registered Kozaks on the Dnieper.

He did not need to

march against the registered Kozaks, for many of them were
in sympathy with the rebel cause.

At Kamianyi Zaton there

occurred a third mutiny; these registered Kozaks killed
their loyal officers and deserted to Khmelnytskyi.

During

the following days of battle the remaining registered
Kozaks and squadrons of dragoons in young Potocki's camp
also deserted their commander.

From May 15’ to the 16th,

as the Tatars joined Khmelnytskyi's forces, the remnants of
the vanguard were annihilated.
Army thus ceased to exist.

The vanguard of the Crown

30

Meanwhile, Crown Grand Hetman Mikolaj Potocki
waited anxiously for news from the vanguard.

Receiving no

word for some time, he decided to march southward.

On

^ F o r the Battle of Zhovti Vody (April 29 to May 15 or
16, 1648), see the following sources and monographs:
K.
Grodzicki's letter to M. Potocki [Kodak], May 9, 1648, in
P amiatniki etc., I, 3, 21-24; J. Belchacki's letter to
Anonymous, Cherkasy, May 20, 1648, in Sprawy i rzeczy e t c .,
pp. 110-12; Anonymous letter from Cherkasy, May 20, 164-8,
in Lipinski, "Annexa", op . c i t . , p. 355; Chrzaszcz, op. c i t .
pp. 264-67; Gorka, o p . c i t . , p. 114; and Iu.< Tys-Krokhmaliuk
Boi Khmelnytskoho etc (Munich, 1954), pp. 51-64
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May 3

he finally received a message that his son's

detachment was surrounded and was defending itself against
great o d d s .

Appealing for additional troops, Potocki then

advanced to Chyhyryn.

Here news reached him about the

mutiny of the registered Kozaks on the Dnieper.
19,

he received the tragic news about his son.

On May
Ordering

a retreat, Potocki decided to meet the enemy in a fortified
camp near Korsun.

Upon the sight of such a large Kozak-

Tatar force, however, he changed his mind and resumed the
retreat.

This was a fatal mistake:

into a skillfully-prepared ambush.
suffered an overwhelming defeat.

he led the Crown Army
On May 26, 1648 it

31

These military disasters brought to an end the
decade of that "golden peace" in effect since the Kozak
Ordinance of 1638.

The best troops of the Commonwealth,

and the mainstay of the magnate rule in Ukraine, ceased to
exist.

Mikolaj Potocki, and the second-in-command, Crown

^ F o r the Battle of Korsun (May 24 to 26, 1648), see
the following sources and monographs: Anonymous report on
the defeat of the Hetmans, [n.p.], May 26, 1648, K.
Rajecki's letter to K. Lubomirski, Polonne, May 28, 1648;
and the letter of J. Ulinski and S. Jaskolski to [M.
Lubienski], Bar, June [8 ], 1648, in Jakuba Michalowskiego
etc., pp. 17-24, 36-38.
See also Krokmaliuk, o p . c i t .,
pp. 67-81.
Concerning the correct address and date of
letter of Ulinski and Jaskolski see Kubala, op. c i t . ,
p. 447, n. 48.
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Field Hetman Marcin Kalinowski, became Tatar prisoners.
To make the matters even worse,

at the time when the

Commonwealth needed a strong leader, it was to experience
the chaos of the interregnum, for on May 20 King Wladys
law died.

To add to these misfortunes of the ruling order,

the south-eastern palatinates were engulfed by a terrible
fire —

the rising of the serfs.

These events were indeed

32
a "terrible rerum metamorphosis" .
Many nobles were convinced that these catastrophic
developments were visible signs of God's wrath and punish
ment for their sins.

Some of them were driven into

desperation by the thought that "the serfs will now rule
over u s " , and fled in panic into the interior parts of the
Commonwealth.

Others saw no hope and expected that they

would perish.

The south-eastern palatinates were left to

the ravages of the serfs.
Kozak rebels.

33

There was no force to stop the

Yet, at such a time Khmelnytskyi actually

32

A. Kysil's letter to M. Lubienski [Hoshcha], May 31,
1648, in Vossoedinenie Ukrainy etc.', II, 25.
See ibid., W. Zaslawski's letter to M. Lubienski,
D u b n o , June 2, 1648; and A. Kysil's letter to M. Lubienski,
Hoshcha, June 7, 1648, in Szajnocha, "Zrodla", op. c i t ., II,
2, 392, 403; Anonymous letter from Lviv, June 4, 1648, and
B. Leszczynski's speech at the Convocation Diet, Third
Session, Warsaw, July 18, 1648, in Jakuba Michalowskiego
etc., pp. 32-34 112; and J. Jerlicz, Latopisiec etc., 2
vols (Warsaw, 1853), I, 62.
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halted his victorious advance at Bila Tserkva.

To the

optimistic nobles this move was an act of "moderation" on
his part.

The pessimist saw it only as an attempt to

prepared a death blow to the Commonwealth.

34

Ill
Early in June, 1648 Bohdan Khmelnytskyi found him
self in a position similar to that of a man who attempted
to vault into a saddle, but who jumped over a horse
instead.

35

Khmelnytskyi expected to carry out a success

ful military campaign, but certainly not to annihilate the
Crown Army in two main engagements.

Although he counted on

the rising of the serfs in Ukraine, he anticipated neither
such a spontaneous outburst of the "serfs' fury", nor an
eruption of a movement of such great proportions, which
threatened with the extirpation of the ruling class.

These

unexpected developments made possible for Khmelnytskyi the

^ S e e Letter of S. Kishevych [Lviv], July 13, 1648,
cited by Lipinski, op. c i t ., p. 238; A. Kysil's letter to
M. Lubienski [Hoshcha], May 31, 1648, in Vossoedinenie
Ukrainy etc., II, 25; Zolkiewski's letter to J. Ossolinski,
Dub n o , June 8 , 1648, and W. Zaslawski's letter to the
Convocation Diet, Dubno, June 14, 1648, in Szajnocha,
"Zrodla", op. c i t ., II, 2, 405; X, 197-203.
35

See Hrushevskyi, op. c i t . , VIII, 3, 9‘.
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attainment of his boldest aims.

The Kozak leader, however,

had still no clearly defined plans at this time,

Contrary

to the beliefs of many panicky nobles, Khmelnytskyi could
not throw all caution to the w i n d s .

He was also in no

position to send an ultimatum to the government, or to deal
Furthermore, h e .1 had no

a death-blow to the Commonwealth.
intention to march at Warsaw.

Khmelnytskyi halted the victorious Kozak advance
cit Bila Tserkva for a definite purpose.

His Tatar allies,

laden with plunder and numerous captives, returned to
Crimea in the middle of June.

36

Although Khan Islam III

promised to send back his hordes in August ,

^

Khmelnytskyi

was uncertain of Tatar military aid in the future.

It

was no secret to him that Khan received strict orders from
the Turkish government to return to Crimea and not to

■^See Islam Ill 's letter to Wladyslaw IV [ Zubzhytsa ],
June [11], 1648 (sic) , in Jakuba Mich alov/ski ego etc., p. 41.
Concerning the correct place and date of issue of this
letter see Kubala, op. c i t ., p. 449, n. 61. The Khan must
have pretended not to know about the death of the king
(May 20th) at the request of Khmelnytskyi.
See n. 44
below.
37 See Gorka, op. c i t . , p. 116.
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invade the Commonwealth again.

This order meant in fact

that the Kozak-Tatar alliance came to an end.

Were the

Khan to ignore the orders of his suzerain, he had to face
the consequences from Muscovy.

If the Tatars entered into

the territories of the Commonwealth, Muscovy would send
its troops against them.

Both Khmelnytskyi and Islam III

were aware that the Muscovite government was prepared to
honour the defensive anti-Tatar alliance, which was
concluded with the Polish-Lithuanian state m

1647.

39

Neither of them wished to involve Muscovy in the conflict.
Apart from these adverse developments, Khmelnytskyi

-^ I b i d . See also Ahmed Pasha's letter to Potocki
[Constantinopole, c a . , late May or early June, 1648]; [L.
Miaskowski's letter to J. Ossolinski, Kamianets, c a . , June
11, 1648], in Szajnocha, "Zrodla", op. c i t ., X, 293-94,
267-68; and the summary of Ahmed Pasha's letter to J.
Ossolinski [Constantinopole, c a . , June 11, 1648], in Zygmunt
Abrahamowicz e d . , Katalog dck umentow tureckich. Dokumenty
do dziejow Polski i krajow osciennych w latach 1455-1672
[A Catalogue of Turkish Documents.
Documents Pertaining to
History of Poland and to the Neighbouring Countries in the
Years 1455-167 2] (Warsaw: Panstwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe,
1959), pp. 326-27.
Concerning the correct names, places
and dates of issue of these letters see Szajnocha, op. cit.,
II, 1, 107-08, 110-11.
39
See A. Kysil's letter to M. Lubienski [Hoshcha], May
31, 1648, in Vossoedinenie Ukrainy etc., II, 26; S.
Bolkhovskii's letter to A. Kysil, Khotmyzhsk, June 14,
1648, in Akty otnosiashchiesia etc., Ill, 204; and B.
Khmelnytskyi's letter to S. Bolkhovskii, Chyhyryn, June 30,
1648, in Dokumenty Bohdana Khmelnytskoho etc., p. 54.
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still faced danger from other sources.

He speculated that

King Wladyslaw issued a general mobilization order for the
gentry of t h e •Commonwealth, and that the king had ordered
the troops of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania to march against
the Kozaks.
the king?

Would the Kozaks dare to take up arms against
He also had some evidence that the nobles were

preparing to offer some resistance.

The initial step was

taken by Prince Jeremi Wisniowiecki, who began to make
attempts to quell the rising of the serfs.

This magnate

began to rally the panicky nobles to his side and
40
encouraged them to follow his examples.
I
Under these circumstances Khmelnytskyi found no
reason to press his army towards Warsaw.

The march into

Polish ethnic territories might drive the gentry into a
desperate defence of their fatherland.

Moreover, his

troops were weary after a strenous campaign.
were ill-equipped, unorganized and untrained.

Many of them
Khmelnytskyi

thought more about defence and consolidation of his gains.
Z^t this early stage of struggle he achieved already,
considerably more than he expected.

The Kozak military

successes and the rising of the serfs would help him to
40

.
See Kubala, op. c i t ., p. 276; and Tomkiewicz, op. c i t .,
p. 187.
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satisfy his personal ambitions and to secure official confirmation of the rights of the Kozak Army.

41

He thus saw no

need to jeopardize his bargaining position upon the outcome
of some major battle during the Kozak drive to Warsaw.
During this period of inaction, Khmelnytskyi
received an important messuage from Adam Kysil, the Palatine
of Bratslav.

This Orthodox magnate advised him to cease all

hostilities, make no further advance, rupture the Tatar
alliance and to send a delegation to Warsaw with assurance
of loyalty to the Commonwealth.

At the same time the dele

gates should acquaint the government with Kozak grievances
and present to it definite demands.

Kysil promised to

Khmelnytskyi to use his influence in Warsaw on Kozak behalf,
if the conditions he proposed were carried out.

42

^ S e e B. Khmelnytskyi's letter to Wladyslaw IV, Bila
Tserkva,June 12, 1648 (sic., see n. 44 below); in Dokumenty
Bohdana Khmelnytskoho e t c ., pp. 33-34; and the Journal of W.
Miaskowski, Pereiaslav, February 23, 1649, in Vossoedinenie
Ukrainy e t c ., II, 108.
42

See A. Kysil's letter to B. Khmelnytskyi[Hoshcha],
June [7 ], 1648, in Jakuba Michalowskiego etc., pp. 46-48.
In this collection of documents Kysil's letter is dated
June 12th; while the same copy of this letter, in Pamatniki
etc., I, 3, 140-48, is dated June 14th. Both dates are
incorrect. The correct date is June 7th, as evident from
the following correspondence: A. Kysil's letter to M.
Lubienski, Hoshcha, June 7, 1648.
See Szajnocha, "Zrodla",
op. cit., II, 2, 398-403; and Kubala, op. c i t ., p. 448,
n. 50.
Kysil's letter to Lubienski is also found in Jakuba
Michalowskiego etc., pp. 65-68, but again is dated
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Khmelnytskyi siezed this opportunity to strengthen
his new position which resulted from the recent victories.
He agreed to accept Kysil's proposals and to enter into
negotiations with the government.

43

In order to gain

greater concessions, he pretended to know nothing about the
death of King Wladyslaw.

44

In a humble letter to the late

king he emphasized that he was not responsible for starting
of the conflict.

He only acted in self-defence when

Potocki marched against him.

Khmelnytskyi assured the king

of his faithfulness and loyalty to his person,

and even

alluded to their common interest in combatting the tyranny

incorrectly — June 30th.
Concerning the correct dates of
these letters see Szajnocha, o p . c i t ., II, 1. 116-17; and
Kubala, op. c i t ., p. 448, nn. 50, 53.
43

See B. Khmelnytskyi's letter to A. Kysil, Bila Tserkva,
June 13, 1648, in Dokumenty Bohdana Khmelnytskoho etc., pp.
44-45; and A. Kysil's letter to M. Lubienski Hoshcha ,
June 16, 1648, in Jakuba Michalowskiego etc., p. 50.
44 .
.
King Wladyslaw IV died on May 20, 1648; yet, on June
12th Khmelnytskyi still addressed a letter to him.
There is
enough evidence to show that Khmelnytskyi knew about the
death of the king well before June 12t.h. Some of the
contemporaries believed that Khmelnytskyi played a game of
pretense.
See A. S. Radziwill, Pamietniki etc., 2 vols
(Poznan, 1839), II, 293. He must have asked Khan Islam III
to help him in this game of pretense.
See n. 36 above.
Khmelnytskyi's motives were obvious.
He knew who would read
his letter. He was able to refer specifically and to allude
to various "promises” of Wladyslaw IV without fear of contra
diction.
See Hrushevskyi, op. c i t . , VIII, 3, 16.
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of the magnates.

The Kozak Army would also remain loyal

to the king; it wished to be placed exclusively under his
protection.

He emphasized that peace was possible if the

demands of the Kozaks were taken into consideration.

45

At the same time he also wrote humble letters to several
influential magnates, asking them for intercession upon
Kozak behalf.

46

That at this time Khmelnytskyi formulated great
political designs were only alarming rumours, without
foundation, circulating among the panicky nobles.

They saw

Khmelnytskyi as a "Rusin prince" who intended to carve out
<
of the south-eastern palatinates of the Commonwealth a
"sovereign Rusin principality", or to establish a "Rusin
monarchy" with Kiev as his capital.

47

Nothing of the sort

45

See B. Khmelnytskyi1s letter to Wladyslaw IV, Bila
Tserkva, June 12, 1648, in Dokumenty Bohdana Khmelnytskoho
etc., pp. 33-34.
46

See B. Khmelnytskyi's letters to A. Kazanowski and to
W. Zaslawski, Bila Tserkva, June 12, 1648, ibid., pp. 39-43.
He also wrote to J. Ossolinski and to A. Radziwill.
See
Radziwill, op. c i t ., II, 296.
47

See the following letters: A. Kysil to M. Lubienski
[Hoshcha], May 31, 1648, in Vossoedinenie Ukrainy e t c . , II,
25; Anonymous letter from Lviv, June 4, 1648; J. Ulinski and
S. Jaskulski to [ M. Lubienski], Bar, June [8], 1648; and
the speech of B. Leszczynski at the Convocation Diet,
Second Session, Warsaw, July 17, 1648, in Jakuba Michalow
skiego etc., pp. 34, 39, 109.
See also the following:
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was advanced by him to the government.

Khmelnytskyi did

not expect to gain complete independence.

The rebellion

he led was not a premeditated death blow to the PolishLithuanian state.
anti-magnate —

The only anti-state —

or more properly

design proposed by him, was his desire for

strengthening the authority of the monarch.
whole, he made very moderate claims.

48

On the

These amounted more

or less to his desire of reaching a compromise with the
government.
The chief aim of Khmelnytskyi, as well as that of
all the Kozaks, was to secure the repeal of the Ordinance
o f 1638 and the official confirmation of all former Kozak
liberties.

This is evident from the demands of the Kozak

Army brought to Warsaw by its delegates.

Apart from

Extract from the letter of L. Miaskowski to anonymous,
Kamianets, June 8 , 1648; anonymous despatch from Brody,
June 10, 1648, in Szajnocha, "Zrodla" op. c i t ., II, 407,
409, M. Ostrorog to J. Ossolinski, Lviv, June 4, 1648, in
P amietniki o Koniecpolskich etc., p. 424; and MS. B.Z.N.
Ossol ., 189, f .77.
48

See B. Khmelnytskyi1s letters to the following:
Z.
Czerny, Bila Tserkva, May 27, 1648; Wladyslaw IV, Bila
Tserkva, June 12, 1648; and Jan Kazimierz, Zamostia,
November 15, 1648, in Dokumenty Bohdana Khmelnytskoho etc.,
32-34, 80. See also Sobieski's report at the Convocation
Diet, Fifth Session, Warsaw, July 21, 1648, in Jakuba
Michalowskiego etc., p. 121; and the Diary of W. Miaskowski
Pereiaslav, February 22, 1649, in Vossoedinenie Ukrainy etc.,
II, p. 108.
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numerous examples of grievances against the injustice of
various officials, the Kozaks listed only four items of
greater importance.

For their Army the Kozaks asked the

doubling of the quota of registered Kozaks to 12,000; they
demanded pay which they failed to receive for the past
five years; and the restoration of their former military
self-government.

Finally, on behalf of the Orthodox clergy

the Kozaks also wanted the establishment of full authority
of the Orthodox Church, as well as the restoration^Ortho
dox churches held in certain towns of the Crown and the
49
Grand Duchy by the Uniates.
The Kozaks also wanted an autonomous territory
beyond Bila Tserkva under the jurisdiction of the Kozak
Army, which would be free from various Crown officials and
in which the Crown Army would not be stationed.

50

This

wish, no doubt, was the source of the alarming rumours
about Khmelnytskyi and his ’’sovereign Rusin principality" ,

^ S e e the Grievances and Demands of the Kozak Army, Bila
Tserkva, June 12, 1648, in Dokumenty Bohdana Khmelnytskoho
e t c ., pp. 36-37.
Cf)

See M. Potocki1s letter to Wladyslaw IV [Korsun],
March 31, 1648, in Vossoedinenie Ukrainy etc., pp. 15-16;
and J. Ulinski and S. Jaskulski's letter to [M. Lubienski],
Bar, June [8 ], 1648, in Jakuba Michalowskiego etc., p. 39.
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51
which circulated among the nobles.*

.
Since nothing of

this sort was specified in the official demands of the Kozak
Army to the government, this must have been matter of
secondary importance.
To Khmelnytskyi and to the Kozaks religious freedom
was the only important "national" question.

As had been

customary since the 1520's, the Kozaks championed for the
rights of the Orthodox Church.

They were little concerned

with other "national" questions of the Rusin people.
is best illustrated by their egotistical demands.

This

They

failed to mention the needs of the unprivileged classes.
As far as the Rusin populace was concerned, it was a handy
tool to be used in gaining concessions for the Kozak Army.
They cared little about the rights of the submerged
agrarian population.

It was this element, however, which

radically changed the nature of the Kozak revolt.

As the

rising of the serfs took greater dimensions and a more
terrible form, Khmelnytskyi was left with two choices: to
flow with the tide, or to make attempts to dam it.
At the close of June he summoned a general council
of the Kozak Army at Chyhyryn to deal with this problem.

^ S e e Hrushevskyi, op. c i t ., VIII, 3, 12.
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Most Kozaks expressed hope that their delegates would
return from Warsaw with a favourable answer to their
demands, and that peace would result eventually.

They were,

however, prepared to accept even the worst news.

For this

reason they had to decide on a definite course of action.
The Kozak officers were generally against the continuing
on with the hostilities.

They proposed to move supplies

of all available foodstuffs to Zaporozhe; Khmelnytskyi was
even prepared to flee into the Don district of Muscovy.
From here negotiations could be carried on without danger
with both the Poles and the T u r k s .

If agreement was reached

with the Poles, they would fight the Turks again; if nego
tiations brought no fruit, they would accept the protection
of the sultan and continue to fight the Poles.

Others

argued that all "lawless bands", serfs and Tatars should
be called for support at the first indication of hostility
of the Poles.
negotiations;

The common Kozaks were decisively against
and they openly clamoured for the continuation

of war. 52

See the Report of Rev. P. Lasko, Chyhyryn, June 29,
1648, in Vossoedinenie Ukrainy etc., II, 44-46; the Inter
rogation of Kozak Prisoners, Halych, July 29, 1648, in
Jakuba Michalowskiego etc., p. 93; and S. Karpinski's letter
to Anonymous, Bar, June 25, 1648, in Szajnocha, "Zrodla",
op. c i t ., II, 2, 430-32.
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The Kozak general staff decided to adopt a policy
of caution.

Khmelnytskyi,

as well as many of the Kozak

officers, belonging as they did to the gentry, were watching
the rising of the serfs with apprehension.

This group was

not altogether pleased with the massacres'of the. nobles.
Would the serfs accept Kozak masters in place of the
eradicated Polish or Rusin lords?

Would the serfs return

to the tilling of the soil and to the burdens of corvee
once peace was concluded?

The Kozaks were not interested

in any drastic changes of the existing socio-economic order.
Khmelnytskyi decided that he did not want to dam the serf
deluge; he only wanted to control its flow.

If he allowed

himself to be carried with the serf deluge, his personal
position and the interests of his own class, as well as
those of the Kozaks, might perish.

Thus, on the one hand,

the serf rising aided his plans; on the other, it hampered
his negotiations with the government.

He had to come to

terms with the government before matters would go beyond
his control.
At this time Khmelnytskyi had little control over
the serf movement.

The serfs acted independently and

frequently paid no heed to his manifestoes.

Khmelnytskyi

received news that the serfs on the left bank of the Dnieper
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intended to select another leader for themselves.

He began

to have serious misunderstandings with the popular serf
leader Maxym Kryvonis.

In order to establish his authority,

secure his own gains and that of the Kozaks, and to quiet
the apprehensions of the nobles, Khmelnytskyi decided to
carry out dangerous and unpopular measures.

He seemed to

create a rift between the Kozaks and the serfs by restri
cting serf entry into the Kozak Army, denouncing the
cictions of the "lawless bands" , sending manifestoes to
restore order in the countryside and by executing several
of the serf leaders.

He even claimed that if the govern-

«
ment agreed to meet the Kozak demands he was willing to
assist the.ruling class to check the deluge of the serfs.
This was only the one side of the coin.
Past experience, however, taught Khmelnytskyi of
the many dangers and disadvantages of being the weaker
partner during the negotiations.

He had no intention of

being forced into that position.

The Kozak leader led

53

See B. Khmelnytskyi1s manifestoes to the Kozaks and
Serfs, Chyhyryn, June 27 and July 12, 1648, in Dokumenty
Bohdana Khmelnytskoho etc., pp. 54-57; Report of Rev. P.
Lasko, Chyhyryn, June 29, 1648, in Vossoedinenie Ukrainy
etc., II, 45; and the Anonymous despatch [n.p., ca. July
7-8, 1648], in Szajnocha, "Zrodla", op. c i t ., II,
2, 422.
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certain men of influence to believe that he would obey the
i

demands of the government and that he was prepared to
settle all differences over the conference table.

54

He was

too shrewd, however to place his complete trust in the
promises of the ruling order, especially when there were
still many voices raised in Warsaw against the "humiliation"
of making too many concessions to the lowest riffraff of the
55
Commonwealth".

To follow the demands of the government

to the letter was to invite disaster.

Khmelnytskyi decided

first to consolidate his own position among the Kozaks and
the serfs.

He would then find a way by which he could apply

pressure on the government to gain Kozak demands.

Finally,

he decided to organize a strong army which would guarantee
that all the promises of the government woul'd be kept.

In

order to accomplish all t h i s , Khmelnytskyi agreed to an
armistice.

All hostilities were to be suspended until

Kozak delegates returned from Warsaw with the reply of the

~*^See B. Khmelnytskyi1s letter to A. Kysil, Chyhyryn,
June 27, 1648, in Dokumenty Bohdana Khmelnytskoho etc.,
pp. 51-52.
55

See the Speech of B. Leszczynski at the Convocation
Diet, Second Session, Warsaw, July 17, 1648, in Jakuba
Michalowskiego etc., p. 109.
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government to the demands of the Kozak Army.

The

armistice, however, rested on a weak foundation:

both

sides built the agreement on distrust and deceit.

5^See M. Lubienski's letters to J. Tyszkiewicz and J.
Sisniowiecki, Warsaw, June 24, 1648, ibid., pp. 62-63;
Senate's letters to J. Tyszkiewicz and J. Wisiowiecki,
Warsaw, June 24, 1648, in Szajnocha, "Zrodla", op . c i t .,
II, 2, 425-28, and in Pamiatniki etc., I, 3, 102; and B.
Khmelnytskyi1s letter to A. Kysil, Chyhyryn,1 June 27, 1648,
in Dokumenty Bohdana Khmelnytskoho etc., pp. 51-52.
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CHAPTER IV

THE CONFLICTING POLICIES OF THE OSSOLINSKI-WISNIOWIECKI
GROUPS, AND THE TRANSORMATION OF THE KOZAK REBELLION
INTO THE NATIONAL STRUGGLE OF THE RUSIN PEOPLE

I
At a time when unity of action for the government
was of the utmost importance to prevent further bloodshed
in the south-eastern pa.latinates , the Commonwealth was
plagued by additional difficulties.

A solution how to deal

with the Kozaks and the serfs was yet to be found; new army
<
commanders to replace the captive hetmans were still to be
appointed;

and a new monarch was still to be elected.

Worst of all, at such a difficult time the Commonwealth did
not have a strong leader.

The Interrex, Primate Maciej

Lubienski, was only a nominal head of state.

This feeble

old man was unable to provide strong leadership, or even to
unite all the hostile factions among the nobles of the
Commonwealth.^

As a result of these conditions, there

emerged two main groups among the nobles: one was led by

■^See L. Kubala, Jerzy Ossolinski, 2nd rev. ed (Lviv,
1924), p. 267.
105
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the Crown Grand Chancellor, Jerzy Oss olinski;

the other

was dominated by the Palatine of R u s , Prince Jeremi
Wisniowiecki.

Both groups agreed on the accomplishment of

one basic aim: the restoration of the staus quo of the old
order in the south-eastern palatinates of the Commonwealth.

2

Ea.ch group, however, proposed a different programme on the
ways and means of dealing with the Kozak-serf problem;
clashed on the issue of appointment new army commanders;
and supported different candidates for the Polish throne.
The Kozak-serf problem proved to be the chief source of
disagreement between the two groups.
Jerzy Ossolinski attempted to save the Commonwealth
from the impending catastrophe by acting for the indecisive
Lubienski.

Driven and guided by the love of his country and

by his personal ambitions, Ossolinski steered the ship of
state during the interregnum by half-legal measures.

3

His

primary concern was to prevent the fusion of the Kozak
rebellion with the rising of the serfs and to rupture the
2

See Zofia Libiszowska, "Stosunek polskich mas ludowych
do walki narodowo-wyzwolenczej na Ukrainie w latach 16481654"
[The Relation of the Polish Popular Masses to the
Struggle for the National Liberation in Ukraine During the
Years 1648-1654], in Sesja naukowa etc (Warsaw, 1956),
p 38 .
.
3

See Kubala, o p . c i t ., pp. 268-74.
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Kozak-Tatar military alliance.

He believed that these were

the sources of grave danger to the Commonwealth.

But these

sources of danger could be averted by governmental conces
sions to the Kozaks, designed to pacify them by satisfying
their narrow class interests.

Moreover, Ossolinski reasoned

that the pacified Kozaks, in order to safeguard their newlygained governmental concessions, could be easily induced to
quell the rising of the serfs.
Once the domestic strife ended within the Common
wealth, Ossolinski planned to revive the old animosities
between the Kozaks and the Tatars, to smash their "unholy"
alliance and then to direct the Kozaks against Crimea.

But

there was also another reason why Ossolinski sought to set
into motion the war plans of the late King Wladyslaw IV
against the Muslim world.

He attempted to strengthen the

pov/er of the candidate for the Polish throne of his own
choice.

The Crown Grand Chancellor therefore planned to

make use of the Kozaks as an instrument in the royalist
reaction against the anti-monarchical faction of oligarchs
and nobles of the Commonwealth.

4

^See ibid., pp. 279-80.
See also Libiszowska., o p . c i t . ,
p. 38; W. Tomkiewicz, Jeremi Wisniowiecki (1612-1651)
(Warsaw, 1933), p. 191; and Wladyslaw Czaplinski, Dwa sejmy
w roku 1652.
Studium z dziejow rozkladu Rzeczypospolitej
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For these reasons Ossolinski and his supporters
initiated a programme of "contentment", or a programme of
conciliary policy towards the Kozaks.

5

The immediate aim

of this group was to halt all hostilities with the Kozaks
and to settle all difficulties by negotiations.

Ossolinski

encouraged the Orthodox magnate, the Palatine of Bratslav,
Adam Kysil, to act as a mediator between the government and
the Kozaks.^
The major aim of the other group, to use the words
of one demagogue, was to ensure that "our bondsmen would
7
not rule over u s " .

The loudest spokesman for thxs group

szlacheckiej w XVII wleku
[The Two Diets in the Year 1652.
A Study from the Times of the Declining Commonwealth of the
Gentry in the XVII Century]
(Wroclaw: Zaklad Narodowy im.
Ossolinskich, 1955), pp. 32-34.
On the renewed plans of
war with the Turks, see E. Latacz, Ugoda Zborowska a piany
tureckie Jana Kazimlerza (Ksrakow, 1933) .
C
This policy is clearly stated in an anonymous circular
entitled "An opinion of One Polish Noble on the Pacification
of the Zaporozhian A r m y " . It was/most likely composed by
Ossolinski or Kysil.
See Sprawy i rzeczy etc (Lviv, 1914),
pp. 119-23.
6

See J. Ossolinski's letter to A. Kysil [Warsaw, June 7,
1648], in K. Szajnocha, "Zrodla" [Sources], Dwa lata dziejow
naszych. 1646. 1648., 2 vols (Warsaw, 1900), II, 2, 420.
Concerning the correct date of this letter see Kubala,
o p . c i t ., p. 448, n. 49.
7

S. Lubomirski's letter to[A. Kysil], Wisnicz, June 14,
1648.
Cited by Zbigniew Wojcik, Dzikie Pola w ogn i u .
O Kozaczyznie w dawnej Rzeczypospolitej, 2nd ed (Warsaw:
Wiedza Powszechna, 1961), p. 176.
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was Prince Jeremi Wisniowiecki.

He was a Polonized Rusin

"kinglet" , who in his youth rejected Orthodoxy for Roman
Catholicism,

and who owned vast latifundiae and thousands

of serfs in Ukraine.

8

In Wisniowiecki1s evaluation, the

conflict within the Commonwealth was nothing more than an
insurrection of slaves,
severe arm of justice.

9

against whom must be raised the
The Kozaks must first be subdued;

then suitably punished for their treason;

and only then

could certain concessions be offered to them.

This meant

in fact to resort to sword and bloodshed in quelling the
Kozaks and the serfs, and then to dictate conditions of
I
peace to the vanquished.
Wisniowiecki saw in the policy of
"contentment" of the Kozaks the ultimate ruin of the
Commonwealth.

He believed that the rebels would only be

encouraged to continue their lawlessness and rebellion,
their ambitions would never be satisfied.
such policy would be catastrophic:
of the nobles".

as

The result of

"the continual oppression

Wisniowiecki would rather die than to

tolerate the rule of "the bondsmen and the most foul
O
See Tomkiewicz, o p . c i t ., pp. 6-8 , 57-113; and I. P.
Krvpiakevych, Bohdan Khmelnytskyi (Kiev, 1954), p. 18.
9See Tomkiewicz, o p . c i t ., p. 208.
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masses".

Notwithstanding the opposition of Wisniowiecki and
other intransigents, the programme of Ossolinski seemed to
be: successful.

It appeared that Adam Kysil managed to

arrange an armistice.

It also appeared that Khmelnytskyi

agreed to cease hostilities and that he was prepared to
negotiate.

At first most of the gentry of the Commonwealth

hailed these unexpected developments with satisfaction.
Some individuals even began to search for answers as to the
causes of the conflict within the Commonwealth.
The most common conclusion, as that of K. Opalinski,
was that God punished them for their sins, especially for
their ill-treatment of serfs.

The Lithuanian magnate,

Prince A. Radziwill, described this punishment in terms of
retributive justice.

"Formerly in this country the poor

were oppressed; now they oppress the rich.

Formerly the

lords used various means in order to squeeze blood from
their own serfs; now the serfs are reciprocating in kind".

Wisniowiecki1s letter to A. Kysil, Horochky, June
21, 1648, in Jakuba Michalowskiego etc (Krakow, 1864), pp.
55-56.
^ S e e K. Opalinski, "On the Burdens and the Oppression
of Serfs in Poland", Satyry (Wroclaw, 1953)', Book I, Satire
3, 11, 1-140, pp. 23-29.
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Convinced that "Our Merciful Lord punished us less for our
sins than we deserved", he concluded that it was imperative
.

.

.

.

"to limit our liberties, or rather the abuse of them".

12

Other individuals also echoed his conclusion: the
nobles of the Commonwealth, claimed one contemporary, equate
"liberty" with "licence".1 1

An anonymous noble pointed out

the main cause of the conflict within the Commonwealth in
the following way:

"The nobles in our country have so much

freedom,/ That little of it was left for the burgesses, and
14
hardly any for the serfs".

Another noble claimed that

the "kinglets", or "those who formed sovereign states [in
Ukraine],

and infringed upon the rights of not only the

serfs, but also of the nobles", should be held responsible
for the conflict.

15

These were the opinions of individuals

who considered compromise or concessions to the Kozaks as a
12

A. S. Radsiwill, Pamietniki etc., 2 vols
1839), II, 391.
*
'

(Poznan,

13

K. Opalinski, "On the Lame or Rather on the Dead Exe
cution of Our Laws", o p . cit . , Book. Ill, Satire 8 , 1. 48,
p. 158.
14

"A Noble to Another on the Kozak War in the Years 1648
and 1649" . Cited by Janina Bieniarzowna, Walka chlopow w
k a sztelanii k rakowskiej [The Struggle of the Serfs in the
Castellany of Krakow]
(Warsaw: Ludowa Spoldzielnia Wydawnicza, 1953), p. 32.
■^Speech of S. Kobierzycki at the Coronation Diet
Cited by Czaplinski, op. cit., p. 15.
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solution to the conflict.

But these were only the voices

of a small minority of the nobles of the Commonwealth.
The great majority of nobles of the Commonwealth
viewed Ossolinski's policy of "contentment" with suspicion
and regarded it extremely dangerous for themselves and for
their state.
tudes.

There were several reasons for these atti

First of all, when some of these nobles heard that

Kysil arranged an armistice and that Khmelnytskyi was
prepared to negotiate, they became ashamed of their former
panic.

Interpreting Khmelnytskyi1s unexpected actions and

his willingness to negotiate as a sign of Kozak weakness,
<
these nobles decided that the danger was over.

At this

point they would not "dishonour" themselves or their state
by allowing the "riffraff" to remain unpunished.

Had not

the lowest refuse of society deserved punishment for their
foul deeds and crimes?

Were the laments and the bloody

tears of the nobles, the desecrated churches and the treason
and perjury of the Kozaks to be forgotten?'*"^
Another reason why the policy of compromise was

^ S e e J. Wisniowiecki1s letter to A. Kysil, Horochky,
June 21, 1648, in J akuba Michalowskiego etc., pp. 55-56; and
W. Zaslawski’s letter to the Convocation Diet, D u b n o , July
14, 1648, in Karol Szajnocha, "Zrodla"[ Sources], Dziela
Karola Szajnochy [The WTorks of Karol Szajnocha] (Warsaw: J.
Unger, 1878f7~X~ 197-203 .
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unpopular among the majority of the nobles was because they
believed that it paved the way for Khmelnytskyi to create
his "sovereign Rusin Principality".

17

Even if Khmelnytskyi

failed in his plans of separatism, there still existed
another danger: the Commonwealth of the gentry would face
a radical transformation.

Khmelnytskyi, it was said,

favoured to change the status of the king from primus inter
pares among the nobles to an absolute monarch, as well as
to drastically curtail the liberties of the nobles.

18

Finally, the initial successes of Ossolinski's
policy failed to silence his greatest critics and opponents.
On the contrary, these individuals redoubled their efforts
to spread their point of view among the nobles of the
Commonwealth.
tiations.

These intransigents had no faith in nego

They advised the gentry to expect a long struggle

19
with the rebels.

. .
They wanted to make use of the armistice

17

See for example D. Slugocki's letter to Niezabitowski,
Cbolhanskyi Kamian, ca. September 8 , 1648, in Jakuba
M ichalowskiego etc., pp. 182-83.
l-^See for example D. Sobieski's report at the Convo
cation Diet, Fifth Session, Warsaw, July 21, 1648, ibid.,
pp. 120-121; and the reaction to this report, in M. Golinski,
MS. B.Z.N.Ossol., 189, f. 123.
19

.
See S. Lubomirski1s letter to the Dietane of the Pala
tinate of Krakow, Wisnicz, June 24, 1648, in Adam Przybos
e d . , Akta sejmikowe wojewodztwa krakowskiego [Records of

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

114

by raising a strong army; at the same time, however, they
also wanted some military action against the enemy.

20

It

nattered little to these supporters of the policy of the
sword what was promised to the Kozaks, because they
21
believed that "frangenti fidem, fides frangatur eidem" .
Wisniowiecki and his supporters took advantage of
the Dietines, which began their first sessions on June 25,
1648 throughout the Commonwealth.

They not only spread

their credo among these assemblies of the gentry, but also
launched a strong campaign in order to discredit the policy
of Ossolinski.

22

Moreover, these intransigents were res

ponsible for spreading malicious rumours against the late
King Wladyslaw IV and the Crown Grand Chancellor.

They

claimed that the king sought revenge on the nobles because

the Dietine of the Palatinate of Krakow}, 2 vols (KrakowWroclaw: Polska Akademia Umiejetnosci-Zaklad Narodowy im.
Ossolinskich, 1953-1955), II, 345.
20

See the letter of J. Tyszkiewicz and others to the
Senate, Kolchyn, July 30, 1648; and J. Wisniowiecki's letter
to M.Ostrorog, Zbarazh, August 12, 1648, in Jakuba
Michalowskiego etc., pp. 98-100, 154-55.
21

W. Zaslawski's letter to the Convocation Diet, D u b n o ,
July 14, 1648, in Szajnocha, "Zrodla", op. c i t . , X, 202.
22

Typical of this action is S. Lubomirski1s letter to
the Dietine of the Palatinate of Krakow, Wisnicz, June 24,
164-8, in Akta sejmikowe wojewodztwa krakowskiego, II,
344-48.
~~
'
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in 1646 they wrecked his plans of war with the Turks; thus,
in retalliation he incited the Kozaks to rebellion against
them.

In another version of these rumours, the king was

supposed to depend upon the Kozaks in order to establish a
hereditary monarchy and to extend absolute rule at the
expense of the liberties of the nobles.

Khmelnytskyi, it

was said, acted with the permission and the knowledge of
the king; and the third party in that arrangement was
Ossolinski, the "author" of the Kozak rebellion.

23

In this way the opponents of the policy of "content
ment" of the Kozaks gained a great deal of support from the
gentry as a whole,

I
and especially from those of the eastern

palatinates, who either lost or were threatened with the
loss of their estates to the "riffraff".

Most of the

23

See for example the lampoon, "Compendium consiliorum
of Jerzy Ossolinski, Crown Chancellor", which was composed
in 1649 by Wisniowiecki or by one of his followers. See
P amietniki o Koniecpolskich etc (Lviv, 1842), pp. 422-27.
In the same year appeared "Ad nugacem militem responsio",
which refuted all the charges made against Ossolinski in the
above lampoon.
See Jakuba Michalowskiego etc., pp. 476-83.
Another interesting document is B. Khmelnytskyi1s letter to
Jan Kazimierz, Chyhyryn, June 6 , 1651, in Dokumenty Bohdana
Khmclnytskoho etc (Kiev, 1961), pp. 631-32. This letter is
an obvious forgery.
It was written by some supporter of
Wisniowiecki and therefore an enemy of the royal court.
The
main value of this letter is that it contains many charges
against King Wladyslaw IV, Ossolinski, and other individuals.
See also J. Jerlicz, Latopisiec etc., 2 vols (Warsaw, 1853),
I , 52-53.
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deputies elected at the Dietines to attend the sessions of
the Convocation Diet at Warsaw were instructed by their
electors to wreck all the "machinations" of Ossolinski.

24

24 OssolinsKi's emergency meassures were extremely unpopu
lar with the gentry of the Commonwealth.
Contrary to law
and custom, he attempted to transform the assembly of the
nobles of the Palatinate of Mazowsze at Warsaw, into a kind
of Convocation Diet.
Under pressure of Ossolinski, this
assembly issued on June 9, 1648 a manifesto addressed to the
whole country.
This manifesto contained three controversial
items:
faster election of a new king;
immediate mobili
zation; and appointment of three regimentaries (W. Zaslaws k i , M. Ostrorog and A. Koniecpolski) in place of the cap
tive hetmans.
The majority of the nobles were enraged at this mani
festo. They held Ossolinski responsible for it. They did
not view his actions as an attempt to save the Commonwealth
from an impending catastrophe.
On the contrary, they saw
Ossolinski's measures as a deliberate attempt on his part to
settle his personal differences with his enemies, as well as
to elect a king of his own choice.
The new monarch would
undoubtedly try to extend "absolutum dominium" and thereby
curtail their liberties.
For these reasons, the PreConvocation Dietines rejected all of this manifesto of June
9, or parts of it.
For typical attitudes of the gentry see the Resolutions
and Instructions to the deputies of the Dietine of the Pala
tinate of Krakow, Proszowice, June 25, 1648, in Akta sejmikowe wojewodztwa krakowskiego, II, 354-58; the Dietine of
the Palatinates of Poznan and Kalisz, Sroda, June 24, 1648,
and an extract from the letter of an anonymous noble from
the Palatinate of Lublin [n.p.], July 7, 1648, in Jakuba
Mi.chalowskiego etc., pp. 63-64, 73.
See also Kubala, o p .
cit., pp. 282, 450, n. 7; and W. Lipinski, Stanislaw Michal
Krzyczewski etc (Krakow, 1912), pp. 260-61.
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II
While the pacifists and the intransigents fought
verbal battles, the nominal leader of the latter group,
Prince Jeremi Wisniowiecki, decided to act on his own with
the sword.'
who had

Wisniowicki was one of the few men of importance

not lost their heads' after the military disasters

of the Crown Army, the death of King Wladyslaw and the
rising of the serfs.

Ukraine was virtually without defense,

for the nobles left it to the prey of the Kozaks, Tatars and
serfs.

These nobles, rather than organizing some kind of

resistance, simply fled for their lives and sought shelter
in the fortresses of the western palatinates.

Most of them

were demoralized and only echoed words of despair.

Under

these circumstances Wisniowiecki decided to-save what could
be yet saved.

In his own way he proceeded to evolve order

out of chaos.
For proper understanding of Wisniowiecki1s intransigency to the Kozaks and the serfs, it is necessary to
remember that the source of that intransigency dated from
the annihilation of the Crown Army at Korsun

(May 26, 1643).

At that time he was trapped in his own latifundiae on the
left bank of the Dnieper by the rising of his own serfs, and
by the Kozak-Tatar forces on the right bank of the Dnieper.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

118

He issued manifestoes to the gentry to flock under his
colours, and then began to escape from his "cage".

He made

a spectacular march to the north with some six thousand
troops and with great numbers of nobles and Jews.

Turning

westward, he crossed the rives Desna, Dnieper and Prypiats,
marched south, and reached the northern borders of the Pala
tinate of Kiev by the middle of June.

Wisniowiecki then

undertook to oppose force by force and to check the rising
of the serfs with all the resources at his disposal.

25

At the close of June, Wisniowiecki began a counter
offensive against the roaming bands of serfs.

To the cruel

actions of the serfs he retalliated r/ith even worse
cruelties.

"Discharge your duties in such a way",

Wisniowiecki instructed his troops regarding all those who
opposed him, "that they may feel they are being put to
death".

26

.
Leaving a trail of hangings, e m p a l m g s

9S

and

.

.

See B. K. Maskiewicz, "Pamietniki Boguslawa Kazimierza
Maskiewicz a" [The Memoirs of Boguslaw Kazimierz Maskiewicz],
in Pamietniki etc (Wroclaw, 1961), pp. 243-46; Natan
Hannower, "Jawein Mecula t.j. Bagno Glebokie.
Kronika
zdarzen z lat 1648-1652, napisana przez Natana Hannowera z
Zaslawia i wydana po raz pierwszy w Wenecyi w r 1656", in
Sprawy i rzeczy etc., p. 22; and Tomkiewicz, op. cit.,
,

26

196197 7

J. W. Rudawski, Historja polska etc., 2 vols
Petersburg, 1855), I, 37.

(St.
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decapitations in the Palatinate of Kiev, he then inarched to
Volynia.

There his organized and disciplined body of

troops performed feats of "miraculous valour"

against the

27
motely serf masses commanded by Maksym Kryvonis.

Thxs

querilla warfare in 1648, was waged to the close of
August.

28

Both leaders adopted a policy of an eye for an

eye: Kryvonis' terrible atrocities were answered by even
. 29
more terrible pogroms of Wisniowiecki.
By fighting fire with fire, Wisniowiecki acted

27

Some historians have attempted to prove that Kryvonis
was a Scotsman and a secret agent of the Protestant powers.
Their claims rest on very weak foundations. See Lubomyr
Wynar, "The Question of Anglo-Ukrainian Relations During the
Rule of the Great Ukrainian Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytskyi",
Ukrainian Review, X (Spring, 1963), 37-39.
^^see Maskiewicz, in Pamietniki etc., pp. 247-54;
Tomkiewicz, op. c i t ., pp. 194-34.
29

and

.
Kryvonis is characterized by Golinski as "the great
tyrant and murderer, pillager of towns, villages, churches,
priests, nobles, Jews, women and children".
M. Golinski,
MS. B.Z,N.Ossol., 189, f. 113.
Kryvonis' massacres of the
Jews are described in great detail by Hannower, in Sprawy
i rzeczy etc., pp. 28-43.
The progroms of Wisniowiecki are described in M.
Kryvonis' letter to W. Zas lav/ski [ Polonne?] , July 25, 1648,
-*-n Jskuba Michalowskiego etc., p. 8 8 ; B. Khmelnytsky's
letters to the Senate, Zamostia, November 15, 1648, and to
the Commissioners, Uladivka, August 19, 1648, in Dokumenty
Bohdana Khmelnytskoho etc., pp. 82, 6 6 ; and S. Muzhylovskyi's
report to Aleksei Mikhailovich [Moscow], February 14, 1649,
in Vossoedinenie Ukrainy etc., 3 vols (Moscow, 1954), II,
129.
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against the orders of the government.

30

While in Warsaw

attempts were made to arrange an armistice and to open
negotiations with Khmelnytskyi, Wisniowiecki took deliberate
counter-steps in order to paralyze these attempts. 31

On

the one hand, by these counter-steps Wisniowiecki settled
his personal accounts with Ossolinski and his group,
especially for not having been given the command of the
Crown Army.

32

On the other hand, his steps resulted also

from his love of his country.

Wisniowiecki sincerely

believed that the policy of the pacifists was a disgrace
for the Commonwealth,

and that the crimes of the "riffraff”

could only be atoned by their blood.

Regarding parlays as

as a waste of time, he endeavoured to convince the pacifists
that "the more we deliberate, the more . . . we perish",
and pointed out that the enemy used the armistice to grow

^wisniowiecki received an informal note from Kysil
about the armistice and the negotiations, who asked him "not
to provoke the enemy".
See A. Kysil's letter to J.
WTisniowiecki, Hoshcha, June [ca. , 10-15], 1648, in Jakuba
Michalowskiego etc., pp. 54-55.
Officials announcements
were sent to Wisniowiecki by the Primate and the Senate.
See M. Lubienski's letter to J. Wisniowiecki, Warsaw, June
24, 1648, ibid., p. 63; and Senate's letter to J. Wisnio
wiecki, Warsaw, June 24, 1648, in Pamiatniki etc., 4 vols
(Kiev, 1845), I, 3, 102.
~~
31

See Tomkiewicz, o p . c i t ., p. 194.

32See ibid . , pp. 188-94.
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stronger and to commit more atrocities.

33

He was right; but

he failed to see that much of this resulted from his own
irresponsible actions.

These actions also contributed to

the failure of negotiations and made the attainment of
peace impossible.
Wisniowiecki was a remarkable man, an individual
with an iron will,
commander.

and an extremely gifted military

He was also a typical borderland "kinglet", who

was hated by magnates and by courtiers in Warsaw,

But he

was idealized by the gentry and the Jews, who saw in him
the saviour of the Commonwealth.

34

. . . ,.
Although Wisniowiecki
(

managed to hold hiw own against the overwhelming numbers
of the serfs, he had insufficient strength to crush the
rising of the serfs by striking a blow which would decide
the conflict.

Thus, rather than extinguishing the fire, he

only added fuel to it.

His cruel actions, which even

alarmed some of his closest collaborators, were called as

^ S e e J. WTisniowiecki's letter to A. Kysil, Horochky,
June 21, 1648, and the letter of J. Tyszkiewicz and others
to the Senate, Kolchyn, July 30, 1648, in Jakuba
Mlchalowskiego etc., pp. 55-56, 99-100.
See also Hannower,
-'•n Sprawy i rzeczy etc., p. 35.
^ S e e the "Verses on the Poarom of the Hetmans at
Korsun" (1649), in Jakuba Michalowskiego etc., p. 476; and
Hannower, in Sprav/y i rzeczy etc., p. 22.
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35
a "provocation of the enemy".

Even before he initiated

his campaign of terror and pogroms, it seemed as if every
serf in Ukraine took up arms and either killed or drove
out his own master.

By the beginning of July the serfs

"neither sowed nor plowed, but only wandered about armed".
While some serfs were engaged in independent fighting,
looting and killing, other serfs banded together and formed
a great army.

As this army moved westward, towns and

castles fell on its path; and fresh risings of the serfs
began to erupt in the western palatinates.

36

Wisniowiecki's irresponsible actions contributed
greatly to three important developments.
actions caused the "serfs'

First of all, his

fury" to intensify and to spread

into the neighbouring palatinates.

To the nobles every

serf was a potential enemy; and every hamlet or town a

^~*Cited by Szajnocha, op. c i t . , II, 1, 201.
3

See the letter of J. U l m s k i and S. Jaskolski to
[ M. Lubienski], Bar, June [8], 1648, in Jakuba Michalowskiego
etc., p. 10; Zolkiewski's letter to J. Ossolinski, Dub n o ,
June 8 , 1648, and S. Karpinski's letter to Anonymous, Bar,
June 25, 1648, in Szajnocha, "Zrodla", op. c i t . , II, 2,
405, 430-31; Rev. P. Lasko's report, Chyhyryn, June 29,
1648, and S. Muzhylovskyi1s report to Aleksei Mikhailovich
[Moscow], February 14, 1649, in Vossoedinenie Ukrainy etc.,
II, 45, 129; and B. Khmelnytskyi1s letter to A. Kysil,
Chyhyryn, June 27, 1648, in Dokumenty Bohdana Khmelnytskoho
e t c ., p . 52.
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potential enemy's nest.

37

Moreover,

'
as the struggle took

greater dimensions and a more terrible form, it began to
gain support from all classes of the Rusin people.
by August,

Finally,

as the deluge of the serfs innundated the Pala

tinates of Kiev, Brats lav, Chernihiv, the1 greater portions
of Podolia and Volynia and the southern areas of several
of the palatinates of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, the
Kozaks were also forced to move into action.

38

While Wisniowiecki was perpetrating reprisals
against the serfs in Volynia, the Convocation Diet

(July

16 to August 1, 1648) began .its sessions in Warsaw.

Right

from the first session the pacifists of Ossolinski and the
intransigents of Wisniowiecki became engaged in a verbal
duel.

Because of the great friction between the two groups,

precious time was wasted on needless debates.

The most

37

See the letter of J. Tyszkiewicz and others to the
Senate, Kolchyn, July 30, 1648, in Jakuba Michalowskiego
etc., p. 1 0 0 .
38

See the list of captured towns, Session of the Senate
Council, Warsaw, August 22, 1648, ibid., pp. 158-59:
Hannower, in Sprawy i rzeczy etc., pp. 46-47; K. F.
Obuchowicz, "Dyaryusz Kazimierza Filipa Obuchowicza Wojewody
Smolenskiego i Marszalka Kola Rycerskiego" [The Diary of
Kazimierz Filip Obuchowicz, Palatine of Smalensk and Marsha],
of the Chamber of Deputies], in Pamietniki historyczne etc
(Vilnius, 1859), p. 20; and E. Kotlubaj, Zycie Janusza
Radziwilla etc (Vilnius, 1859), pp. 112-16.
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pressing problems received little attention.
the Kozak matters were badly handled.

In general,

Rather than sending

the delegates of the Kozak Army with a hopeful answer as
soon as possible after their arrival in Warsaw, the
wrangling Diet kept them needlessly for two weeks and then
sent them back with a vague reply.

If the Kozaks showed

signs of repentence and were willing to make reparations
for their crimes, they would then merit forgiveness.

In

order to show their good faith to the government, the
Kozaks were required to surrender all prisoners and leaders
of serf bands, as well as to break their alliance with the
Tatars.

<
At a later date a commission would be appointed

which would study all Kozak grievances and which would also
acquaint the Kozaks with the additional demands of the
government.

39

Considering the military successes of the

Kozaks, this was a preposterous answer.
At the same time as the Diet resolved the terms
40
under which peace was to be negotiated with the Kozaks,
O Q

See the Convocation Diet's letter to the Kozak Army,
Warsaw, July 22, 1648, in J akuba Michalowskiego etc.,
pp. 85-86.
40

The peace terms with the Kozaks were resolved by the
Diet on July 26th.
The following were the main terms: the
Kozaks had to surrender all prisoners, leaders of serf
bands, captured cannon and arms (Arts. 1, 2 and 7); to
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it. received alarming reports.
nates of the Crown,

The south-eastern palati

as far west as Volynia, and the

bordering areas of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, were
falling under the control of the "riffraff".

Moreover,

according to various despatches, Muscovy was also sending
military aid to the Kozaks.

These serious adverse news had

the effect of speeding up the phlegmatic proceedings of the
Diet.

With certain promptness the Diet agreed to appoint

Adam Kysil to hea.d a commission.

He was given plenipoten

tiary powers and entrusted with the impossible task of
hjilting the advance of the enemy by concluding peace with
the Kozaks.
preparations.

The Diet also voted to continue military
At the end of July it approved Ossolinski's

three appointed regimentaries in place of the captive

bring to an end their military alliance with the Tatars
(Art. 3); to lift the siege of Kodak Fortress (Art. 6); and
to reaffirm their loyalty to the Commonwealth and to serve
it faithfully (Arts. 4 and 5). The commission received
plenipotentiary powers (Art. 11).
It was to hear the grie
vances of the Kozaks (Art. 8); and to promise them pay only
if they swore loyalty to the Commonwealth and surrendered
the letters of King Wladyslaw IV, in which he allegedly
granted them permission to increa.se' the quota of the regis
tered Kozaks to 12,000 (Arts. 8 and 9). The commission was
to offer to the Kozaks the same terms as those of 1638, but
if they refused to accept them, it could offer them those
of 1630 or even of 1625.
See Szajnocha, "Zrodla", op. c i t .,
II, 2, 462-64; and Ra.dziwill, o p . c i t . , II,, 309.
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hetmans, but as a precaution named,thirty-two commissioners
to aid them.

On August 1st the Convocation Diet ended its

deliberations.41
News of the rising of the serfs taking greater
dimensions and a more terrible form brought fear into the
hearts of many deputies lest the Kozaks, who were still
relatively quiet, side with the serfs.

This situation

caused even the most ardent intransigents to re-evaluate
their position.

In the end the deputies were forced to vote

for the plans of Ossolinski, which they fought so strongly
against.

Both Ossolinski and Kysil spared no arguments to

convince the deputies that they made the right decision.
It was wiser, they claimed, to pacify the Kozaks with some
concessions and to separate them from the Tatars and the
serfs, rather than to have to face the combined Kozak-Tatarserf menace.
Both of those men maintained that Khmelnytskyi
really wanted peace.

Kysil assured his colleagues that he

would be able to negotiate peace without "dishonouring" the

^ S e e the Record of the Convocation Diet, Eighth to
Fourteenth Sessions, Warsaw, July 24 to August 1, 1648, in
Jakuba Michalowskiego etc., pp. 126-44; Radziwill, op. cit.,
II, 309-16; Obuchowicz, in Pamietniki h istoryczne etc., pp.
19-20; and M. Golinski, MS. B.Z.N. Ossol., 189, f. 112 et
seq.
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Commonwealth by some radical concessions to the Kozaks.
Both Ossolinski and Kysil led the Diet to believe that once
the Ordinance of 1638 was repealed, the Kozaks would easily
accept terms similar to those offered to them in 1625 or
1630.

In order to satsify their opponents Ossolinski and

Kysil voted for a mobilization of an army.

They expected,

however, that this army would be used simply for the
purpose of overawing the Kozaks with its show of strength
and thereby forcing them to come to terms more quickly.

42

It appeared that Ossolinski won a major victory at the
C o n v o c a t ion Diet and that he would be able to put all of
I
his policy into effect.
Ossolinski, however, did not win a
victory: the Diet merely accepted the lesser of two evils.

Ill
Three basic phases can be distinguished in the
heretofore described conflict within the Commonwealth in
1648.

The first phase was the Kozak rebellion under

Khmelnytskyi.
phase.

The rising of the serfs began the second

In the third phase all the social strata among the

Rusin people coalesced into a united front.

In this way

the Kozak rebellion was transormed into a Rusin national
47

See Kuba1 a, op . c i t . , pp. 290-91, 298-99.
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struggle for independence from the Polish-Lithuanian
Commonwealth.
The Kozak rebellion was the first phase of the
conflict within the Commonwealth.

The Kozak rebellion was

an armed protest of one Rusin stratum against the intole
rable conditions of life.

The aims of the Kozaks were

narrow and specific: they now wanted the government to
repeal the Ordinance of 1638 and to confirm their former
liberties.

The Kozaks seemed to show little concern for

the rights and the aspirations of the unprivileged classes
of the Rusin people.

They considered religious freedom the

only important Rusin national question.

One of the main

results of the "dreadful [Kozak] rebellion" was that it
set into motion a far more terrible "war of the
* 1
serfs
1.43
The rising of the serfs was the second stage of the
conflict within the Commonwealth.
"serfs'

The beginning of this

fury" was almost spontaneous.

Although it was

prepared by Kozak slogans and set into motion by Kozak
victories of May 1648, the rising nevertheless erupted
43

A.
Kysxl's letter to Wladyslaw IV, Hoshcha, May 27,
1648, in Szajnocha, "Zrodla", o p . c i t . , II,* 2, 382.
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without Kozak organization or aid.

44

From the "hell of the

serfs" emerged a great social movement which threatened to
45
destroy the existence of the "heaven of the nobles".
During this "brigantage of the serfs" began "unheard-of
turmoils and massacres".

The Rusin serfs reacted savagely

against their exploiters and oppressors: Polish and Rusin
nobles and Jews, and all their families, servants, dependents and agents.

46

Wisniowiecki1s pogroms, from June to

August 1648, opened wider the dykes for a deluge of serfs.

^/j:The effects of these slogans are illustrated in M.
Potocki1s letter to Wladyslaw IV [Korsun], March 31, 1648,
in Vossoedinenie Ukrainy etc., II, lf-16. The serfs took up
arms immediately after the Battle of Zhovti Vody.
See
Maskiewicz, in Pamietn iki etc., p. 239. The captive serfs
of the Kamianets area, for example, testified under torture
that "nullam sibi commerciium et societatem cum Cosacis
esse, but themselves, out of their own free will, taedio
servitutis et Poloniae dominationis impatientes arma
adversus immodica unsurpantes corripuerunt". Letter of S.
Kushevych [Lviv], August 26, 1648.
Cited by Lipinski,
op. c i t ., p. 82, n. 3.
^~*In the opinion of Pacichelli, an Italian who visited
the Commonwealth in the middle of the seventeenth century,
"Clarum regnum Polonorum est coelum nobiliorum, est infernus
rusticoru m " . Cited by Lipinski, op . c i t ., p. 18, n. 1.
46

See Jerlicz, op. cit.., I, 61-62; Zolkiewski1s letter
to J. Ossolinski, D u b n o , June 8 , 1648, in Szajnocha, "Zrodla!
o p . c i t ., II, 2, 405; Rev. P. Lasko's report, Chyhyryn, June
29, 1648, and S. Muzhylovskyi1s report to Aleksei Mikhailo
vich [Moscow], February 14, 1649, in Vossoedinenie Ukrainy
etc., II, 45, 129; and J. Jelicki1s .letter to the Sherif
of Dybiv, Ustyluh, September 3, 1648, in Sprawy' irzeczy etc
p. 113.
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These pogroms also set the stage for the third phase of
the conflict.
The third phase of the conflict within the Common
wealth was characterized by the coalescence of all the
social strata among the Rusin people and by the emergence
of a common Rusin front.

The Kozak rebellion, which was

first changed by the rising of the serfs, was now comple
tely transformed by the active participation of other
strata of the Rusin people —

nobles, burgesses and clergy.

Although there were many nobles, the so-called
"gente Rutheni, natione Poloni" , in the opposing camp, many
others chose to support the aspirations of the Rusin "riffraff".47

Those nobles who actively participated m

the

rebellion did so for various reasons and acted in various
roles.

The "military" element figured prominently as

officers in the Kozak Army.

Other nobles played an

extremely important part as organizers and leaders of serf
movements, especially in Rusin ethnic territories which
were not yet occupied by the Kozaks.
administrative,

Still others, assumed

judicial and diplomatic duties in the areas

47

On the participation of the Rusin nobles and on their
role in the conflict, see Lipinski, •o p . cit1
., pp. 12-332.
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controlled by the Kozak Army.

The presence of nobles in the

Kozak Army was readily admitted both by Khmelnytskyi and his
adversaries.

These nobles, who "became Kozaks", were often

contemptuously referred to by their opponents as leaders of
"bands of rabble", or "traitors" who "betrayed God and the
48
Commonwealth".

Many of these nobles displayed great

hostility to the Commonwealth and urged Khmelnytskyi to
. .
49
resume hostilities.
Just as the nobles, the Rusin burgesses also assumed
important roles, both in the leadership of the Kozak Army
and m

that of the serfs.

50

Many municipalities established

contacts with Khmelnytskyi and aided both the Kozaks and
the serfs.

51

Khmelnytskyi1s appeals to the burgesses for

48

See A. Kysil's letter to J. O s s o l m s k i , Rovne, August
12, 1648 and the anonymous report on the activities of
Khmelnytskyi, n. p., July 30, 1650, in Jakuba Michalowsklego
etc., pp. 150, 554; L. Miaskowski1s letter to W. Miaskowski,
Kamianets, August 17, 1648 and W. Zaslawski's letter to the
Convocation Diet, Dubno, July 14, 1648, in Szajnocha,
"Zrodla", op. c i t ., II, 2, 457-58; X, 202.
AQ
" See G. Kunakov's report to Muscovite Department of
Foreign Affairs (1649), in Akty otnosiashchiesia etc., 15
vols (St. Petersburg, 1861), III, 404; and Hannower, in
Sprawy i rzeczy etc., p. 22.
50

Interrogation of Kozak prisoners, Halych, June 29,
1649, in Jakuba Michalowskiego etc., pp. 91-94; and Lipinski,
op. c i t . , pp. 126-27.
51 See A. Konecpolski1s manifesto the gentry [n.p.], May
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the surrender of their towns to him were received by them
with enthusiasm.
continued,

52

A contemporary noted that if this trend

"there would.be no town [left] which would

53
defend itself against Khmelnytskyi".

By such frequent

examples of "treachery", the Rusin burgesses facilitated
for the "rebels" their movement into the interior of the
western palatinates.
In many cases, the messengers sent from Rusin
54
burgesses to Khmelnytskyi were Orthodox priests.

With

religious differences so pronounced between the combatt a n t s , it is not difficult to imagine the role played by
the Orthodox clergy.

f
The "bishops, archimandrites,

abbots,

archpriests, priests and other servants of the houses of
G o d " , whom Khmelnytskyi called to defend their "ancient

31, 164-8, in Pamiatniki etc., I, 3, 44-45; Interrogation of
Kozak prisoners, Halych, July 29, 1648, in Jakuba
Michalowskiego etc., pp. 93-94; Maskiewicz, in Pamietniki
etc., pp. 247, 252; and Hannower, in Sprawy i rzeczy etc.,
pp. 2,9 et seq.
c;p
See A. Kysil's letter to M. Lubienski [Hoshcha ], May
31, 1648, in Vossoedinenie Ukrainy etc., II, 25-2.6.
r o

Letter of J. Ulinski and S. Jaskolski to [M. Lubienski],
Bar, June [8 ], 1648, in Jakuba Michalowskiego etc., p. 40.
C

A

See Aleksander Czolowski, "Relacya o oblezeniu miasta
Lwowa przez, Bohdana Chmielnickiego 1648 rok u " , Kwartalnik
Historyczny, VI (no. 3, 1892), 549; and Lipinski, op. c i t .,
pp. 84-85.
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Greek [Orthodox] faith",

55

responded to his appeals.

The

lower clergy played an especially important role in the
conflict.

They were the "priests conspirators"

56

who

fomented the Rusin people with religious slogans and encouraged them to take up arms "for the faith".

57

They

organized serf bands, and even served as their leaders.^8
They set up a network of communications among themselves
and sent frequent reports to Kiev.
emissaries of Khmelnytskyi. 60

59

They were also the

They were "more a hinderance

than aid" to those who attempted to resolve the conflict by

Khmelnytskyi1s manifesto to the Rusin people,
Chyhyryn [ca. early 1648], in Dokumenty Bohdana Khmelnytskoho
e t c ., p. 625.
56
W. Miaskowski's letter to L. Miaskowski, Lviv,
September 27, 1648« Cited by Lipinski, op . c i t ., p. 22.
67
~ This is typically illustrated in F. Arsenev's letter
to Muscovite Department of Defense, Voinov, June 7, 1648, in
Akty Moskovskogo gosudarstva (St. Petersburg, 1894), II, 222;
and in W. Zaslawski's letter to the Convocation Diet, Dubno,
July 14, 1648, in Szajnocha, "Zrodla", op. c i t ., X, 200.
^ S e e W. Lozinski, Prawem i lewem etc., 2 v o l s ., 4th ed
Lviv, 1931), I, 420.
59

See the interrogation of Kozak prisoners, Halych,
July 29, 1648, in Jakuba Michalowskiego etc., p. 93.
^ S e e W. Miaskowski's letter to L. Miaskowski, Novosilka,
February 1, 1649, ibid., p. 365.
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negotiations.6'1' The ruling order suspected most of the
r r-\

Orthodox clergy of secretly supporting the "rebels"

An

apprehended "priest conspirator" suffered savage reprisals
0 3

for the part he played.
Thus on the whole the third phase of the conflict
within the Commonwealth was characterized by the trans
formation of the Kozak rebellion into the national struggle
of all the strata of the Rusin people.

Both sides in the

struggle emphasized that the conflict did not concern the
people of the same nationality.

Khmelnytskyi used

national-religious slogans effectively in order to gain
support for the Kozak rebellion.

He stirred all those of

"the same faith and blood" to rise against the "Poles, the
enemies of our [Rusin] people".
the ruling class —

To those in the camp of

Poles or Polonized Rusins -- everything

"Rusin" was detested, feared, suspected or distrusted.

^ L e t t e r of A. Kysil and W. Miaskowski to Jan Kazimierz,
Vasylkiv, February 11, 1649, in Ojczyste spominki etc., 2
vols (Krakow, 1845), II, 10.
See also M. Golinski, MS.
B.Z.N.Ossol., 189, f. 210
Cso

See Lipinski, op. cit., p. 85, n. 7.

6^See M. Kryvonis1 letter to W. Zaslawski [Polonne?],
July 25, 1648, in Jakuba Michalowskiego etc., p. 8 8 ; and B.
Khmelnytskyi1s letters to the Commissioners', Uladivka,
August 19, 1648 and to the Senate, Zamostia, November 15,
1648, in Dokumenty Bohdana Khmelnytskoho etc., pp. 6 6 , 82.
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In their correspondence, the nobles of the Commonwealth
stressed the fact that it was the "Rusin Kozaks"

and the

"Rusin dragoons" who mutinied, deserted the Crown Army and
then joined the ranks of the rebels.

"We are all in

extreme danger from the treacherous Rusins, our serfs",
complained one noble to another.

Prince Wisniowiecki was

also endangered by the rising of his own "Rusin" serfs;
moreover, he was unable to trust all of his own troops
because many of them were "Rusins".

In the opinion of one

noble, most "Rusins" were either in sympathy with the
rebels, or took an active part in the rebellion.

Still

another noble complained that it was very difficult to spy
among the "Rusins" because "all of them are traitors".

It

was therefore obvious to the contemporaries that a "Rusin
rebellion" was taking place, in which "the conspiracy of all
the Rusins" was evident. 64 .....

^ S e e B. Khmelnytskyi's manifesto to the Rusin people,
Chyhyryn [ca. early 1648], ib i d ., p. 625; Z. Czerny's letter
to J. Ossolinski, Bila Tserkva, May 25, 1648, M. Ostrorog's
letter to J. Ossolinski, Lviv, June 12, 1648 and the letter
of Lviv burgesses to Karol Ferdynand, Lviv, September 15,
1648, in Pamiatniki etc., I, 3, 25-26, 94, 269; Anonymous
despatch from Ukraine, Pidhortse, May 21, 1648, Z. Czerny's
letter to Anonymous, Bila Tserkva, May 26, 1648, W.
Miaskowski's letter to P. Gembicki, Lviv, May 28, 1648, and
the Anonymous letter from Lviv, June 4, 164j3, in Jakuba
Michalowskiego etc., pp. 17, 25-26, 32; M. Ostrorog's letter
to J, Ossolinski, Lviv, May 26, 1648, in Szajnocha, "Zrodla",
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The conflict within the Commonwealth was thus not
a civil war, because it concerned mainly two ethnic groups
—

Polish and Rusin —

which were sharply divided by reli

gious, linguistic and cultural differences.

For the Rusins

this was a struggle for national liberation.

IV
The third phase of the conflict within the Common
wealth v/as characterized by the emergence of the Rusin
united front, which coalesced from all the social strata
among the Rusin people.

The Rusin ethnic solidarity alone

would not have been sufficient to bring about this common
front and to transform the Kozak rebellion into a national
struggle for liberation.

Rather, the most important and

dominant single factor which bound all the Rusins together,
and which gave cohesion to the whole movement for their
liberation, was their common religion.

Religious, more

than ethnic differences, deepened the gulf between the
Poles and the Rusins.

For the latter, Orthodoxy emphasized

their ethnic origin, and in the majority of cases the

o p . c i t ., II, 2, 380; M. Ostrorog's letter to J. Ossolinski,
Zbarazh, July 3, 1649, in Ojczyste spominki etc., II, 54;
and W. Zaslawski's manifesto the the Crown Army, D u b n o , July
19, 1648, cited by Lipinski, op. cit., p. 99.
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cleavage in the social structure of the Commonwealth.

At

the same time, the Orthodox faith was the main factor which
fostered the national consciousness of all the classes of
the Rusin people.
No better example can be found of this fact than by
examining the actions and the attitudes of the many Polonized Rusin nobles, who were still Orthodox, yet who chose
to take up arms against their Orthodox brethern.

At the

Convocation Diet the Orthodox deputies were prepared to
declare "every noble" who took part in the rebellion as
"an enemy and a betrayer of the fatherland".

They also were

(

ready "to shed blood" fighting along with the Polish nobles
agaxnst "the lawless

.

[Rusxnj serfs".

65

The same men, how

ever, at a time when their "fatherland" seemed to be on the
brink of disaster, took advantage of this predicament to
demand concessions for the Orthodox Church.

They clamoured

for the abolition of the Uniate Church and for the restoratxon of all rxghts to the Orthodox Church.

66

6 3Record of the Convocatxon Dxet, Exghth Sessxon, Warsaw,
July 24, 1648.
Cited by Lipinski, o p . c i t ., p. 28.
•

66

See the Record of the Convocatxon Dxet, Seventh and
Eighth Sessions, Warsaw, July 23-24, 1648 and the Record of
the Election Diet, Thirteenth Session, Warsaw, November 12,
1648, in Jakuba M ichalowskiego etc., pp. 122-23, 126-27,
311-14.
See al_o Radziwill, o p . c i t ., II, 340.
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When similar demands were brought by the Kozak
delegation before the Diet, many Polish nobles suspected
their Orthodox colleagues and other Orthodox nobles of
secret collaboration with Khmelnytskyi or of influencing the
course of the conflict.

Only the nobles, reasoned one

magnate, were sufficiently enlightened to concern them
selves with religious matters.

It was certainly not the

concern of all "the perjurers, tyrants, rebels, bandits,
invaders and profaners of churches".

It would be ridiculous

to assume that the serfs, "who have no knowledge about God
and who have no faith . . . [and who]

live not only like

barbarians, but also like wild beasts", would demand the
68
restoration of Orthodox churches held by the Uniates.
Contrary to his opinion, the religious issues concerned not
only the Rusin nobles, but all strata of the Rusin society.
The scrupulous and detailed reports of the Muscovite
envoy Grigorii Kunakov to the Posolskii Prikaz illustrate
the significance of the religious factor.

According to him,

the senators at the Election Diet were prepared to pass a
resolution which called for the abijgition of the rights of

^ S e e Lipinski, op. cit., pp. 29-30.
t

(ZQ

W. Zaslawski's letter to the Convocation Diet, D u b n o ,
July 14, 1648, in Szajnocha, "Zrodla", o p . c i t ., X, 200.
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the Orthodox Church.

They argued that "one faith in the

whole state" would prevent future "strife and quarrels

. . .

among lords, nobles and common people" within the Common
wealth.

The Catholic Primate was against it.

lie advised

them not to adopt such dangerous measures, for "all of them
[i.e., Rusin nobles] will join Khmelnytskyi and the Kozaks.
He also pointed out that even at this time there was "much
blood being shed for the

[Orthodox]

ii 69
faith .

Khmelnytskyi also fully realized that the common
religion of the. Rusin people gave the cohesion to the whole
movement against the Commonwealth.

He therefore made use

of religious slogans to stir the Rusins into action.

The

Kozaks, it was said, were fighting the Poles "for the
[Orthodox]

faith".

70

These slogans were re-echoed by the

6 9G. Kunakov1s report to Muscovxte Department of Foreign
Affairs (1649), in Akty otnosiashchiesia etc., Ill, 304.
70
Archdeacon Paul had no doubt that Khmelnytskyi
"fought for the cause of religion [and therefore] . . . God
gave him strength, and assisted his endeavours from the
beginning of his career till the end? and hurled destruction,
by his sword, on the vanity and discord of his enemies".
Paul of Aleppo, The Travels etc., 2 vols (London, 1831), I,
2, 73, 175.
This slogan, "for the faith", appeared frequently in
Muscovite sources. See for example the reports of Muscovite
voevodas to the Departments of Foreign Affairs and Defense,
as well as letters of private individuals, from May to
August 1648, in Akty ontosiashchiesia etc., Ill, 212-13,
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Orthodox priests to the Rusin populace.

71

The serfs there

fore regarded Khmelnytskyi as a "Saviour", who would free
them from the yoke of serfdom and who would safeguard their
religion.

72

The serfs, as well as other "people of Greek

[Orthodox] faith", anxiously awaited the arrival of Kozak
troops into their districts, in order to surrender towns
to them or to participate with them m

the conflict.

73

Since it seemed that "all the Rusins" reacted with hate
"against the Catholics and the Poles",

74 .
it is little

wonder that one Polish magnate wrote:

"all hope lies only

m

our Catholic people;

75
. . . only these we can trust". '

216, 227, 237, 229-30; in Vossoedinenie Ukrainy etc., II,
50-51; and in Akty Moskovskogo gosudarstva, II, 222.
^ S e e w. Zaslawski's letter to the Convocation Diet,
Dubno, July 14, 1648, in Szajnocha, "Zrodla", op. c i t .,
X, 200.
7 2M. Ostrorog's letter to J. Ossolinski, Lviv, June 4,
1648, in Pamietniki o Roniecpolskich etc., p. 423; and
Anonymous letter from Lviv, June 4, 1648, in Jakuba
Michalowskiego etc., p. 33.
73

Anonymous letter from Lviv, June 4, 1648, m
M ichalowskiego etc., p. 34.

-Jakuba

74Anonymous letter from Lviv, September 7, 1648,
by Lipinski, op. cit., p. 22.

Cited

75
L. Opalinski's letter to Borowski, Poznan [June] 2,
1648, ibid., p. 20. This letter is dated May 2nd, but June
2nd makes more sense.
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The ruling class thus began to equate "Orthodox" with
76
"-creason .
The nature and the intensity of the rebellion
against the Commonwealth started by the Kozaks was first
changed by the participation of the serfs, and then by the
participation of the Rusin people as a whole.
therefore-, a "Rusin rebellion" .

It was

During this rebellion the

most important single factor which bound all the Rusins
together, and which gave cohesion to the whole movement,
was their common religion.

The chief aim of the Rusins

engaged in belligerence was to gain independence from the
Commonwealth.

Both of the opposing sides emphasized that

the conflict was concerned with this issue.
Already at the eleventh hour of the Kozak rebellion
the ruling class expressed grave fears that the Kozaks
wanted "absolute rule m

Ukraine".

77

Following the first

Kozak victories the gentry grew more alarmed.

Rumours

began to circulate among them that the Kozaks intended to
create an independent state, and that Khmelnytskyi was
76

.
See M. Ostrorog's letter to J. Ossolinski, L v i v ,
4, 1648, in Pamietniki o Koniecpolskich etc., p. 423.

June

77m. Potocki1s letter to Wladyslaw IV [.Korsun ], March
31, 1648, in Vossoedinenie Ukrainy etc., II, 15.
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prepared to assume the title of "Prince of Rus" and to
declare Kiev as his capital.

78

By September 1648 some

contemporaries analysed the conflict within the Commonwealth
as "the Rusin rebellion and the deluge of the serfs, allied
with the heathen", which "already gained control over all
79
ox Ukraine".

In these words they descrxbed a natxonal

rising of'the Rusin people in which the social element still
predominated,

and which was strengthened by a political

alliance with the Tatars.
gained control of Ukraine.

At present time the Rusins
Fresh rumours began to circulate

among the nobles of the Commonwealth that these "traitors"
also had the intention of "separating Rus from the Crown".

80

Their aim was then to secure independence for all of the
Rusin ethnic territories.

These developments influenced

the course of action and the plans of Bohdan Khmelnytskyi,
who began to assume control of the whole movement for Rusin
liberation.

7R

Typical of these rumours is A. Kysil's letter to M.
Lubienski [Hoshcha], May 31, 1648, ibid . , II, 25.
79

Letter of Lviv burgesses to Karol Ferdynand, Lviv,
September 15, 1648, in Pamiatniki etc., I, 3, 269.
80

D. Slugocki's letter to Niezabitowski, Cholhanskyi
Kamian, ca. September 8 , 1648, in Jakuba Midhalowskiego
etc., p. 183.
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CHAPTER V

KHMELNYTSKYI'S DIPLOMACY PRECEDING THE BATTLE OF
PYLIAVTSI AND THE CHANGE OF HIS AIMS FOLLOWING
THE FRESH KOZAK MILITARY SUCCESSES

I
The Convocation Diet ended its deliberations on
August 1, 1648.

This Diet appointed Adam Kysil as the head

of a commission! instructing him to proceed to Kiev and to
negotiate peace with Bohdan Khmelnytskyi.

The efforts to

solve the grave difficulties of the Commonwealth by diplof
matic means were, however, hindered by several obstacles.
One of these obstacles was the overconfidence of
the government that the conflict would be resolved over a
conference table.

For this reason the Diet issued a vague

reply to the Kozak demands, and formulated a series of
highly unrealistic counter-demands of its own.^

Further

more, because of the phlegmatic proceedings of the Diet and
the needless debates, the delegates of the Kozak Army were

•^See Convocation Diet's letter to the Kozak Army,
Warsaw July 22, 1648, in Jakuba Michalowskiego etc (Krakow,
1864), pp. 85-86.
143
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2

kept waiting in Warsaw to July 2 2nd. This two week delay
created serious misunderstandings between the two sides.
Khmelnytskyi, who despatched the Kozak delegates to Warsaw
on June 12, still awaited for their return with the answer
from the government at the end of July.

3

To make matters

worse, malicious rumours began to circulate among the
Kozaks that their delegates were executed m

Warsaw.

4

Thus,

this unnecessary delay led only to the worsening of
tensions and the the resumption of the hostilities.
Another serious obstacle was the renewal of the
hostilities between the two sides before the term set for
an armistice expired.

Many nobles disregarded the orders

of the government and began to wage a guerilla war against
the serfs.

Prince Wisniowiecki, the leader of the reaction,

being alarmed at the steady gains of the "riffraff" and the
general lack of resistance of the gentry, redoubled his
2

.

.

.

.

See the Record of Convocation Diet, Sixth Session,
Warsaw, July 22, 1648, ibi d ., p. 121; and A.S. Radziwill,
Pamietniki etc., 2 vols (Poznan, 1839), II, 302.
3
See B. Khmelnytskyi1s letter to W. Zaslawski, Pavoloch,
July 30, 1648, in Dokumenty Bohdana Khmelnytskoho etc
(Kiev, 1961), p. 62.
4
See M. Kryvonis' letter to W. Zaslawski [Polonne?],
July 29, 1648; and A. Kysil's letter to J. Ossolinski,
Khorlupie, August 9, 1648, in Jakuba Michalowskiego etc.,
pp. 8 8 , 152.
See also Radziwill, op. c i t . , II, 318.
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terroristic activities.

Vindicating his own cause and that

of his timid "brethren", he continued to provoke the serfs
with his particular brand of atrocities.

5

These actions

came at a time when Kysil sought contact with Khmelnytskyi
to begin negotiations.
Finally, after having to fight his way through the

6
roaming bands of serfs, Kysil began to realize that there
existed yet another obstacle.

The success of the negotia

tions and the attainment of peace did not depend on the
goodwill of Khmelnytskyi alone, but also on that of "the
multitude of riffraff".

Reports reached him that "lawless

I
men" gained the upper hand in the Kozak camp; they did not
wsmt peace but war.

Kysil speculated that if Khmelnytskyi

was not killed during the disturbances among the Kozaks,
then he surely remained "in the discretion of[these]
C

See M. Kryvonis' letter to W. Zaslawski [Polonne?],
July 29, 1648; J. Wisniowiecki's letter to M. Lubienski,
Cholhanskyi Kamin, August 30, 1648, and A. Kysil's letter
to M. Lubienski, Ukhanie, September 29, 1648, in Jakuba
M ichalowskiego etc., pp. 8 8 , 175, 204.
See also B.
Khmelnytskyi1s letters to the Commissioners, Ulaaivka,
August 19, 1648 and Kumanivtsi, August 28, 1648, in Dokumenty
B ohdana Khmelnytskoho etc., pp. 6 6 , 6 8 .
^See A. Kysil's letter to J. Ossolinski, R o v n e , August
2, 1648, in Jakuba Michalowskiego etc., p. 149.
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congregated multitudes".

7

Thus, it was the "rabble", the

common Kozaks and serfs, that constituted the greatest
menace to the Commonwealth.
Yet, Kysil remained optimistic; he was certain that
all his efforts would not be in vain.

He was also encou

raged by the willingness of Khmelnytskyi to meet the demands
of the government.

The Kozak leader claimed to have sent

the Tatars back to Crimea.

He released all nobles which

were captive in the Kozak camp, and either executed or
punished many of the serf leaders.

Khmelnytskyi even

showed goodwill by agreeing to accept the mediation of the
I
Metropolitan Bishop of Kiev, Sylvestr Kosiv.

Finally, even

at the end of August his letters still expressed hope that
g

reconcilliation was possible.

This was, however, only the

7
See A. Kysil's letters to J. Ossolinski, Khorlupie,
August 9, 1648; to M. Lubienski, Ukhanie, September 29,
1648, ibid. , pp. 149, 204; to B. Khmelnytskyi [ Lutsk j],
August 12, 1648, in K. Szajnocha, "Zrodla "[Sources], Dwa lata
dziejow naszych.
1646.
1648., 2 vols (Warsaw, 1900), II,
2, 451; and to S. Potocki, Karchivka, September 7, 1648, in
Karol Szajnocha, "Zrodla" [Sources], Dziela Karola Szajnochy
[The Works of Karol Szajnocha] (Warsaw: J. Unger, 1878), X
220. See also M. Krosnowski's letter to S. Zadorski, Lviv,
September 1, 1648, and A. Szoldrski's letter to Anonymous,
Warsaw, September 23, 1648, in Jakuba Michalowskiego etc.,
pp. 178, 199-200.

8

See B. Khmelnytskyi's letters to the Commissioners,
Uladivka, August 19, 1648, and Kumanivtsi, August 28, 1648,
in Dokumenty Bohdana Khmelnytskoho etc., pp. 66-68.
See
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one side of a coin.
The other side was entirely different.

Khmelnytskyi

must have decided sometime in July that the whole business
of negotiations would come to naught.

The Poles were not

ready to make concessio n s t h e y were acting in bad faith,
for while Kysil was sent to negotiate with him, a new army
was being mobilized.

9

He was, however, prepared either to

carry on negotiations, or in case this failed, to wage war.
He was not inactive during the term set for the armistice.
On the contrary,

just like his enemies, Khmelnytskyi also

took advantage of the armistice and planned out his strate(

gic moves.

His diplomatic policy was devised to gain time.

At the same time as Khmelnytskyi sent manifestoes
to restore order among the serfs, denounced their"lawless
ness” before the officials of the Commonwealth and punished
or executed some of their leaders, he also encouraged the

also the following letters; A. Kysil to J. Ossolinski,
Rovne, August 2, 1648 and Nadhoryn, August 22, 1648; A.
Kysil e t a l ., to M. Lubienski, Cholhanskyi K a m i n , September
13, 1648, in Jakuba Michalowskiego etc., pp. 149, 160, 186;
and the Anonymous despatch from Hlyniany, August 13, 1648
and [M. Lubienski] to W. Zaslawski [Warsaw], August 10,
1648, in Szajnocha, i;Zrodla" , o p . c i t . , II, 2, 454; X, 210.
g
See B. Khmelnytskyi's letters to A. Kysil, Chyhyryn,
June 27, 1648, and to S. Bolkhovskii, August 8 , 1648, in
Dokumenty Bohdana Khmelnytskoho etc., pp. 52.
65.
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the serf movement.

His emissarj.es- and agitators fomented

revolt among Rusin and Eelorusin people in the territories
where serfdom was firmly entrenched.

From the Kozak Army

he sent small detachments of troops into areas where the
serfs took up arms.

These provided leaders for the serf

bands, organized them and took possession of towns or for
tresses captured by the serfs.
Although Khmelnytskyi complained to the government
about the atrocities committed by Wisniowiecki, he excused
the actions of Kryvonis.

He also made no definite steps to

restrain the activities of other popular leaders,--Hanzha,
Holovetskyi, Nebaba, Topyha, Vysochan and Morozovetskyi —
who spread the rising of the serfs into all Rusin and Belorusin ethnic territories of the Commonwealth.^^

Khmelnytsky

thus created a barri.er of serfs between the Kozak troops and
those of the Commonwealth.

He was protected by the serfs,

and made a coordinated Polish-Lithuanian military action
against him extremely difficult.

At this time he was also

able to devote his attention to other matters, especially

^ S e e S. Muzhylovskyi1s report to Aleksei Mikhailovich
[Moscow], February 14, 1649, in Vossoedinenie Ukrainy etc.,
3 vols (Moscow, 1954) , II, 129; W. Lipinski, Stanislaw
Michal Krzyczewski etc (Krakow, 1912), pp. 86-98; and I. P.
Krypiakevych, Bohdan Khmelnytskyi (Kiev, 1954), pp. 134-38.
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to the building and reorganization of the Kozak Army.
While Khmelnytskyi1s "bands of riffraff" intensified
the serf rising within the southern palatinates of the
Grand Duchy of L i t h u a n i a , t h e Kozak leader also attempted
to create a rift between Polish and Lithuanian nobles and
to paralyze any common military undertakings.

He establi

shed contacts with Belorusin Orthodox clergy, burgesses and
nobles,

arid sought their aid.

As far as the gentry was

concerned, he contacted those who expressed little hostility
to the Kozak revolt and disenchantment with their Polish
"brethern".

By his declarations of goodwill to the

Lithuanian magnates, Khmelnytskyi hoped to gain their sympathxes for the Kozak cause.

12

Of particular interest to him were the men who were
known for their views of "separatism"

from the Crown.

The

leading figure of this group was the Lithuanian Field
Hetman Janusz Radziwill, the head of the Calvinists in

^ S e e K. F. Obuchowicz,
"Dyaryusz Kazimierz Filipa
Obuchowicza Wojewody Smclenskiego i Marszalka Kola Rycerskiego", in Pamietniki historyczyne etc (Vilnius, 1859),
pp. 19-20; and E. Kotlubaj, Zycie Janusza Radziwilla etc
(Vilnius, 1859), pp. 112-14.
12
"See B. Khmelnytskyi1s manifesto to the Zaporozhian
Army, Pavoloch July 27, 1648, in Dokumenty Bohdana
Khmelnytskoho etc., p. 58.
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Lithuania and the "protector" of Protestants within the
Commonwealth.

Some kind of secret, understanding was reached

between Khmelnytskyi and Radziwill, for although the latter
initiated limited action against the rising of the serfs,
he still showed no desire to march against the Kozaks.

13

By

these steps Khmelnytskyi was able to confine the troops of
the Grand Duchy of Lithuania within its own territories.
Furthermore, he rekindled the antagonisms among the gentry
of the Commonwealth.
During the same time Khmelnytskyi attempted to
convince other magnates or men of influence of his good
intentions.

By writing humble letters to them, Khmelnytskyi

hoped to gain their support and intercession on Kozak
behalf,

as well as to camouflage his true intentions.

14

13 See G. Unkovskii's report to Muscovite Government
(1649), in Vossoedinenie Ukrainy etc., II, 160-61; Lipinski,
o p. c i t ., pp. 270-71; and Kotlubaj, op. c i t ., pp. 113-16.
14

See B. Khmelnytskyi1s letters from Bila Tserkva and
Natashka, to A. Kazanowski, June 12; to W. Zaslawski, June
12; to A. Kysil, June 13; and to W. Zaslawski, June 14, 1648,
in Dokumenty Bohdana Khmelnytskoho etc., pp. 3 9-47.
He also
wrote to A. Radziwill and to J. Ossolinski on approximately
the same dates.
See Radziwill, o p . c i t ., II, 296; and J.
Ossolinski's letter to the Kozak Army, Warsaw, July [9],
1648, in Jakuba Michalowskiego etc., pp. 86-87.
In this
documentary collection the letter of Ossolinski is dated
July 22, but it is evident from the. text that this date is
incorrect.
The correct date should be July 9. See L. Kubala,
Jerzy Ossolinski, 2nd rev. ed (Lviv, 1924), p. 451, n. 20.
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He wrote to Wisniowiecki that he had no quarrel with him;
the serfs, not the Kozaks, were responsible for all the
ravages.

Being aware of the feuds among the "kinglets", he

tried to set one against the other.

To his most obvious

enemies he wrote soothing letters, and attempted to win
their confidence and to quiet their apprehensions by
promising that no harm will come to their estates.

15

Khmelnytskyi1s greatest success, however, was that he was
able to convince such men as Ossolinski and Kysil that he
was ready to settle everything by means of negotiations.
By arranging an armistice he gained time to further his
i
pla n s .
Although Khmelnytskyi was protected from the
interior of the Commonwealth, he still faced danger from
the east.

According to the treaty concluded in 1647,

Muscovy was obliged to send military aid to the Commonwealth if it were invaded by the Tatars.

16

When the Tatars

came to aid the Kozaks, the Commonwealth appealed to
15

See B. Khmelnytskyi1s letters to S. Laszcz, Pavoloch,
July 29, 1648, and to W. Zaslawski, Pavoloch, July 30,
1648, in Dokumenty Bohdana Khmelnytskoho etc., pp. 59-60,
62-63; and Rev. P. Lasko's report, Chyhyryn, June 29, 1648,
in Szajnocha, "Zrodla", op. c i t ., II, 2, 440.
^ S e e the terms of the treaty in Akty otnosiashchiesia
etc., 15 vo l s . 'St. Petersburg, 1861), III, 128-30.
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Muscovy to honour its obligations.
were prepared to do.

18

17

This the Muscovites

Khmelnytskyi was thus compelled to

take quick steps to prevent the materialization of the
Muscovite military intervention.

Even though the Muscovites

were to fight the Tatars only, a blow against the Tatars
was also a blow against the Kozaks.
Khmelnytskyi began by cutting the communication
lines between Warsaw and Moscow;

he intercepted the envoys

from both sides and seized their letters.

He flattered Tsar

Aleksei Mikhailovich by referring to him as the protector of
of Orthodoxy;

and tempted the tsar with the vacant throne

I
of Poland, the recovery of Smalensk territories, and with
the vague suggestions that the Kozaks wished to accept him
as their protector.

Khmelnytskyi also appealed for tsar's

troops to support the Kozak cause; shamed the Muscovites
that they, the strong defenders of Orthodoxy, even consi
dered giving aid to the Poles against people of the same
faith; and emphasized that Muscovy should expect only
17

See A. Kysil's letter to N. Pleshcheev, Hoshcha, May
11, 1648, ibid., III, 188-90.
18

See A. Kysil's letter to M. Lubienski [Hoshcha], May
31, 1648, Decree from the Department of Defense to N.
Pleshcheev [Moscow], May 30, 1648, in Vossoedinenie Ukrainy
etc., II, 26, 496, n. 21.
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goodwill from the Kozaks.

He issued threats, that if no

troops were sent from Muscovy to the Kozak aid, the Kozaks
would be forced to co-operate with the Tatars against the
19
Muscovites.
Khmelnytskyi was fortunate that internal disturbances broke out m

Muscovy. 20

The tsar, whether he wished

to take advantage of the Commonwealth's predicament to carry
out the traditional wishes of Ivan Kalita, or really to come
to its aid, now was in no position to send his troops out
of Muscovy.

21

Early m

August Khmelnytskyi learned that no

19

See B. Khmelnytskyi's letters to Aleksei Mikhailovich,
Cherkasy, June 18,
to S . Bolkhovskii, Chyhyryn, June 30,
and to N. Pleshcheev, Rosava, July 11 and Pavoloch, August
3, 1648, in Dokumenty Bohdana Khmelnytskoho etc., pp. 48-50,
54-55, 57, 64.
See also G. Klimov's report to Muscovite
Department of Foreign Affairs, Moscow, June 26, 1648 in
Akty otnosiashchiesia etc., Ill, 215-17; and A. BuinosovRostovskii and S. Veliaminov's letter to Muscovite Depart
ment of Defense, Iablonov, July 6 , 1648, in Akty Moskovskogo
gosudarstva, 3 vols (St. Petersburg, 1894), II, 232-33.
20

See A. A. N o v o s e l s k n and A. N. Speranskii, "Gorodsk.ie
vosstaniia v Russkom gosudarstve v seredine XVII v.
Zemskii
sobor 1648-1649 gg."
[Town Risings in the Russian State in
the Middle of the Seventeenth Century. Land Assembly of
the Years 1648-1649], in Ocherki istorii S.S.S.R. etc
(Moscow, 1955), pp. 224-49.
These uprisings, the first
which began in June, 1648 in Moscow, continued to spread in
1649 and 1650.
See M. N. Tikhomirov, "Vosstaniia v Novgorode i Pskove v 1650 g."
[The Risings in Novgorod and
Pskov in 1650], ibid., pp. 249-56.
^ S e e Aleksei Mikhailovich's decree to Z. Leontev and I.
Xobylskii, Moscow, July 6 , 1648, in Vossoedinenie Ukrainy
etc., II, 53; and Radziwill, op. c i t . , II, 287.
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Muscovite troops were being sent to a .id the Poles.

22

He

was therefore also safe from the east.
From the south Khmelnytskyi was protected by his
Tatar allies.

It was not in their interest that peace

should materialize; therefore, they urged Khmelnytskyi to
continue the hostilities.

23

Khan Islam III pledged to send

Tatar troops for a new Kozak campaign, even though he knew
that this would be against the orders of his suzerain.

The

High Porte was at war with Venice; thus, it had no desire
to antagonize the Commonwealth.

Even before official

protests arrived in Constantinopole against the actions of
the Tatars, the khan received strict orders not to invade
the territories of the Commonwealth again.

24

Once

See B. Khmelnytskyi's letter to S. B o lkhovskn,
Kostiantyniv, August 8 , 1648, in Dokumenty Bohdana
Khmelnytskoho etc., p. 65.
23

See Rev. P. Lasko's report, Chyhyryn, June 29, 1648,
in Szajnocha, "Zrodla", o p . c i t ., II, 2, 439-40.
24

See M. Ostrorog's letter to J. Ossolinski, Hlyniany,
August 4, 1648; [L. Miaskowski's letter to J. Ossolinski,
Kamianets, June 11, 1648]; and Ahmed Pasha's letter to M.
Potocki, Constantinopole [ca. late May or early June, 1648],
in Szajnocha, "Zrodla", op. c i t ., X, 206, 267-68, 293-94.
Seie also Ahmed Pasha's letter to J, Ossolinski, Constantino
pole [ca. June 11, 1648], in Zygmunt Abrahamowicz e d . ,
Katalog dokumentow Tureckich. Dokumenty do.dziejow Polski
i krajow osciennych w latach 1455-1672 (Warsaw: Panstwowe
Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1959), pp. 326-27.
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Khmelnytskyi learned of this decision, he spared no efforts
in Constantinopole to secure permission for the Tatar
military aid.

Favourable circumstances brought him success

again.
Early in August the government of' Grand Vezir Ahmed
Pasha was overthrown, and Sultan Ibrahim I was dethroned
during a mutiny of the Janissaries and later executed.

25

The new government accepted Khmelnytskyi1s irresistible
offers; money, troops, prisoners for Turkish galleys and
cession of the Podolian fortress Kamianets.

In return it

officially approved the Kozak-Tatar alliance and the antiCommonwoalth enterprises of Khan Islam III.

On August 28

Kalga Crim Giray led the Tatar hordes from Crimea to
Khmelnytskyi1s aid.

26

25

See P. Rycaut, The History etc. (London, 1680), [2],
pp. 33-34; Radziwill, op. c i t ., II, 318; Despatch of [D.
Cieklinski? ] , Hlyniany, August 26, 164-8, in Szajnocha,
"Zrodla", o p . c i t ., II, 2, 461; arid M. Golinski, MS. B.N.Z.
Ossol, 189, f. 141
^ S e e Radziwill, op. c i t . , II, 318; L. Miaskowski1s
letter to W. Miaskowski, Kamianets, October 27, 1648, in
Jakuba Michalowskiego etc., p. 211; Despatch of [D.
Cieklinski?], Hlyniany, August 26, 1648, in Szajnocha,
"Zrodla", op. c i t ., II, 2, 461; and 0. Gorka, "Nieznana kronika
tatarska lat 1644-50", Kwartalnik Historyczny, LXII (no. 3,
1955), 116-17.
The hostile attitude of the new government
of the Ottoman Empire to the Commonwealth is well expressed
in the letter of the new Grand Vezir Sufi Mehmed Pasha to
J. Ossolinski, Constantinopole, [ca. August or September,
1648), in Abrahamowicz, op. c i t . , p. 328.
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Even as the Tatars marched, Khmelnytskyi continued
to call for parleys and expressed hope that reconcilliation
with the Commonwealth was still possible.

27

However, the

commission, led by Kysil, found so many obstacles on its
path, that it was virtually impossible for it to begin
negotiations.

By the middle of September —

after a month

and a half since the commission departed from Warsaw —
two sides had not met.

the

Even the over-optimistic Kysil

became skeptical of the whole business.

28

By this time it

became clear that Khmelnytskyi was only playing for time
and that the whole issue would have to be resolved by the
I
force of arms.
During this diplomatic game of Khmelnytskyi, the
rising of the serfs took even a more menacing form and
spread over vaster areas.

At the close of July, a great

27

See B. Khmelnytskyi's letter to the Commissioners,
Kumanivtsi, August 28, 1648, in Dokumenty Bohdana
Khmelnytskoho etc., pp. 67-68.
28

See the various letters and reports of Adam Kysil and
the Commissioners during the months of August and early
September: in Jakuba Michalowskiego etc., pp. 149-53,
159-66, 169-74, 177; and Szajnocha, "Zrodla", o p . c i t .,
II, 2, 449-53, 464-66; X, 209, 220-21. The following
are the final reports: A. Kysil et a l ., to M. Lubienski,
Cholhanskyi Kamin, September 13, 1648, and A. Kysil to
M. Lubienski, Kostiantyniv, September 15, 1648, in Jakuba
Michalowskiego etc., pp. 184-86, 192-93.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

157

battle was fought near Staro-Kostiantyniv between the
forces of W.isniowiecki and Kryvonis.

Although neither side

won a decisive victory, the battle proved to be more advan
tageous for the "riffraff".

Wisniowiecki had insufficient

troops to carry on the hostilities; he was thus forced to
withdraw beyond the Horyn River.

29

More and more fortresses

and towns-fell to the serfs; early in August they captured
the "impregnable" arsenal-fortress of Bar.

30

By this time

Khmelnytskyi began a slow march with the Kozak Army into
Volynia.

It was to be opposed by an army of "deer"; a

disorganized, but a splendid assembly of the gentry.
Most of the magnates and the country squires,

among

the anatagonists of Khmelnytskyi, entered the concentration
area at Cholhanskyi Kamin as if they were attending some
sort of a celebration.

Their camp was filled with luxurious

tents, furniture, gold and silver plate and expensive
clothes.

Immense transport brought in rich food supplies.

29

On the Battle of Staro-Kostiantyniv (July 26 to 28,
1648) see; Jakuba Michalowskiego etc., pp. 97-100, 145-48;
Sprawy i rzeczy etc (Lviv, 1914), pp. 97-98; B. K. Maskiew i c z , "Parnietniki Boguslawa Kazimierza Maskiewieza" , in
Pamietniki Maskiewiczow etc (Wroclaw, 1961), pp. 250-54;
and w. Tomkiewicz, Jeremi Wisnioweicki (1612-1651) (Warsaw,
1933), pp. 216-20.
I
30
See the correspondence m Jakuba Michalowskiego etc.,
pp. 149-211.
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The magnates tried to outdo each other by giving great
feasts; at the same time, their old feuds were renewed.
Even though attempts were made to reconcile them, little
cooperation resulted.

Thus, in the camp of Khmelnytskyi's

antagonists quarrels continued, disorganization prevailed
and general military discipline vanished.
Many of the nobles regarded their presence in the
camp as a mere formality.

They believed that negotiations

between Kysil and Khmelnytskyi would eventually lead to the
cessation of hostilities and then to the re-establishment
of peace.

Arriving in this state of mind in the camp, they

expected to witness this event.

At the same time they also

expected that by their large numbers they would strengthen
the bargaining position of the commission.

Moreover, they

would make sure that the rebels did not ask for too many
concessions.
Others, while not ruling out a conflict, showed
great, contempt for the Kozaks and the serfs.

If they failed

to overawe the enemy with their numbers and splendour, then
they thought, they would use whips, not swords, against the
"rabble".

Finally, still others, were not too happy at the

prospect of destroying their own serfs.

Who would replace
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the serfs and do their work?
While the Kozak Army had in Khmelnytskyi one leader
who possessed extraordinary powers during the time of war,
nothing of the kind existed in the camp of the gentry.
There was no unity of command.

The three regimentaries, who

received temporary command of the army while the hetmans were
Tatar captives, had little talent and experience as military
commanders.
labels;

The Kozaks gave each of them appropriate

"Feather bed" to Prince Wladyslaw Zaslawski, the

Palatine of Sandomierz;

"Latinist" to Mikolaj Ostrorog, the

Crown Cup-Bearer; and "Babe" to Aleksander Koniecpolski,
the Crown Ensign.

32

To make m a t t e r s ‘worse, thirty-two com

missioners were appointed by the Convocation Diet to aid
these three regimentaries.

This sufficed not to lose one,

but thirty-five battles in all.

33

31 See V. Kochowski, Annalium Poloniae etc., 4 vols
(Krakow, 1683), I, 53; S. Grondski, Historia belli etc (Pest,
1789), 75; S. Temberski, Stanislawa Temberskiego etc (Krakow,
1897), pp. 87-90; and M. Golinski, MS. B.Z.N.Ossol., 189,
f. 149.
32 Zaslawski

("Feather bed") was a pleasure-loving
magnate; Ostrorog ("Latinist") was a man of learning; and
Koniecpolski ("Babe") was still a young man.
See Kowalski's
letter to his father, Warsaw, November 22, 1648, in Sprawy
i rzeczy etc., p. 116; and Grondski, op . c i t ., p. 72.
^ S e e Kubala, op. c i t . , p. 289.
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A contemporary observed that an army of deer led by
a lion was worth much more than an army of lions commanded
by a deer.

34

Prince Jeremi Wisniowiecki was this "lion".

He had the admiration respect and confidence of the mass of
quarrelsome country squires, among whom could be found every
shade of opinion.

But he was excluded from the high

command by his opponents.

It mattered little to them that

this "lion" had the necessary military experience and
excellent leadership qualities, and that he alone was able
to restore discipline among this "deer" army of the nobles.
Wisniowiecki was an opponent of Ossolinski's policies; the
latter considered that power in Wisniowiecki1s hands was the
same as a sword in the hands of a madman.

35

Wisniowiecki

thus observed the military preparations of the regimentaries
with ironic aloofness.
This was the state of affairs of an army of the
gentry which became engaged in "pursuit" of the Kozaks in
the middle of September.

After a few successful skirmishes,

it came face to face with the main Kozak strength at Pyliavtsi.
34

The enormous and poorly-located camp of the gentry
. .
See Radziwill, op. cit . , II, 320.

O C

-3See F. Rawita-Gawronski, Bohdan Chmielnicki etc., 2
vols (Lviv, 1906), I, 292.
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"could not be fortified in any manner".

While waiting for

the Kozaks to attack, the gentry made use of this time by
carrying on drunken revelries.

On September 23 alarms were

sounded that the Kozaks were advancing, but "the army cared
nothing about this".
the enemy.

Disorderly groups rushed out against

The battle lasted the entire day without a deci

sive result for each side.
by the shouts of "Allah".

The gentry was greatly disturbed
They believed that great numbers

of Tatars joined the Kozaks,
nearly lost its heart".

The result was that "the army

To make; matters worse, rumours

began to circulate during the night that its officers were
deserting.

The effects of these rumours was catastrophic: the

gentry panicked and fled in all directions.

The regulars

that remained by their posts were annihilated.

36

Such was the fate of the brilliant and seemingly
powerful army.

The country squires, who came prepared to

defend their Fatherland, to terrify any foreign invaders and
to compell the rebellious serfs and Kozaks to fall on
their knees, were now no more than disorderly bands of

•^On the Battle of Pyliavtsi (September 20 to 23, 1648)
see Jakuba Michalowskiego etc., pp. 200-10; Sprawy i rzeczy
etc., pp. 117-19; M. Golinski, M S . B,Z.N.Ossol., 189, ff.
146-51; and Iu. Tys-Krokhmaliuk, Boi Khmelnytskoho etc.
(Munich, 1954), pp. 85-103.
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fugitives.

The way to the heart of the Commonwealth was

opened once more to the Kozak-serf-Tatar forces.

"We have

perished totally", despaired one noble, adding that the only
hope for the Commonwealth lay in the Divine Providence.

37

II
After the disaster at Pyliavtsi, the remnants of the
nobles gathered in Lviv and entrusted the command of the
decimated army to Prince Jeremi Wisniowiecki.

Doubting

that the city could be defended, Wisniowiecki left the
burgesses to their own resources and retreated with most of
his troops to Zamostia.

He was m o r e ,confident that this

strong fortress would stop the enemy's drive toward Warsaw.

38

Furthermore, he was faced with a new problem; the Palatinate
of Rus became engulfed by a rising of all classes of the
Rusin population.

39

While Wisniowiecki made a hasty retreat,

Khmelnytskyi began a slow march towards Lviv.

His lack of

37Anonymous letter from Lviv, September 29, 1648, in
J akuba Mich alowskiego etc., p. 200.
3R

See Tomkiewicz, op. c i t ., pp. 248-257; and L. Kubala,
Szkice history cz n e , 1st s e r . , 5th ed (Lviv, 1923), pp.
53^58.
39

See W. L o z m s k i , Prawem i lewem etc., 2 v o l s . , 4th ed.
(Lviv, 1931) , I, 419-26; and Volumina Legum (Warsaw, 1737) ,
IV, 302-03.
*
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haste can be explained by the fact that he awaited the
arrival of the main Tatar horde under Crim Giray.

When the

Tatars appeared, the combined armies then marched to Lviv
and besieged it.

40

Khmelnytskyi was not particularly eager to capture
Lviv, since this would expose that city to the merciless
sacking by his savage allies.

He thus agreed to lift the

siege when the burgesses proposed to pay an enormous
idemnity, most of which went to the Tatars.

At the close

of October he sent the bulk of the Tatars to Crimea; at
the same time he ordered the Kozak Army to march to
Zamostia.

41

Khmelnytskyi reached his objective early in

November and laid siege to it.

The Kozak Army now stood

on the ethnographic frontiers of Poland, facing the last
obstacle of some strength before Warsaw.
During this time the Election Diet (October 6 to
November 25, 1648) was in session at Warsaw.

Most of the

deputies regarded the fiasco at Pyliavtsi as a direct
40

See Gorka, op. c i t ., p. 117.

^ S e e ibid. On the siege of Lviv (October 6 to 26,
1648) see: A. Czolowski, "Relacya o oblezeniu miasta Lwowa
przez Bohdana Chmielnickiego 1648 rok u " , Kwartalnik
Historyczny, VI (no. 3, 1892), 544-50; and Kubala, Szkice
historyczne, op. ci t . , pp. 53-66.
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result of Ossolinski1s c o n c i l i a r y policy to the Kozaks.
Their temper indicated that this Diet would not only bury
the conciliary policy, but also that any candidate for the
Polish throne who supported it would not be elected.

In

November only the two remaining brothers of the late king
were competing for the crown:

Jan Kazimierz, ex-Jesuit,

ex-cardinal and the hereditary "King of Sweden";

and his

younger brother Karol Ferdynand, Bishop of Wroclaw and
Plock.

The former was supported largely by the conciliary

group at the head of which stood Ossolinski; the latter, by
the intransigents headed by Wisniowiecki.
Jan Kazimierz established contacts with Khmelnytskyi
sometime m

August. 42

In October, while the Kozak-Tatar

forces were besieging Lviv, the Kozak leader declared his
support for the candidacy of Jan Kazimierz.

43

While under

the walls of Zamostia, Khmelnytskyi received promises from
Jan Kazimierz that once elected he would satisfy all Kozak
demands and would enforce their rights.

44

Khmelnytskyi

responded by his renewed pledges of support for Jan Kazimierz .
42

See Kubala, Jerzy Ossolinski, o p . c i t ., p. 322.

43 See Czolowski, op. c i t ., p. 549.
44

G. Kunakov's report to Muscovite government
in Akty otnosiashchiesia etc., Ill, 285.

(1649),
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This he revealed in his letters to the nobles and the
burgesses of Zamostia, to the Senate and to various other
individuals.

45

In the diplomatic m a n e o u v e r m g which

surrounded the election, Khmelnytskyi thus cast the deci
sive vote for Jan Kazimierz.

The rest was accomplished by

the much-talented ijerzy Ossolinski.

On November 14 the

younger brother officially withdrew his candidacy.

On

November 20, 1648 Jan Kazimierz became the King of Poland
and the Grand Duke of Lithuania.

46

On November 15, before his official election, Jan
Kazimierz sent his envoy Jakob Smiarowski to the Kozak
camp with the announcement that he was elected king.

He

also requested Khmelnytskyi to show his goodwill by ceasing
all hostilities and by marching back with his army to
45

See B. Khmelnytskyi1s letter to the Nobles and the
Burgesses of Zamostia, November 6 , 1648, in Dokumenty
Bohdana Khmelnytskoho etc., p. 72. The contents of this
letter of Khmelnytskyi became known in Warsaw by November
12.
See the Record of the Election Diet, Thirtieth Session,
Warsaw, November 12, 1648, in Jakuba Michalowskiego etc.,
p. 312. The following sources reveal that Khmelnytskyi
wrote to other persons:
Kochowski, op. cit., I, 95; W.
Rudawski, H istoria polska etc., 2 vols (St. Petersburg,
1855), I, 45; and A. Kysil's letter to an Anonymous Kozak
Colonel, Hoshcha, May 18, 1649, in Ojczyste spominki etc.,
2 vols (Krakow, 1845), II, 27.
^ S e e Kubala, Jerzy Ossolinski, op. c i t . , pp. 301-28.
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Ukraine.

47

to Warsaw.

On the same day, Khmelnytskyi sent his envoys
48

The Kozak envoys, headed by Reverend Andrzej

Mokrski, — ■ Khmelnytskyi1s former professor at a Jesuit
college —

arrived in Warsaw on November 24, missing the;

envoy Smiarowski on the way to Khmelnytskyi.

49

They brought

two letters: one for the senators, the other for Jan
Kazimierz.
In his letter to the senators Khmelnytskyi defended
his position and actions, begged for forgiveness and
requested the punishment of the magnates, especially Koniecpclski and Wisniowiecki, whom he blamed for the existing
conflict.

50

He wrote to Jan Kazimierz that he was prepared

to serve him, and claimed that the only reason he marched
to Zamostia was to ensure that no one else was elected
king.

51

Khmelnytskyi also instructed his envoys to

4-7

See A. Kraushar, "Poselstwo Jakoba Smiarowskiego do
Bohdana Chmielnickiego pod oblezony Zamosc w r. 1648 (Ze
zrodel rekopismiennych)", Kwartalnik Historyczny, V (no. 4,
1891), 818-21; and Radziwill, op. c i t . , II, 350.
A Q

See Kubala, Jerzy Ossolinski, op. c i t ., p. 331.

^^See the Record of the Election Diet, Forty-first
Session (Senate only), Warsaw, November 24, 1648, in Jakuba
Michalowskiego etc., p. 359.
cn

See B. Khmelnytskyi1s letter to the Senate, Zamostia,
November 15, 1648, in Dokumenty Bohdana Khmelnytskoho etc.,
pp. 81-82.
51

. .
See B. Khmelnytskyi's letter to Jan Kazimierz,
Zamostia, November 15, 1648, ibid., p. 80.
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negotiate directly with Jan Kazimierz.

They were to inform

the government that if any other candidate was chosen king,
it should expect neither negotiations nor peace.

52

The envoy Mokrski presented the following demands
to the king-elect:
lion;

amnesty to all participants in the rebel

confirmation of the rights and privileges of the

registered Kozaks; increase of their number to 12,000;
dependence of the Kozak Army on the king alone, not on the
government; sheriffs and other officials would have no
jurisdiction over the Kozaks; they were to be judged by the
same laws as the nobles; free election of officers of the
Kozak army; blanket permission to send naval, expeditions to
the Black Sea; free access to and unrestricted use of the
steppes;

a land grant for Khmelnytskyi; official confir

mation of his office as a Kozak Hetman; no punishment to
the rebel serfs; legal recognition of the Orthodox Church;
restoration of all churches and benefices belonging to it;
and the abolition of the Uniate Church.

53

These demands did

not differ greatly from those Khmelnytskyi sent to Warsaw

^ S e e Kubala, Jerzy Ossolinski, o p . c i t ., p. 331.
C"O
See the Demands of the Zaporozhian Army, Zamostia,
November 15, 1648, in Dokumenty Bohdana Khmelnytskoho etc.,
pp. 83-84.
See also Jan Kazimierz's letters to B.
Khmelnytskyi, Warsaw, December 1, 1648, in Szajnocha,

UNIVERSITY OF WINDSORLIBRARY
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in June.

Thus, even after three decisive victories the

Kozak leader limited himself to very moderate demands.
Not too many of the senators shared this opinion.
After a great deal of heated debate, they decided to post
pone the answer on the grounds that Khmelnytskyi1s envoys
were not sent to the king-elect, but only to the candidate
for that office.

In order to receive their decision, he

must send new envoys with petitions to the king-elect.
Using this pretext, they prepared an anti-dated manifesto in
the name of the king and addressed it to the Kozak Army.

55

The manifesto announced the election of Jan
I
Kazimierz; the king-elect ordered the cessation of all
hostilities;

and commanded the Kozak Army to retire to its

territories in Ukraine, to send the Tatars to Crimea and

"Zrodla" , op. c i t . , II, 2, 473-75, and December [11] , 1648,
in Jakuba Michalowskiego etc., pp. 217-19; (Concerning the
correct date of this last letter see Kubala, Jerzy
O ssolinski, op. cit ., p. 462, n. 25); Record of the Election
Diet, Forty-first Session (Senate only), Warsaw, November
24, 1648, in Jakuba Michalowskiego etc., p. 359; and
Radziwill, op. c i t ., II, 350.
54 See the Instructions to the Delegates of the Kozak
Army, Bila Tserkva, June 12, 1648, in Dokumenty Bohdana
Khmelnytskoho etc., p. 37.
RC
See the Record of the Election Diet, Forty-Second
Session (Senate only), Warsaw, November 25, 1648, in Jakuba
M ichalowskiego etc., p. 359; and Kubala, Jerzy Ossolinski,
o p . c i t . , p. 33':-33.
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to despatch new envoys to Warsaw with assurances of
fidelity.

In return, the king pledged to confirm all the

Kozak liberties and to send a commission which would
examine all Kozak grievances and begin negotiations with
them.
Jan Kazimierz did not see the value of such
pjroceedings.

He thus called the envoy Mokrski for a con

ference without the knowledge of the senators.

Following

the secret discussions with the king, Mokrski left Warsaw
on December first.

He carried a letter in which Jan

Kazimierz agreed to accept all of Khmelnytskyi1s demands.

57

Shortly after his departure the royal envoy Smiarowski
returned; with him also arrived new Kozak envoys.

These

announced that Khmelnytskyi lifted the siege of Zamostia,
sent the Tatars to Crimea and ordered the Kozak Army to
march to Ukraine.

The Kozak leader also asked the king to

appoint a commission so that peace negotiations could be
C(Z

.

.

.

^uSee Jan Kazimierzfs manifesto to the Kozak Army,
Warsaw, November [21], 1648, in Szajnocha, "Zrodla",
o]3. c i t . , II, 471-73.
Concerning the correct date of this
document see Kubala, Jerzy Ossolinski, op. c i t . , p. 461,

n .. 22.
See Jan Kazimierz's letter to B. Khmelnytskyi, Warsaw,
December 1, 1648, in Szajnocha, "Zrodla", op. c i t . , II,
2, 472-75.
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started.
In his reply Jan Kazimierz repeated the offers he
made in his previous letter.

He also added the following

instructions: Khmelnytskyi and his officers should arrive
at a place designated by the commissioners to take an oath
of fealty; there he would receive the insignia of his office
and begin negotiations.

Once this was accomplished, Kozak

envoys should bring the petitions of the Kozak Army to the
Coronation Diet, where they would be ratified.

The king

again insisted that Khmelnytskyi must send the Tatars back
to Crimea, himself retire to Ukraine with the Kozak Army,
order all the serfs to return to their homes and issue
manifestoes banning lawless b a n d s .

Neither the Crown nor

the Lithuanian armies would hinder him in carrying out the
59
royal orders.
Jan Kazimierz was now satisfied that peace would
materialize.

On December 12, he issued a manifesto decla

ring an end of all hostilities.^

Following this he

~^See G. Kunakov's report to Muscovite government
(1649), in Akty otnosiashchiesia etc . , III, 284.
59

See Jan Kazrmierz's letter to B. Khmelnytskyx, Warsaw,
December [11] , 1648, in Jakuba Michalowskiego etc., pp.
217-19.
.
'
~
60See Kubala, Jerzy Ossolinski, op. - i t ., p. 334.
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appointed members to a commission, at the head of which
he placed Adam Kysil.

Negotiations with the Kozaks

were scheduled to begin at the end of January, 1649, in
Kiev.

61

It thus appeared that the Commonwealth would be

spared further strife and bloodshed.

In Warsaw the

unexpected "moderation" of Khmelnytskyi was attributed to
the divine intervention.

62

Ill
Thus, at the height of his success Khmelnytskyi
halted his advance, supported the candidacy of Jan Kazimierz,
entered into negotiations with him, ^imited himself to
modest demands, left all the decisions at the hands of the
king, sent back his Tatar allies and began a return march
to Ukraine.

Khmelnytskyi1s motives were quite plain.

By

taking these steps he found a good opportunity to settle
matters without continuing war.

In Jan Kazimierz and his

advisors, he found men who would follow his bidding.
Furthermore, his troops were weary after a long campaign,
and as it was not customary for the Kozaks to undertake a
a winter campaign, Khmelnytskyi decided to halt all military

k^See ibid., p. 335.
62

. .
See ibid.

p. 336.
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operations.
Moreover, the Kozaks had penetrated the ethnographic
boundary of Poland; thus, they were faced with a more
hostile population.

More important still, Khmelnytskyi

wanted to gain time to further his ambitious plans, which
began to take shape after the victory at Pyliavtsi.

By

accepting'the offers of the king, Khmelnytskyi also assured
himself a safe return to Ukraine with all the plunder.

He

therefore issued manifestoes throughout all territories
under Kozak control, which announced the end of war.

The

nobles were urged to return to their estates; the serfs, to
/■

obey their masters.

At the same time he began to march to

Kiev.
No palatine of Kiev ever received such a welcome
from the Kievan burgesses as had Bohdan Khmelnytskyi, when
he entered Kxev on the Orthodox Christmas Eve.

64

On the

outskirts of the city he was welcomed by all the inhabi
tants.

He was met by the visiting Patriarch of Jerusalem

03
See B. Khmelnytskyi's manifesto to the Rusin people,
Ostoroh, December 12, 1648, in Dokumenty Bohdana Khmelnytskoho etc., pp. 85-86.
See also S. Oldakowski's letter to
A.. Sieniawski, Sokal, January 2, 1649, in Szajnocha,
"Zrodla", o p . c i t ., II, 2, 479.
I

^ S e e Joachim Jerlicz, Latopisiec etc., 2 vols.
1853), I, 72.
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and the Metropolitan Bishop of Kiev, who gave him a place
of honour in his sleigh.

They proceeded to the gates of

Kiev through the processions formed by the Orthodox clergy;
the crowds cheered, the bells pealed and the guns roared.
The professors and students of the Kievan' Academy honoured
him with "orations and acclamations".

They welcomed him as

"Moses, saviour and liberator of the Rusin people from the
Polish bondage, and as a good omen called Bohdan —
Given".

God

On this occasion the Patriarch bestowed the title

"Illustrious Prince" upon him.

The archmandrite of the

Monastery of the Caves prepared a feast in his honour.
There were foreign envoys seeking to confer with him.

65

Khmelnytskyi was profoundly stirred by this enthu
siastic reception by the Kievans.

He was welcomed by all

classes of the Rusin society in Kiev, "the mother of the
cities of Rus"; the capital of old Kievan Rus, at one time
a metropolis which was a rival to Constantinopole, from
whence Grand Princes Volodymyr and Iaroslav ruled a vast
territory and where the monuments of their times were still
visible —

Golden Gate, Cathedral of St. Sofiia, Monastery

65

See the Journal of W. Miaskowski, Pereiaslav,
February 23, 1649, in Vossoedinenie Ukrainy etc., II,
109-10.
'
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of the Caves.

Kiev was also the cradle of the Orthodox

Church among the East Slavs.

Even in Khmelnytskyi’s time

it was the most progressive centre of the religious and the
intellectual life in the whole Orthodox world.

By his

triumphant entry into Kiev, Khmelnytskyi sanctified his
military and political leadership with the halo of historical tradition.66
Moreover, it was through the discussions with the
enlightened Rusin ecclesiastical and lay circles at Kiev,
that he grasped the magnitude of his achievements.

Bohdan

Khmelnytskyi thus began to view his position and responsi
bility in a new light.

He realized that he was no longer

merely a leader of rebel Koz a k s , but the head of all the
Rusin
ideals.

people, with wider duties and more lofty political
If at Zamostia he still took advantage of his

military successes for the benefit of the narrow interest
of the Kozak class, then at Kiev he changed his plans
radically.

67

.
This he revealed to Adam Kysil and the commis

sioners upon their arrival at Pereiaslav in February 1649.

^ S e e G. Vernadsky, Boh d a n , Hetman of Ukraine
1941) , p. 58.
”

(New Haven,

67

See M. Hrushevskyi, Istoriia. Ukrainy-R u s y , 10 vols
York, 1956), VIII, 3, 12 2-1297"
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Even at their first meeting Kysil observed a change
in the attitude and plans of Khmelnytskyi.

First of all,

he insulted the commissioners by not receiving them at Kiev,
but making them travel to Pereiaslav.

Although he received

them with great pomp and ceremony, he accepted the royal
insignia of his office without enthusiasm, almost indig
nantly.

Kysil's efforts to begin negotiations on the basis

of Khmelnytskyi1s declarations at Zamostia brought no
re;sults.

Khmelnytskyi ended the first session by a long

denounciation of the "kinglets".

The following day he

announced that the Poles had no right to "Ukraine and all
i
Rus". He even tried to persuade the commissioners to
renounce their loyalty to the Crown and to cast their lots
with the Kozaks, prophesying that "Poland will perish and
Rus will rule very soon this y e a r " . ^
At the third round of negotiations Kysil attempted
to use his old stratagem of divide et impera by appealing to
the personal interests of Khmelnytskyi and to the class
interests of the Kozaks.

He stated that the king was

prepared to satisfy all the grievances of Khmelnytskyi and
68

See the Journal of W. Miaskowski, Pereiaslav,
February 19-22, 1649, in Vossoedinenie Ukrainy etc., II,
105-08.
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those of the Kozaks.

As a bait he proposed to increase the

number of the registered Kozaks to fifteen thousand.

Kysil

stated that the Kozaks v/ere men of knightly rank; therefore,
they should concern themselves with military matters and
with the waging of war.

The Kozaks had nothing in common

with the serfs; they must sever all ties with the "rabble"
and leave'them to the tilling of the soil.

Finally, Kysil

attempted to rekindle the Koz a k s ' hate of the Tatars by
appealing to their "patriotism" and faith.

His aim, of

course, was to rupture the Kozak-Tatar alliance; he also
aimed at turning them against the Turks.

The Kozaks should

be aware of the fact that while they laid waste to Poland
and Lithuania, they also destroyed Rusin ethnic territories.
By acting with the infidels, the Kozaks endangered their
faith and the Orthodox Church.

Rather than destroying the

Commonwealth, the Kozaks should wage wars in foreign lands;
rather than destroying Christians within their ov/n country,
the Kozaks should destroy the infidels.

69

One member of the Commission, the Chamberlin of
Lviv, Wojciech Miaskowski, summarized Khmelnytskyi1s answer
to Kysil.

In it Khmelnytskyi refuted Kysil's arguments and
4

69

See ibid., II, 108.
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outlined his new political credo:
It is useless to talk too much. . . . Now there is no
time [to negotiate]. Hitherto I have undertaken tasks
which I had not thought through? henceforth, I will
pursue aims which I have considered with care.
I will
free all the Rusin people from the Polish bondage.
Up
to now, I have fought because of wrongs done to me
personally; now, I will fight for our Orthodox faith.
All the people as far as Lublin and Krakow will help me.
I will not abandon them, for they are our right hand.
In order that you may not subdue the serfs and then
attack the Kozaks, I will maintain two to three hundred
thousand men, as well as all of the Tatar horde. . . .
The Kozak friendship with them [Tatars] is eternal, . . .
I will neither wage foreign w a r s , nor will I draw my
sword against the Turks or the T a t a r s . I have enough
to do in Ukraine, Podolia and Volynia; and now I am
enjoying sufficient ease, wealth and benefit from my
land and principality as far as Lviv, Kholm and H a l y c h .
When I will reach the Wisla [River], I will say to the
rest of the Poles:
"Be still and keep silent Poles!"
I will drive the wealthier Poles and the dukes and the
princes beyond the Wisla, and if they become too unruly
there, I will seek them out there too. Not a single
noble or prince will I permit to set foot here in
Ukraine, and if any one of them will desire to eat our
bread, he must be obedient to the Zaporozhian Army, and
must make no outcries against the king.
Khmelnytskyi also emphasized that he no longer con
sidered himself only the leader of the Kozaks.
"by the will of God . . .

He became

71
the independent ruler of R u s " .

T h u s , Khmelnytskyi seemingly wanted to rule an independent
Rusin state.

At this time he did not wish to sever all ties

7°Ibid., II, 108-09.
71Ibid., II, 108.
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with the Commonwealth, because he still professed allegience
to Jan Kazimierz.

This, however, was a very thin link.

Khmelnytskyi was unprepared to send the commissio
ners back to Warsaw with a declaration of war.
time, he signed an agreement with them.

Playing for

It declared that

an armistice was arranged to last till May 22.

The negotia

tions were not completed because Khmelnytskyi faced grave
logistical problems; therefore, he was neither able to
compile the lists of the registered Kozaks, nor to send
back the commoners back to their homes.

Because of this

problem, the nobles were requested not to return to their
homes, until May 22.

By this date Khmelnytskyi would be

ready and a new commission could resume negotiations.
During the term of the armistice; neither the Crown, the
Lithuanian nor the Kozak Armies were to cross into each
others territories; the boundaries being the Rivers Horyn
and Prypiats and a line running north.to Horyn from
Kamianets in Podolia.

Finally, Khmelnytskyi consented to

return all prisoners-of-war, on condition that his enemy
Daniel C z a p l m s k i would be surrendered to him.

72

77

See the Agreement between the Commission and B.
Khmelnytskyi, Pereiaslav, February 24, 1649, in Dokumenty
Bohdana Khmelnytskoho etc., pp. 103-04; and Commission's
manifesto the Crown Army, Pereiaslav, February 24, 1649,
-*-n OjczYste spominki etc., II, 13-14.
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In another document Khmelnytskyi really dictated
his conditions for peace.
"petition" to the king:

It took the form of a humble

abolition of the Uniate Church;

guarantee of all the rights of the Orthodox Church, and the
restoration of all of its former churches', foundations and
benefices;

appointment of the Kievan palatine and castellan

to be restricted to Rusins of the Orthodox faith;

at least

three seats in the Senate for the Rusin people which would
go to the Kievan Metropolitan bishop, the palatine and the
castellan.

In Kiev all churches were to remain as they

were at this time; the Jesuits were to be expelled from
that city; Czaplinski was to be surrendered by the commis
sioners to Khmelnytskyi;

and Prince Wisniowiecki was not

to be given command of the Crown Army.

73

The commissioners saw that Khmelnytskyi had no
intention of compromising any further.
them that, they failed:

It became clear to

Khmelnytskyi dared to dream "about

a duchy and rule"; he would be satisfied with nothing less
than an independent state.

74

His attitude during the

73

Articles of Petition of the Zaporozhian Army to Jan
Kazimierz, Pereiaslav, February 24, 1649, in Dokumenty
Bohdana Khmelnytskoho etc., pp. 105-06.
74 See Commission's letter to Jan Kazimierz [Hoshcha],
March 8, 1649.
Cited by Lipinski, op. cit., p. 294.
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negotiations was enough evidence for them that he also had
no intention of keeping any agreement.

75

The line of

demarcation, the truce and the absence of nobles from their
estates would give Khmelnytskyi enough time to forge a
strong army without any interference.
would also look for new allies.

During this time he

His excuses for not

demobilizing the Kozak Army were too obvious:

Khmelnytskyi

had no intention of weakening his army; at the same time he
had no desire of creating dissentions in its rank-and-file
by excluding the serfs.

Furthermore,

although Khmelnytskyi

knew that the magnates in Warsaw would declare his demands
as impossible, he gambled that neither the king nor the
"peace party" would flatly reject them.

Both Jan Kazimierz

and Ossolinski would try to humour him as long as possible.
During this time he would gain the needed time to prepare
fcr a new campaign in the spring of 1649.

75
See the Journal of W. Miaskowski, Pereiaslav,
February 23-26, 1649, in Vossoed inenie Ukrainy etc., II,
108-13.
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CHAPTER VI

KHMELNYTS KYI'S FRESH PREPARATIONS FOR WAR, THE RENEWAL
OF HOSTILITIES AND THE TREATY OF ZBORIV

I
When the commissioners submitted their report on
the outcome of the negotiations with Khmelnytskyi at
Pereiaslav to King Jan Kazimierz, he still had hope that all
difficulties would be eventually resolved in one way or
another.

Both the king and the Crown Grand Chancellor,

Jerzy Ossolinski, realized that there were several reasons
for Khmelnytskyi1s negative attitude to negotiations, and
for his general lack of confidence in the goodwill of the
government.
The Coronation Diet
1649)

(January 19 to February 13,

failed even to discuss Khmel-nytskyi's demands which

he submitted from Zamostia.

The resolutions of this Diet

also must have made him suspicious.

While the commissioners

were on the way to open negotiations with Khmelnytskyi, the
Coronation Diet proposed to increase the strength of the
Crown Army and even authorized the king to call a general
181
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levy of nobles.

Furthermore, although Prince Jeremi

Wisniowiecki was not appointed a temporary hetman, he was
successful in recruiting more adherents to his intransigent
camp.

The intransigent nobles issued threats against

Khmelnytskyi and also expressed vehement objections to any
proposed concessions for the Kozaks.'*'
Both Jan Kazimierz and Ossolinski wanted peace at
all cost.

They still harboured the old war plans of King

Wladyslaw IV.

2

A war with the Ottoman Empire, at a time

when it was engaged in hostilities with Venice, was both
desirable and necessary for the Commonwealth.
It would
I
employ the energies of the Kozaks and thus solve most of the
internal problems of the Polish-Lithuanian state.

In order

for such plans to materialize, peace had to be first
concluded with the Kozaks.

Contrary to the advice of many

senators and even some of the commissioners, but pressed
into action by Ossolinski, Jan Kazimierz decided to remove

"^See L. Kubala, Jerzy Ossolinski, 2nd rev. ed (Lviv,
1924), pp. 340, 347-48; and Jozef Leszczynski, "Projekty
reformy panstwa polskiego na sejmie koronacyjnym Jana
Kazimierza w 1649 r." [The Draft of Reforms of the Polish
State at the Coronation Diet of Jan Kazimierz in 1649], in
O Naprawe Rzeczypospolitej etc (Warsaw, 1966), pp. 90-91.
^See Kubala, op. c i t ., pp. 279-80, 337-39; and E.
L a t a c z , Ugoda Zborowska a plany tureckie Jana Kazimierza
(Krakow, 1933), pp. 10-11.
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all the existing obstacles from the road leading to nego
tiations.
Since the Commonwealth was to reap great benefits
from the successful war with the Turks, no sacrifice was
too great for it in order to satisfy the demands of
Khmelnytskyi.

3

With the exception of refusal to surrender

Czaplinski, whom he promised to punish severely, Jan
Kazimierz agreed to accept all other main demands of
Khmelnytskyi.

4

The king also attempted to win Khmelnytski's

confidence and goodwill by granting him titles to various
5
estates.
Khmelnytskyi took advantage of this policy of
"contentment" pursued by the king and the chancellor, and
used it effectively to camouflage his far-reaching aim:

to

prepare the final blow for the Commonwealth, both from with
in and from without.

In order to gain time for his plans

and to keep the Commonwealth unprepared for w a r , Khmelnytskyi
3

See Kubala, op. c i t ., p. 349.

^See Jan Kazimierz's letter to B. Khmelnytskyi, Warsaw,
March 27, 1649, in Ojczyste spominki etc., 2 vols (Krakow,
1845), II, 113-17.
5

See Jan Kazimierz's charter for B. Khmelnytskyi, Warsaw,
March 27, 1649, in Akty otnosiashchiesia etc., 15 vols (St.
Petersburg, 1878), X, 462-63.
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continued to lull the king and other influential men to
sleep with his offers of peace.^

He also initiated some

steps by which he sought to sow dissention among the gentry
of the Commonwealth, in addition to other steps by which he
attempted to prevent the coordinated action of Crown and
Lithuanian armies against him.
very ambitious:

Externally, his plans were

he sought to isolate the Commonwealth and

to draw into the struggle against it as many of the neigh
bouring countries as possible.

Khmelnytskyi1s diplomacy

was a series of schemes or intrigues, carried out in a true
Kozak fashion.
Khmelnytskyi made numerous attempts to persuade
Moscovy to take a hostile stand against the Commonwealth.
Through his letters, by means of his envoys and by his
conversations with Muscovite envoys, Khmelnytskyi begged
Tsar Aleksei Mikhailovich not to aid the Poles; to give him
permission to engage the Don Kozaks against the Common
wealth; to protect the rights of the Orthodox Christians;
and to use diplomatic intervention in his favour.

He also

^See B. Khmelnytskyi's letters to S. Lanckoronski and
A. Kysil, Chyhyryn, April 20, April 24, and May 13, 1649,
in Dokumenty Bohdana Khmelnytskoho etc (Kiev, 1961), pp.
109-10, 114-15, 118-19.
See also A. Kysil's< letter to B.
Khmelnytskyi [Hoshcha, ca. late March or early April,
1649], in Ojczyste spominki etc., II, 30-33.
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did not fail to tempt the tsar.

Khmelnytskyi pointed out

that a good opportunity existed to regain the lost Muscovite
lands from the Commonwealth.

Furthermore, he claimed that

if the tsar would heed his pleas, the Kozaks were prepared
to accept his overlordship over them.

7

The Muscovite government rejected all these tempting
offers.

During the 1640's it adopted a policy of extreme

caution in its foreign relations.

Furthermore, Muscovy

itself was faced with serious domestic problems:

agrarian

and religious disorders were rife throughout the country.
Muscovite nobles also viewed, somewhat with apprehension,
the social radicalism of the conflict within the Common
wealth.

The tsar was therefore advised against undertaking

any foreign adventures and urged to ratify peace with the
new Polish king.
The attitude of Muscovy was thus one of "wait and
7

See for example B. Khmelnytskyi1s letters to Aleksei
Mikhailovich, Pereiaslav, February 18; Chyhyryn, May 2 and
May 13, 1649, in Dokumenty Bohdana Khmelnytskoho etc.,
pp. 94-95, 115-16, 117-18.
See also the Report on the
Mission of the Patriarch of Jerusalem at the Department of
Foreign Affairs, Moscow, December 11, 1648 to August 7,
1649; S. Muzhylovskyi's report to Aleksei Mikhailovich,
Moscow, February 14, 1649; and the Report of G. Unkovskii
to the Muscovite government, Moscow-Chyhyryn, March 23 to
June 1, 1649, in Vossoedinenie Ukrainy etc., 3 vols (Moscow,
1954), II, 81-104, 127-31, 145-62.
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see".

The Muscovite government answered Khmelnytskyi1s

appeals only with general assurances and vague promises.
Khmelnytskyi was praised for his good intentions, but would
not receive military aid because "eternal peace" existed
between Muscovy and the Commonwealth.

The tsar agreed to

extend his protection over the Kozaks and to become their
sovereign, but only under the condition that King Jan
Q
Kazimierz would agree to this arrangement.
Khmelnytskyi made the best of these circumstances.
Even though Muscovy remained strictly neutral, he began to
spread rumours that he succeeded in concluding a military
I
alliance with it. The tsar consented to send him 20,000
troops; the Muscovite armies would protect him from the
Lithuanians by not allowing them to cross the Dnieper to
fight the Kozaks.

9

These rumours caused serious difficulties

between the Commonwealth and Muscovy.

The bulk of

g

See the Reply of Prince A. Lvov to the Patriarch of
Jerusalem, Moscow, May 19, 1649, in Vossoedinenie Ukrainy
etc., II, 100-01.
See also Aleksei Mikhailovich's letters
to the Senate, Jan Kazimierz and B. Khmelnytskyi, Moscow,
January 4, May 18 and June 23, 1649, in Akty otnosiashchiesia etc., Ill, 25-26 (Dopolneniia) , 309-11, 320-21.
^See Olszewski's report to the Commissioners [Taikury
May 25, 1649]; and the Senate Council, Warsaw, June 4,
1649, in Jakuba Michalowskiego etc (Krakow, 1864), pp.
396, 405.
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Lithuanian troops was left to guard the Muscovite frontier.
Khmelnytskyi thus capitalized on false rumours.

He

strained the relations between the Commonwealth and Muscovy,
and prevented the coordinated action of the Crown and
Lithuanian Armies against him.
He was, however, more successful in his other under
takings.

Late in 1648, he sent his envoys to Constantino-

pole with a tempting proposition to the Turkish government.
He offered to the sultan all of the territories of the
Commonwealth under Kozak control and begged him to accept
the Kozak Army as vassals of the High Porte.

In return for

these offers Khmelnytskyi expected to get permission for the
Tcitars to support him in the forthcoming campaign, as well
as some Turkish military aid, and consent for his appoint
ment as the ruler of Moldavia.'*'^

The High Porte thought it

wise to sanction the whole project.

If the Kozaks were

turned down, they could conclude an agreement with the
Polish king, who then would be in a good position to seek
revenge for the Tatar depredations in his realm by

^ S e e B. Khmelnytskyi's letter to Muhammed IV, Stare
Selo, November 28, 1648, in Dokumenty Bohdana Khmelnytskoho
etc., pp. 626-27.
The editors of this documentary
collection believe that this is not an authentic letter of
Khmelnytskyi, but that it was fabricated by some of his
enemies.
See p. 627, n. 9.
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declaring war against the Turks.
Khan Islam Ill's envoys supported Khmelnytskyi1s
schemes at Constantinopole, and in response to Khmelnytskyi's
12
frequent letters,
the khan agreed to embark on a new cam
paign as soon as possible.

At the close <bf May, 1649 the

Tatar hordes left Crimea and marched northward. 13
Khmelnytskyi was therefore successful in gaining the support
of the Muslim world.

His prospects were further brightened

by the uphevals within the Turkish government early in May.
Since a belligerent faction was now in power.

Khmelnytskyi

hoped that he would be able to involve the Turks directly
m

the conflict with the Commonwealth.

14

^ S e e W. Bieczynski's letter to L. Miask.owski, Constantinopole, January 30, 1649: and S. Lanckoronski's letter to
[the Deputy Judge of Lviv, Manachyn, May 3.3 , 1649], in
J akuba Michalowskiego etc., pp. 363-64, 408. Concerning the
correct address, place and date of Lanckoronski1s letter see
W. Lipinski, Stanislaw Michal Krzyczewski etc. (Krakow,
1912), p. 278, n. 1.
1

See B. Khmelnytskyi1s letters to Antimir, Peri Aga and
Crim Giray, Chyhyryn, April 10, 11, and 20, 1649, in Dokumenty Bohdana Khmelnytskoho etc., pp. 110-11, 113-14, 112.
There are frequent references to this effect in the corres
pondence of various nobles: see Jakuba Michalowskiego etc.,
pp. 388-89, 392; and Ojczyste spominki etc., II, 17, 19, 3 5 „
49, 51-52.
13See O. Gorka, "Nieznana kronika tatarska lat 1644-50",
Kwartalnik Historyczny, LXII (no. 3, 1955), 117.
ee L. Kubala, Wojna moskiev/ska r. 1654-1655 [The
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The other vassal states of the High Porte —
Moldavia, Walachia and Transylvania —
ficant part in Khmelnytskyi1s plans.

also played a signi
Acting on the advice

of the visiting Patriarch of Jerusalem, Khmelnytskyi
sought to take advantage of his military successes and his
power by inducing Muscovy, Moldavia and Walachia to form an
alliance.

15

Once this league of Orthodox states material

ized, Khmelnytskyi hoped to direct it against the Common
wealth, or if need arose, even against the Ottoman Empire.
To this end he initiated an intensive diplomatic action.
Muscovy, however, preferred to be uncommitted at
(

this time.

The Hospodar of Walachia seemed to favour the

idea and even promised some military assistance to
Khmelnytskyi.

The warmest response came from Hospodar

Vasyl Lupul of Moldavia.

Lupul seemed to show his whole

hearted approval by pompously addressing Khmelnytskyi as
the "Prince of R u s " , by showering him with gifts, by
promising him substantial military aid, and by expressing

Muscovite WTar of 1654-1655]
1910), pp. 26, 346, n. 8 6 .

(Warsaw: Gebethner and Wolff,

^ S e e M. Golinski, MS. B . Z . N .Ossol., 189, f. 212 and
Paul of Aleppo, The Travels etc., 2 vols (London, 1831),
I, 2, 173.
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willingness even to abdicate in favour of Khmelnytskyi.
With Princes Gyorgy and Zsigmond Rakoczy of Transyl
vania Khmelnytsky again concluded an alliance to cooperate
in military action against the Commonwealth.
very tempting offer for the Rakoczys:

He also had a

after the rout of the

Crown Army he promised to elevate Zsigmond to,the Polish
17 ■
throne.
At the Transylvanian court Khmelnytskyi1s envoys
learned that the Rakoczys had many supporters within the
Commonwealth.

Moreover, Khmelnytskyi was assured by the

envoys of the Rakoczis that many nobles of the Grand Duchy
of Lithuania, as well as most of the Protestants, were in
sympathy with the Kozak cause.

The head of all these mal

contents was the Lithuanian Field Hetman Prince Janusz

-^See w. Bieczynski's letter to L. Miaskowski, Constantinopole, January 30, 1649; and W. Miaskowski1s letter to
Anonymous, Novosilka, February 1, 1649, in Jakuba Michalo
wskiego etc., pp. 363, 365.
17

See B. Khmelnytskyi1s letters to the Rakoczys, from
November, 1648 to May 1649, in Dokumenty Bohdana Khmelnytshoho etc., pp. 84-85, 91, 93, 97, 97-98, 98-99, 99-101,
120-21.
see also L. Miaskowski's letter to Anonymous
[Kamianets?] , April 23; S. Lanckoronski's letter to [the
Deputy Judge of Lviv, Manachyn, May 13]; Senate Council,
Warsaw, June 4, 1649, in Jakuba Michalowskiego etc., pp.
389, 405, 407, 408; and S. Lanckoronski1s letter to the
Deputy Judge of Lviv [Manachyn], May 5, 1649, in 0 jczyste
spominki etc., II, 19.
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Radziwill; he would also support Zgigmond Rakoczy to gain
the Polish throne.

18

It was no secret to Khmelnytskyi that this magnate
supported Rakoczy1s candidacy during the interregnum, and
that he continued to keep contact with this Transylvanian
ruler who was declared an enemy of the Commonwealth at the
Coronation Diet.

19

Radziwill hated Jan Kazimierz, for whom

he prophesied a short life.

If the King did not die, he

would be dethroned as a result of the civil war, which would
take place even if Jan Kazimierz managed to pacify the
Kozaks. 20

Radziwill was publicly accused of trying to

separate Lithuania from Poland and to set up a sovereign
duchy with the help of R a k oczy.
synonymous with treason.

in Warsaw his name was

21

Khmelnytskyi thus found a perfect opportunity to
reestablish good relations with the Lithuanian magnate and
"I O

See B. Khmelnytskyi1s letter to the Rakoczys, Pereiaslav, February 20, 1649, in Dokumenty Rohdana Khmelnytskoho
etc., pp. 100-0 1 .
19

See S. A. Radziwill, Pamietniki etc., 2 vols (Poznan,
1839), II, 357; and Kubala, Wojna moskiewska etc., op. c i t . ,
p. 247.
20

See Kubala, Wo]na. moskiewska, op. c i t . , pp. 247, 415,

n. 24.
21

See Radziwill. o p . c i t .. II, 371; and E. Kotlubaj,
Zycie Janusza Radziwilla etc. (Vilnius, 1859), p. 135.
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to make use of his ambitions.

There were frequent exchanges

of envoys between the Kozak and Lithuanian hetmans.
Furthermore, some sort of secret understanding was reached
between them.

22

At the same time Khmelnytskyi contacted

other Lithuanian men of importance.

His envoys requested

the Lithuanian senators to use their influence not to send
23
the troops of the Grand Duchy to ard the Poles.

By

denouncing the serf rising in Lithuania, he hoped to esta24
blish friendly relations with the Lithuanian nobles.

The

aim of all these activities was to sow dissention between
the nobles of the Crown and of the Grand Duchy.
He also
I
wanted to contain the Lithuanian troops within the
boundaries of the Grand Duchy while the Kozak Army marched
against the Crown Army.
22

See B. Khmelnytskyi1s letter to J. Radziwill, Pereiaslav, February 19, 1649, in Dokumenty Bohdana Khmelnytskoho
etc., p. 96; G. Kunakov's Report to the Muscovite Government
(1649); and the letters to the Muscovite Department of
External Affairs of N. Pleshcheev, Putivl, April 16, 1649;
and Z. Leontev and N. Kirillov, Sevsk, June 9, 1649, in
Akty otnosiashchiesia etc., Ill, 299-300, 307, 62 (Dopelneniia) . See also Lipinski, op. c i t ., pp. 274-75, 277-79.
23see G. Unkovskii's report to the Muscovite Government
(1649), in Vossoedinenie Ukrainy e t c . , II, 161.
74

See B. Khmelnytskyi1s letter to H. Czyz, Kiev,
December 31, 1648, in Dokumenty Bohdana Khmelnytskoho etc.,
p. 87; and D. Horski's letter to K. Chodkiewicz, Zaliesie,
January 30, 1649, in Ojczyste spominki etc., II, 7-10.
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On the whole, Khnielnytskyi seemed to have accom
plished his aims by diplomatic means.

True, he was unable

to rouse Muscovy out of its lethargy.

Its statesmen were

interested in his propositions, but they were cautious and
in no hurry.

They were proverbially "measuring the cloth

seven times before they cut i t " .

Khmelnytskyi at least had

the satisfaction that while Muscovy would not support him,
it would not aid his enemies either.

Khmelnytskyi seemed, to

have secured the support from the High Porte and all its
vassals: he was certain about the whole-hearted cooperation
of Crimea; he was assured of some military aid from Moldavia,
Walachia and Transylvania;

and he imagined that the Turks

would enter into the hostilities with the Commonwealth in
spite of their war with Venice.

Finally, Khmelnytskyi

seemed to utilize all the hostile elements within the
Commonwealth for his en d s .
The realization of Khmelnytskyi1s new political
plans did not only depend on the support of foreign powers
or the hostile factions within the Commonwealth; he had a
vast resevoir of "riffraff" at his disposal.

At the same

time as he roused the Commonwealth's neighbours, he also
appealed to the Rusin people.

Issuing callfe for aid to

" all the common people and the Kozaks who believed in G o d " ,
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Khmelnytskyi promised them freedom from their masters after
a victory over the Poles.

25

In response to his appeals

26
"the rebellious serfs thronged together".

Having already

experienced "freedom from labour and tribute, the rabble
armed itself"; their slogan was;

"no lords forever".

27

They did not even want to hear any talk about negotiations
with their oppressors.
last drop of blood.

28

This was to be a conflict to the

Khmelnytskyi declared that his aim was

"to exterminate the Polish name and race";
followers cried out defiantly:

29

his militant

"human tongues will first

30
turn backward before the Poles will rule over u s " .

This

Despatch of L. Sapieha [Loeu, c_a. August 1, 1649], in
Ojczyste spominki etc., II, 42.
T. Obuchowi.cz's letter to L. Sapieha, Manashyn,
May 22, 1649, ibid., II, 29.
27

Journal of W. Miaskowski, Hoshcha, March 7, 1649, m
Jakuba Michalowskiego etc., p. 385.
O Q

*

See Anonymous letter to A. Szoldrski, Warsaw, March
23, 1649, and A. Kysil's letter to B. Khmelnytskyi [Hoscha,
late March or early April, 1649], in O jczyste spominki
etc., II, 16, 30-32; Revelations of Kozak prisoners,
Treshyn, April 18, 1649, in Jakuba Michalowskiego etc., p.
387; and M. Golinski, MS. B.Z,N.Ossol., 189, f. 210.
29

Senate Council, Warsaw, June 4, 1649, m
M ichalowskiego etc., p. 406.
30

L. Miaskowski's letter to Anonymous,
April 23, 1649, ibid., p. 389.

Jakuba

[Kamianets?],
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movement was also supported actively by Rusin nobles, clergy
and burgesses.

31

In April Khmelnytskyi announced the

final orders for a general mobilization of his forces.

His

manifestoes designated all regiments to concentrate at
Mcisliv ' Stav.^^

H
So far Khmelnytskyi was successful in "lulling the
Commonwealth to sleep with the hope of peace and uncertain
33
negotiations".

By May he was ready; he had no further

need of his mask.

Early in June there was no question

about his true motives and plans eveij. in Warsaw.

The royal

envoy Smiarowski reported that Khmelnytskyi received him
indignantly, treated him with contempt and showed no
respect for the letter of the king.

Furthermore, the

31

See W. Miaskowski1s letter to Anonymous, Novosilka,
February 1, 1649, and the Journal of W. Miaskowski, Pereiaslav, February 26, 1649, ibi d ., pp. 365, 383, See also
Commissioners' report to Jan Kazimierz, Vasylkiv, February
11, 1649, in Ojczyste spominki etc., II, 10-12; M. Golinski,
MS. B . Z CN. Ossol., 189, f, 210; and J. Jerlicz, Latopisiec
etc., 2 vols. (Warsaw, 1853), I, 95-96.
32

.

See the various reports, despatches and letters m
Akty otnosiashchiesia etc., Ill, 45, 54, 58 (Dopolneniia);
VIII, 289, 294-95; Jakuba Michalowskiego etc., pp. 389, 397;
and in Ojczyste spominki etc., II, 17.
33

S. Lanckoronski’s letter to the Deputy Judge of Lviv
[Manachyn], May 5, 1649, in Ojczyste spominki etc., II, 19.
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astonished royal envoy heard a declaration of war.

Khmel

nytskyi stated that no further compromise was possible;
"two walls will collide:
remain standing".

one will fall in; the other will

In Smiarowski1s opinion, the hostilities

could only be prevented if the government consented to
humour Khmelnytskyi with the creation of a "sovereign
34
Principality of R u s " .
Already in February 1649 Khmelnytskyi —
"Zaporozhian Machiavelli"

35

this

-- revealed to the commissioners

that "by the will of God" he became "the independent ruler
of Rus".

36

Yet, at that time he still considered himself

to be a "loyal" subject of the Polish King.

Three months

later, however, he decided to sever even this weak link
with the Commonwealth, for he refused to acknowledge alle
giance to Jan Kazimierz.

This he revealed to the Muscovite

envoy Gii^orii Unkovskii in the following form:
In Poland and in Lithuania Jan Kazimierz was elected
king. . . . and the Poles and the Lithuanians crowned
34 Senate Councils, Warsaw, June 4, 1649; and
Olszewski's report [Taikury, May 25, 1649], in Jakuba
M ichalowskiego etc., pp. 3 97, 405-06.
OC
Letter of T. Obuchowicz to[L. Sapieha?] , Taikury,
May 25, 1649, ibid., p. 396.
■^^Journal of W. Miaskowski, Pereiaslav, February 22,
1649, in Vossoedinenie Ukrainy etc., II, 108.
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him and swore fealty to him, and the king swore an oath
to them, and God delivered us from them. The king was
neither elected nor crowned by us . Vie have not kissed
the cross [i.e., swore by the cross]for him.
And they
had neither written nor notified us about this; and in
this way, by the will of God, we have gained freedom
from them. . . . And we do not wish to remain under
37
their subjection and m their bondage.
T h u s , in all the Orthodox churches within the terri
tories controlled by the Kozaks, the Orthodox faithful
ceased to recite the king s name in their common prayers.

38

All traces of the former magnate rule were slowly disappearing.

39

Khmelnytskyi aimed to unite all Rusin ethnic terri

tories within such boundaries as were ruled by the Kievan
,
.
40
grand princes.
Even the greatest optimist among the "peace party"
began to realize that such "madness" of Khmelnytskyi must
be checked.

The king called his ministers to counsel, how

37

G. Unkovskii's report to the Muscovite Government,
C'hyhyryn, April 29, 1649, ibid. , II, 152, 154.
OQ
J See I. P. Krypiakevych, Bohdan Khmelnytskyi
1954), p. 338.

(Kiev,

■R9

See the various letters and report to the Muscovite
Government in Akty otnosiashchiesia etc., Ill, 211, 227,
232, 235, 242, 21 (Dopolneniia) .
^ S e e G. Unkovskii's report to the Muscovite Government
(1649), in Vossoedinenie Ukrainy et c . , II, 154.
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"to save and to protect the institutions of the Father
land,

. . . because not only the sleeve of the gown, or the

gown itself is at stake, but the whole body of the Father41
land" .

R e a l i z i n g that the armies of the Commonwealth

would be matched against the "fearless soldiers" of the
Kozak Army, the government sought as many troops as possible.
German mercenaries were to be recruited; Prussian regiments
were ordered to march south; all existing troops were to
mass together;

and a general call to arms was issued for

the gentry.
In order to gain military aid, diplomatic support
<
and to secure confirmation of various treaties, envoys were
dispatched from Warsaw to Muscovy, Sweden, Transylvania, the
Empire, the Holy See, S p a m and France.
came too late.

42

All these efforts

In hope of peace with the Kozaks, Jan

Kazimierz demobilized many regiments; now he had no time to
build a strong army.

43

Thus, as the term of the armistice

expired, the Commonwealth was "neither prepared for war nor

^ J a n Kazimierz1s summons of the Senators, Warsaw, May
E>, 1649, in Ojczyste spominki etc., II, 20.
42

See the Senate Councils, Warsaw, June 4, 1649, in
Jakuba Michalowskiego etc., p. 408; and Kubala, Jerzy
Ossolinski, op. c i t ., p. 351.
43

.
See K. F. Obuchowicz,

. . .
"Dyaryusz Kazimierza Filipa
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for peace negotiations".
The government still tried to gain time in order to
reiise a strong army.

It thus proposed to Khmelnytskyi to

extend the term of armistice from May 22 to July 1st.
other steps it took were desperate.

The

The royal envoy

Sniarowski was sent to bribe the Kozak colonels.

Kysil also

wrote letters to them in an attempt to discredit Khmelnyts
kyi and to turn them against him.
failed:

All these attempts

Khmelnytskyi would not hear any arguments against

the extension of the truce; the Kozak officers did not desert
their leader; there was no mutiny in the Kozak Army.

Khmel

nytskyi retained his command and his iron grip on the Army
and Smiarowski paid for the provocation with his life.

45

Obuchowicza Wojewody Smolenskiego i Marszalka Kola Rycerskiego", in Pamietniki historyczne e t c . , (Vilnius, 1859),
p. 28.
44

A. Kysil's letter to J. Ossolinski, Hoshcha, May 11,
1649, in Ojczyste spominki etc., II, 21.
45 See H. P m o c c i ' s report on Khmelnytskyi and the Kozaks
(1654); Anonymous letter to A. Szoldrski, Warsaw, March 23,
1649; A. Kysil's letters to J. Ossolinski and to the Kozak
Colonels, Hoshcha, May 11, 15 and 18, 1649; and K. Przyjemski's letter to A. Kysil, Zviahel, June 15, 1649, ib i d ., I
142; II, 14, 21-23, 24-26, 26-29, 45-46.
See also the
Senate Councils, Warsaw, June 6 , 1649, in Jakuba Michalow
skiego etc., p. 404; B. Khmelnytskyi's letter to Jan
Kazimierz, Zboriv, August 16, 1649, in Dokumenty Bohdana
Khmelnytskoho etc., p. 125; and Jerlicz, op.‘ c i t . , I, 98.
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Hostilities were resumed by both sides even before
May 22.

Khmelnytskyi sent various regiments to harass the

Crown Army;

at the same time he massed his troops near Bila

Tserkva and awaited the arrival of his Tatar allies.
The forces of the Commonwealth were grouped in three
divisions.

The first was commanded by the new Regimentaries,

Castellan of Belz, Andrzej Firlej and Castellan of
Kamianets, Stanislaw Lanckoronski.

It was engaged in

sporadic skirmishes in the region of Sluch and Horyn Rivers.
As the Kozak-serf pressure mounted, this division was forced
to withdraw westward and finally to seek shelter of Zbarazh,
a fortress in Podolia.

There it was strengthened by the

arrival of several magnate regiments and finally by the
private army of Prince Jeremi Wisniowiecki.

Wisniowiecki

soon became the de facto commander of the troops.

The second

division, commanded by King Jan Kazimierz, acted as a
reserve and marched to the aid of the first.

The third

division, comprising troops of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania
and commanded by Field Hetman Prince Janusz Radziwill, was
poxsed to enter Ukraine from the northeast.

46

46

See the various despatches, letters and reports m
Akty otnosiashchiesia etc., Ill, 315., 325, 392, 45, 48,
54, 58, 71 (Dopolneniia) ; VIII, 289, 294-95; X, 243;
Ojczyste spominki etc., II, 37-50, 57-58- and in Jakuba
Michalowskiego etc., pp. 398, 409-10.
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Late in May the whole Kozak Army was on the move.
By July 10 the Kozak-Tatar forces appeared before the walls
of Zbarazh.

As the siege began, the assaults at the

fortress and the defence of it were characterized by unparallelled acts of bravery.

47

received disturbing ne w s .

During this siege Khmelnytskyi
The Kozak forces in the Grand

Duchy of Lithuania were routed, and Radziwill, whom he
expected to remain passive, was preparing to march south.
At the same time he learned that Jan Kazimierz was also
marching towards Zbarazh to save the besieged first
division.
t

Khmelnytskyi could not allow himself to be trapped
between two fires.

He reacted quickly by dividing his army

into three parts and assigning to each a specific task.

A

strong force under Colonel Stanislav Krychevskyi marched
into Grand Duchy of Lithuania.

His mission was to prevent

Radziwill's penetration into Ukraine.

On July 31 a battle

was fought near Loeu, on the Dnieper, and the Kozaks
suffered a disastrous defeat.

Krychevskyi, however,

47

On the siege of Zbarazh (July 10 to August 22, 1649)
see the following accounts found in Akty otnosiashchiesia
etc., Ill, 392-93; Ojczyste spominki etc., II, 53-58;
J akuba Michalowskiego etc., pp. 413,- 428, 448-70.
See also
Kubala, Szkice historyczne, o p . c i t ., pp. 73-88, 105-09,
116-18; and Gob! a, op. c i t . , pp. 118-19.
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accomplished his mission; for the Lithuanian troops suffered
so many casualties that Radziwill thought it unwise to
march s o u t h . ^
The second part of Khmelnytskyi1s army continued to
1 ay siege to Zbarazh.

Although the fortress repulsed all

attacks, its defenders were in a desperate state:

their

ranks were decimated; they were short of food supplies and of
ammunition1.

Thus, the issue of the campaign was to be

decided by the clash between the third Kozak force under
Khmelnytskyi himself, together with the Tatars led by Khan
Islam III, and the division commanded by the king.

It was

this division that the Kozak.-Tatar allies sped to intercept.
King Jan Kazimierz departed from Warsaw on June
24; and on July 3 he entered Lublin.

If he had previously

any misgivings about the whole campaign, he gained more and
more confidence upon his arrival in Lublin.

His envoys

returned from Muscovy and from Transylvania,

and informed

him that neither country would support the Kozaks.

Lupul

of Moldavia, himself a born intriguer, was never a true
ally of Khmelnytskyi and would not hesitate to turn against
48

On the Battle of Loeu (July 31, 1649) see the
following accounts: Lipinski, o p . c i t ., p p . *284-322, 355-69;
and Kotlubaj, op. cit., pp. 140-48, 367-71, 416-19.
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him if he could profit by it.

The.Hospodar of Walachia

was more concerned in keeping his throne secure than to
embark on an uncertain adventure.

Furthermore, the

Venetian envoy announced that his countrymen won a resoun
ding naval victory over the Turks at the Dardanelles.
Under these circumstances, the High Porte would not
da.re to permit the Tatars to support the Kozaks or to make
any plans about invasion of the Commonwealth.
also despatches for the king:

There were

these announced the early

victories of both the Crown and the Lithuanian armies over
the Kozaks.

Jan Kazimierz now did not need to fear about

the intentions of Radziwill.

This magnate, upon learning

of the adverse predicaments of Khmelnytskyi, would have no
49
other choice but to march against the Kozaks.
These reports and the advice of Ossolinski made Jan
49

See G. Rakoczy's letter to Jan Kazimierz, Alba lulia,
June 4, and M. Ostrorog's letter to J. Ossolinski, Zbarazh,
July 3, 1649, in Jakuba Michalowskiego etc., pp. 398-99,
410-12; Despatches from Kamianets [ca. end of June], from
Lublin, July 14, 1649, in Ojczyste spominki etc., II,
51-52, 62; Aleksei Mikhailovich's letter to Jan Kazimierz,
Moscow, May 18, 1649, in Akty otnosiashchiesia etc., Ill
309-11; J. Radziwill's letter to Jan Kazimierz, K a z .
Slaboda, June 28, and Jan Kazimierz's letter to J. Radziwill,
Lublin, July 13, 1649, in Kotlubaj, "Dodatki" [Appendices],
op. c i t ., pp. 365-67, 357; Radziwill, op. c i t ., II, 277-80;
Latacz, o p . c i t ., p. 4; and W. Rudawski, Historia polska
etc., 2 vols. (St. Petersburg, 1855), I, 80.
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Kazimierz overconfident.

He ordered Radziwill to lay waste

to Ukraine and to capture Kiev; in the meantime, he would
deal with Khmelnytskyi himself.

50

Another rash act on the

king's part was to march against the vastly superior forces
of the enemy with insufficient intelligence and strength.
Ossolinski did not wish to expose the king to the
tumultuous gentry.

Their military worthlessness was clearly

shown at the Battle of Pyliavtsi;

furthermore, the king might

have to change his plans under their pressure, and now there
was no time for that.

He advised the king to rely more on

foreign mercenaries and the various contingents of the magnates.

51

Jan Kazimierz agreed.

He thus called to his colours

only the gentry militia of the Palatinates of Rus, Belz and
Lublin, which were nearest to the base of operations; the
rejst were to report a month hence.

52

Obviously, he did not

want their presence, for he considered the campaign to be
terminated by that time.

Later, when the danger became

obvious to him, the king did issue the customary third call.
50

See Jan Kazimierz1s letter to J. Radziwill, Lublin,
July 13, 1649, in Kotlubaj, "Dodatki", op. c i t ., pp. 357-58.
51

See Kubala, Jerzy Ossolinski, op. cit., pp. 355-57.

See Jan Kazimierz's manifesto to the nobles, Lublin,
July 13, 1649, in Jakuba Michalowskiego etc., pp. 414-15.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

205

to arms to all the gentry; by that time, however, it was
too late.

53

Having made up his mind to proceed to the rescue of
the first division at Zbarazh, Jan Kazimierz marched on
without being able to gather the necessary information about
the activities of the enemy.

He discredited all despatches

which stated that Khmelnytskyi was supported by many
Tatars.

54

The reports of various Kozak prisoners, and

others, were conflicting, but on the whole encouraging;

55

The

despatches from Grand Duchy of Lithuania announced that
Radziwill was on his way to Kiev. 56
His advisers assured him that Khmelnytskyi would
not dare to resist the will of anointed monarch, the
representative of God upon earth.

The very presence of

the king among the troops would strike fear into the hearts
of the serfs.

The Rusin burgesses would open the gates

of their towns at his command without so much as a
53

.
See Kubala, Jerzy Ossolinski, op. c i t ., p. 359.

54

See A. Trzebicki's letter to Anonymous, Sokal [c a .
July 31, 1649], in Jakuba Michalowskiego etc., pp. 424-25.
55

See the various letters in ibid., pp. 421-26, 429-31.

56

See A. Szoldrski's letter to Anonymous, Poznan, August
9, 1648, ibid., p. 430.
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murmur.

57

In his manifestoes to the Rusin populace the

king thus promised the grant of amnesty and the restoration
of all liberties, if they abandoned Khmelnytskyi.

The

Kozak hetman was declared a traitor and an enemy of the
state, and a price was placed on his headi

He was replaced

by the Kozak Semen Zabuskyi, whom the king appointed to
command the Kozak Army after great ceremonies.59
By the end of the first week of August Jan Kazimierz
weis notified that the defenders of the Zbarazh fortress
were in a desperate situation.

The king, even though he

knew by this time that the Tatar khan supported the Kozaks
at Zbarazh with all his hord e s , decided not to wait for
the gentry militia to assemble in full force, but to press
with his relatively small army to Zbarazh.^0

In doing

so he led his army into a skillfully-prepared ambush near

^ S e e Radziw.il! , op. c i t . , I I , 378; Rudawski, o p . c i t . ,
I, 76; and V. Kochowski, Annalium Poloniae etc., 4 vols
(Krakow, 1683), I, 69.
^ S e e M. Golinski, MS. B ,Z,N.Ossol., 189 f. 264.
59 See Radziwill, o p . e x t ., II, 368; and Rudawski, op.
c i t ., I , 83.
^ S e e A. Szoldrski's letter to Anonymous, Poznan,
August 9, 1649; and Regimentaries1 letter to Jan Kazimierz
[ca. early August, 1649], in Jakuba Michalowskiego etc.,
pp. 430, 428-29.
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■ 61
Zboriv.
On August 15 the royal army was crossing the River
Strypa.

The main part of the army, as it approached the

river, was attacked by a Kozak-Tatar force from the rear
and both flanks.

Since its progress forward was blocked by

the great variety of vehicles in the baggage train and then
by the river, this part of the army had no chance at all
to make an organized stand against the enemy.

As a terrible

confusion resulted, these troops were systematically
decimated.

Following this massacre the victors siezed the

baggage train and most of the g u n s .
r

Meanwhile, that part of the army which crossed the
river also came under a surprise attack, but was in a
better position to organize a hasty defense.

Nevertheless,

some regiments faltered under the pressure of the superior
strength of the enemy and began to retreat in confusion.
During these critical moments the king made frantic efforts
to inspire his army to resist.

Moved by his gallantry,

^ O n the Battle of Zboriv (August 15 to 16 1649) see the
following accounts: Akty otnosiashchiesia etc., Ill, 40910; Jakuba Michalowskiego etc., pp. 435-39; and M. Golinski,
MS. B.Z.N.Ossol., 189, f. 267.
See also Kubala, Szkice
historyczne, op. c i t ., pp. 88-105, 119-22; Gorka, op. c i t .,
119-21; and L. F r a s , "Bitwa pod Zborowem w r. 1649",
Kwartalnik Historyczny, XLVI (nos. 3-4, 1932), 350-70.
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the soldiers rallied to defense.
At sunset the fighting ceased.

During the night

Jan Kazimierz again managed to calm his panicky troops,
many of whom were on a verge of flight after hearing rumors
that the king and their leaders planned to desert them.

As

order was restored, the king commanded that stronger forti
fication be erected around the camp.

"For several hundred

of years neither Poland nor any king had been in such
straits as on August 15" remarked one participant of the
battle.

"It almost came to the repetition of disasters at

Varna or Legnica, or of the times when the Tatar Batu Khan
62
lived twelve weeks in Krakow".
During the night more Kozak troops arrived.

By

dawn, on August 16, the royal army was surrounded, and
assaults were renewed mainly by the Kozaks, for the main
Tatar horde received orders from the khan not to take part
in the fighting.

The royal troops continued to resist these

attacks, but in the process of fighting suffered heavy
casualties.

By noon, as the fighting subsided, the morale

of these soldiers was low, for they realized that their
/■

W. Miaskowski1s letter to Anonymous, Zboriv, August
22, 1649, in Jakuba Michalowskiego etc., p . *439.
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position was almost hopeless.
dangerous position.

Jan‘Kazimierz also saw the

He therefore, decided to extricate his

army from an impending disaster by negotiating peace with
the enemy.

Ill
During the night of August 15, following the
critical moments of the first day of the battle, King Jan
Kazimierz assembled his council of war.

The king, his

ministers and other high-ranking officers discussed various
courses of action.

In the end they agreed that the plan of

the Crown Grand Chancellor would save them all.

Jerzy

Ossolinski sought to create a rift between the Kozaks and
the Tatars.

He believed that Khan Islam III would be

induced by suitable concessions to withdraw the Tatar
support from the Kozaks, and perhaps even to turn his hordes
against them.

63

At the conclusion of the meeting Jan Kazimierz sent
a messenger with his letter to Islam III.

The king wrote

that he was dismayed that the khan should support his rebel
subjects, especially when there were no causes for

^ S e e Rudawski, op. c i t . , I, 84-85; and V. Golobutskii,
Diplomaticheskaia istoriia etc (Kiev, 1962), p. 205.
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hostilities between Crimea and the1Commonwealth.

He assured

the khan of his friendship and reminded him that the late
King Wladyslaw IV was extremely kind to him.

The king also

proposed to the Tatar ruler that negotiations be started
and offered him suitable indemnities.

64

•

Islam III was interested in the proposals of Jan
Kazimierz.

The khan therefore replied that he was prepared

to extend his own friendship to the king.

At the same time

he reproached the king for his failure to notify him that
he was elected the King of Poland.

But the khan decided to

overlook this lack of tact, and requested the king to send
his chancellor to confer with his own vezir on matters of
mutual interest.

65

After being informed about the k h a n 1s demands by his
envoy, Jan Kazimierz answered that he agreed to accept them
and that he would send his chancellor to a designated place
between the two armies.

He also urged the khan to stop all

hostilities without delay.

66

64 See Jan Kazimierz1s letter to Islam III, Zboriv, August
15, 1649, in Pamiatinki etc., 4 vols (Kiev, 1845), I, 3, 45455.
65

See Islam Ill's letter to Jan Kazimierz, Zboriv,
August 15, 1649, ibid., I, 3, 456-58.

66See Jan Kazimierz1s letter to Islam III, Zboriv,
August 16, 1649, ibid., I, 3, 459-60.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

211

At sunset on August 16, as.the fighting of the
second day of the battle subsided, Jerzy Ossolinski and
Sefer Gazi Aga met for the first round of negotiations.

The

vezir then made the following demands: the Tatars will have
the right to plunder and to take prisoners along their
return march to Crimea;

and they will be paid ransom for

the king's army and tribute due to them for several years.
He: also stated that the khan wished that the Kozaks be
pacified, that a territorial autonomy be guaranteed to them,
that their quota be increased to forty thousand and that
they be paid for their services.

At this point the nego

tiations were suspended because Ossolinski wanted time to
discuss these demands with the king.

Jan Kazimierz, how

ever, had little choice but to accept them.

Moreover, as

the negotiations resumed on August 17, he even agreed to a
new demand that additional ransom be paid to the Tatars by
the defenders of Zbarazh.

On the following day both sides

prepared the texts of their agreements.

On August 19 the

signed copies of the treaty were exchanged between the king
and the k h a n . ^
r '-j

See the anonymous journal (1649), in Akty otnosiashchiesia etc., Ill, 412-13; W. Miaskowski's letter to
Anonymous, Zboriv, August 22, 1649, in Jakuba Michalowskiego
etc., pp. 437-38 (a more complete text o J~ a similar letter
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Both Jan Kazimierz and Khan Islam III agreed to
maintain peace between their states and to give mutual
support against their common enemies.

The king pledged

himself to observe the following terms: never to wage war
against the Ottoman Empire; to pay annual tribute to the
Khan; to recognize Tatar pasture rights along the northern
shores of'the Black Sea; and to permit the Tatars an unob
structed passage to Crimea through the south-eastern
peilatinates of the Commonwealth.

Jan Kazimierz also pledged

to grant amnesty to all Kozaks, to confirm Khmelnytskyi’s
post as Hetman of the Kozak Army, to restore all Kozak
rights and liberties and to ensure that they no longer
suffered injustice from officials and nobles.

In turn, the

khan pledged to cause the least possible damage to the terri
tories the Tatars passed en route to Crimea and to forbid
all his subjects to make incursions into the Commonwealth.

68

is listed in Kubala's "Dodatki" [Appendices], Szkice history c z n e , op . c i t ., pp. 119-22, but the dates are different
from the two accounts cited above); and Gorka, o p . c i t .,
pp. 120-2 1 .
For the treaties between Jan Kazimierz and Islam III,
Zboriv, August 19, 1649, see Akty otnosiashchiesia etc., Ill,
413-15; and Kubala, "Dodatki", Szkice historyczne, op. c i t .,
p. 122. The Muscovite envoy to the Commonwealth was con
vinced that a secret alliance was concluded between the king
and the khan directed against Muscovy.
See G. Kunakov's
report to the Department of Foreign Affairs (1649), in
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These shameful and difficult conditions clearly
indicate that Ossolinski did not effect a split between the
Kozaks and the Tatars.

Nevertheless, Khmelnytskyi was sur

prised that the khan decided to negotiate with the king,
whom he intended to capture, send to Crimea and then to
negotiate an enormous sum for his ransom.

Obviously,

Islam

III now changed his mind because he decided that he would
gain more by negotiations.

It was certainly not in his

favour to have one of the hostile sides completely over
power the other.

The khan also favoured the old device of

divide et impera.
It was therefore for a definite reason that his
main horde did not take part in the second day's battle.

He

was content to watch the Christian "infidels" as they
attempted to destroy each other, and decided to intervene
only when it became obvious that the Kozaks would emerge
victorious.

At this time he ordered Khmelnytskyi to cease

hostilities and to begin negotiations with the king.
Khmelnytskyi therefore had little choice but to yield to
the pressure of the Tatar ruler.

Were he to refuse to heed

Akty otnosiashchiesia etc., Ill, 404-05.
Nothing of the
sort is mentioned in other sources, including the Tatar
chronicle.
See Gorka, op. cit., p. 121.
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the khan, he faced the possibility of the Tatars turning
, . 69
against him.
Khmelnytskyi was already contacted by the king on
August 15.

Jan Kazimierz declared in his letter that he

was astonished that Khmelnytskyi dared to lift the sword
against him, the anointed representative of God.

He

ordered Khmelnytskyi to stop all fighting and to withdraw
his troops from the field of battle.

Once he complied with

this order, he should send his envoys with Kozak grievances.
At this time the king would appoint a commission to resolve
all difficulties.

Jan Kazimierz promised that if

Khmelnytskyi heeded him, he would do everything in his power
70
to restore the Kozak rights and liberties.
Khmelnytskyi's answer to the king was delivered
together with the khan's letter.

The Kozak hetman claimed

that both he and his father were always faithful servants of
the Crown.

He did not take up arms against the king; on

the contrary, this was his last resort to seek justice from
69

See G. Kunakov's report to the Department of Foreign
Affairs (1649), in Akty otnosiashchiesia etc., Ill, 395;
and Gorka, o p . c i t . , pp. 120-21.
70

See Jan Kazimierz's letter to B. Khmelnytsky, Zboriv,
August 15, 1649.
Cited by Hrushevskyi, o p . ‘c i t ., VIII, 3,
199-200.
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the tyranny of the magnates.

Khmelnytskyi emphasized that

he: would gladly place himself under the protection of the
king and would obey his commands to the letter, were it not
for the lawlessness of the nobles, who wielded more power
than their own monarch.

He concluded his' remarks to the king

by repeating the proposal he made at Zamostia: the Kozaks
want to serve the king faithfully and want to free him from
71
the bondage of the "kinglets".
Jan Kazimierz responded the following day by admonish
ing Khmelnytskyi for the fate of his envoy Jakob Smiarowski,
but the king was even willing to overlook this atrocity.

He

offered Khmelnytskyi another chance to earn royal favour and
to keep his post of Hetman of the Zaporozhian Army.

Jan

Kazimierz proposed that Khmelnytskyi carry out several con
ditions.

Khmelnytskyi must swear an oath of fealty;

and he

must prove himself a loyal subject by ceasing to carry on
relations with foreign rulers, by pledging not to stir the
serfs, by withdrawing all his troops from the battle area and
by sending all the serfs back to their homes.

72

Khmelnytskyi1s

71

See B. Khmelnytskyi1s letter to Jan Kazimierz, Zboriv,
August 15, 1649, in Dokumenty Bohdana Khmelnytskoho etc., pp.
122-23.
72

See Jan Kazimierz's letter to B. Khmelnytskyi, Zboriv,
August 16, 1649.
Cited by Hrushevskyi, ■-p. c i t ., VIII, 3,
203-04.
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answer was delivered to the king the same day.

He explained

in detail why Smiarowski deserved his fate, and added that
he was prepared to discuss all other matters with the Crown
Grand Chancellor.

73

Khmelnytskyi did appear during the second round of
Ossolinski-Sefer Gazi negotiations.

At this time he attem

pted to introduce Kozak matters into discussion.

Ossolinski,

however, told him to prepare all his demands in writing and
to submit them to the king. 74

Khmelnytskyi followed this

instruction by sending Kozak envoys with two letters.

In

his own letter Khmelnytskyi assured the king of his loyalty
f

and asked him for a personal favour:
his enemy Daniel Czaplinski.

75

capital punishment for

The other letter had the

form of an eighteen-article petition of the Zaporozhian
Army to the king, which was to serve as the basis for the
7 3See B. Khmelnytskyi1s letter to Jan Kazimierz, Zboriv,
August 16, 1649, in Dokumenty Bohdana Khmelnytskoho etc.,
pp. 124-25.
7

A

' S e e W. Miaskowski's letter to Anonymous, Zboriv,
August 22, 1649, in Jakuba Michalowskiego etc., p. 438; Anon
ymous journal (1649), in Akty otnosiashchiesia etc., Ill,
413; and Hrushevskyi, o p . c i t ., VIII, 3, 206.
75

See B. Khmelnytskyi1s letter to Jan Kazimierz, Zboriv,
August 17, 1649, in Dokumenty Bohdana Khmelnytskoho etc.,
pp. 126-27.
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forthcoming negotiations.

Jan Kazimierz gave his verbal assurances to the
KC'Zak envoys that the petition would receive his consider
ation.

He made similar promises in a letter to Khmelnyt

skyi, adding that he would send the commissioners as soon
as possible.

He again emphasized that all troops and field

artillery.must be withdrawn.

77

On August 18 Khmelnytskyi

answered that he was delighted that finally all the diffi
culties would be settled amicably.

He had already removed

the guns; he had not yet withdrawn his troops because of
the danger from the roving bands of Tatars.

78

On the same day Ossolinski and other commissioners
began to negotiate with Khmelnytskyi.

Late at night the

terms of peace were finally agreed upon by the two sides.
On August 19 Khmelnytskyi was called to take an oath.

The

commissioners had considerable difficulty in administering
76
See the Petition of the Zaporozhian Army to Jan
Kazimierz, Zboriv, August 17, 1648, ibid., pp. 128-30.
77

See the Anonymous journal (1649), in Akty otnosiashchiesia etc., Ill, 413.
Jan Kazimierz's letter to B.
Khmelnytskyi has perished.
It is evident from Khmelnytskyi
letter to the king of August 18 (see n. 78 below) that he
did write such a letter and made these comments.
78

See B. Khmelnytskyi's letter to Jan Kgzimierz, Zboriv
August 18, 1649, in Dokumenty Bohdana Khmelnytskoho etc.,
pp. 131-32.
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the oath to Khmelnytskyi, because he demanded that the king
take a similar oath and that his enemy, Daniel Czaplinski,
be: immediately surrendered to him.

Next day the whole

proceedings ended with a ceremony in the king's tent.
Khmelnytskyi appeared before Jan Kazimierz did homage to him
and asked for his pardon.

79

Finally, with the lifting of

the siege of Zbarazh on August 22 ,
Ccime to an end.

the whole campaign

80

The agreement concluded at Zboriv between Jan
Kazimierz and the Commonwealth, on the one side, and Bohdan
Khmelnytskyi and the Zaporozhian Army, on the other, was
de facto a treaty.

Officially, however, it was regarded

only as an act of royal grace: the king merely consented to
approve the petitions of his subjects.

Its official name

was "A Declaration of His Royal Majesty's Grace, given [in
response to] the Articles of Petition of the Zaporozhian
81
Army".
79 See W. Miaskowski's letter to Anonymous, Zboriv, August
22, 1649, in Jakuba Michalowskiego etc., pp. 438-39; and the
anonymous journal (1649), in Akty otnosiashchiesia etc.,
Ill, 413.
80 See the anonymous diary on the siege of Zbarazh (1649),
in Jakuba Michalowskiego etc., p. 469.
R1

For the full text of the Treaty of Zboriv see Appendix

I.
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The 11Declaration" was divided into three main parts.
Articles 1, 2, 3, 6 , 7 and 11 dealt exclusively with Kozak
ma.tters.
following:

The chief provisions of these articles were the
all former rights and liberties of the Zaporo

zhian Army were restored; the king issued a separate charter
in confirmation of this article;

82

The new quota of the

registered Kozaks was raised to forty thousand; Kozak terri
tories roughly comprised the Palatinates of Kiev, Bratslav
and Chernihiv; neither the Crown Army nor the Jews were to
have access into areas where Kozak regiments were stationed;
the Hetman of the Zaporozhian Army was responsible for the
preparation of the new register; and'he was granted the
district of Chyhyryn.
Articles 4 and 5 stated that all Kozaks and their
supporters were granted a general amnesty.
and 10 dealt with other matters.

Articles 8 , 9

All questions dealing with

the abolition of the Uniate Church and with the restoration
of the rights and the benefices to the Orthodox Church were
to be discussed at the forthcoming Diet.

The metropolitan

82
See Jan Kazimierz’s charter to the Zaporozhian Army,
Zboriv, August 18, 1649,
in Akty otnosiashchiesia etc., X,
453-54.
This charter is incorrectly dated August 18, 1650.
This must have been a simple case of a clerk's slip of the
pen as this charter was entered into the Kievan records.
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bishop of Kiev was to receive a seat in the Senate.

All

offices in the Palatinates of Kiev, Bratslav and Chernihiv
were to be restricted to nobles of the Orthodox faith.

The

Jesuits were neither to reside nor to found schools through
out Ukraine.

Finally,

all these articles were to be rati

fied by the Diet.
The aims, desires and slogans of the Kozaks and of
the Rusin people found their expression —
part —

at least in

in the terms of the Treaty of Zboriv.

was not a complete failure.
experiment.

This treaty

On the contrary, it was a bold

The following analysis

will show that the

individuals who draughted the terms of the Treaty of Zboriv
attempted at once to solve the pressing Kozak problem and to
remedy the chief aims of the Rusin society as a whole.
In the past the government of the Commonwealth never
made such sweeping concessions to the Kozaks as it had by
the Treaty of Zboriv.
dent for the future.

83

This m

itself was a useful prece

Articles 1 and 2 of the treaty, as

well as the royal charter, fulfilled the aims and satisfied
the interests of all those in the ranks of the Kozak Army.
83

In the view of E. Latacz, these concessions were made
to the Kozaks because Jan Kazimierz wanted to gain their
support for his planned war with the Turks.
See Latacz,
op. c i t . , pp. 6-7.
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The Commonwealth retained the registered Kozaks in its
service and their quota was increased from six thousand to
the nominal figure of forty thousand.

They secured the

repeal of the draconic Ordinance of 163 8 .

T h u s , this meant

that they regained such rights as their military self-govern
ment and the election of their own officers.

Jan Kazimierz

also issued a special charter which confirmed all former
Kozak liberties.
Ukraine gained political autonomy within the frame
work of the Commonwealth.

Its new status was stressed by

the royal charter and articles 2, 6 , 7 and 9 of the treaty.
Comprising the Palatinates of Kiev, Bratslav and Chernihiv,
the new Kozak territories were to be ruled by the Hetman of
the Zaporozhian Army.

By the virtue of his office he

assumed great powers.

Kozak troops were responsible for the

defense of their lands; and the Crown Army was denied access
to them.

As the Kozaks gained control of Ukraine, their

military system of government and administration was intro
duced.

Thus, a kind of military republic was born.

links with Warsaw were very weak.

Its

Even these links empha

sized the autonomy of Ukraine, for only Rusin nobles of
Orthodox faith were eligible to hold appointments within it.
Articles 8 and 10 of the treaty were further
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expanded by a special royal charter issued in Warsaw on
January 12, 1650.
—

It stressed that "all the Rusin people"

churchmen and laymen, nobles and commoners —

retained

their national, religious and cultural rights and liberties
throughout the Commonwealth.

The Orthodox Church was guaran

teed its rights; the Orthodox clergy were granted a number
of concessions; and the Orthodox faithful were promised
freedom of worship.
of the burgesses.

Special reference was made to the rights
Finally, all Rusin schools and printing

presses were permitted to function without any obstruction.

84

No concessions of importance were made to the serfs,
because neither the ruling class nor 'the Kozaks intended to
liberate them.
The circumstances surrounding the agreements reached
at Zboriv by all the combattants were highly unusual.
Islam III emerged as the central figure.

Khan

By concluding a

separate peace with King Jan Kazimierz, the khan betrayed
his Kozak allies.

Moreover, he "mediated" peace between Jan

Kazimierz and Bohdan Khmelnytskyi,

and became the guarantor

of the terms of the treaty between the King of Poland and
his subjects.
R4

The khan therefore made the real gains at the

See Hrushevskyi, o p . c i t ., VIII, 3, 262-63.
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expense of the two combattants.

Apart from the enormous

ransom, renewal of the payment of tribute, great amount of
plunder and the useful alliances, he left the two warring
sides in a weakend position and still hostile to each other.
Furthermore, he secured permission from the king to plunder
and to sieze captives from the Rusin ethnic territories.
This Khmelnytskyi previously would not allow to him.^~*
The treaty of Zboriv between Jan Kazimierz and the
Commonwealth, on the one side, and Bohdan Khmelnytskyi and
the Zaporozhian Army, on the other, was built on very weak
foundations.

Both sides were compelled to accept its

terms: the Polish king, by the exigencies of war; the Kozak
hetman, by Tatar threats of retalliation.
satisfied with the treaty.

Neither side was

Most of the Commonwealth1s

nobles considered its terms humiliating.

These terms also

neither corresponded with the actual successes of Kozak
arms, nor satisfied the expectations of the Rusin society,
especially the serfs.

It was clear to all that the treaty

was merely a temporary arrangement and that the issues would
have to be resolved once more in the near future by the force
of arms.
I
See Gorka, op. c i t ., p. 115.
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CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION
The religious persecution, the economic exploitation
and the varying degrees of oppression of all classes of the
Rusin people within the Polish-Lithuanian state, combined
with the degeneration of the "Commonwealth of the gentry",
caused a terrible conflict in 1648 and in 1649.

Some nobles

of the Commonwealth described these beginning years of the
reign of King Jan Kazimierz as the "Initium Calamitatis
Reipublicae" .^

It was a suitable label for a period during
I

which their Commonwealth experienced many serious reversals.
True, the Commonwealth managed, to survive the worst ravages
of the storm: fluctuat nec mergitur.

But in the process

the Commonwealth also received unparalleled military, poli
tical and ideological b l o w s , as well as incalculable extre
mely severe w o unds.
There were many shades of opinion among the contem
poraries about the causes and tie issues of the conflict
within the Commonwealth.

Most of those who searched for

pun on the royal cipher I.C.R.
which appeared on coins.

(loannes Casimirus R e x )
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answers as to the cause of the conflict, or who sought to
find explanations for the great calamities, invariably
concluded that God punished them for their sins, especially
for their ill-treatment of serfs.

Most of those contem

poraries who attempted to analyse the nature of the conflict
generally stressed its social aspect.

In their correspon

dence, diaries and memoirs, they described some kind of
antithesis between the nobles on the one hand, and the serfs
on the other.

But still there were those who saw the real

issues of the great conflict.

They admitted that the

struggle within the Commonwealth concerned the Rusin people,
who for the most part were fighting for three main goals:
political independence, religious freedom and socio-economic
improvement.

There was, however, little disagreement among

the contemporaries on two points: that the Kozaks played a
decisive role in the struggle;

and that the greatest enemy

of the Commonwealth was that "Zaporozhian Machiavelli" —
Bohdan Khmelnytskyi.
Bohdan Khmelnytskyi was an individual of exeptional
genius.

It was he who managed to unite the "perfidious"

Kozaks, the "traitorous" nobles, the "conspirant" clergy,
the "senseless" and "embittered" burgesses and the "blood
thirsty" serfs —

all the social strata of the Rusin people.
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For all these people, who represen,ted conflicting interests,
he found a common aim.

He alone managed not only to demand

obedience from them, but also to hand out punishment to
them.

He was a talented military commander, an able admini

strator and, above all, extremely dexterous diplomat.

Much

of his success resulted from his ability of finding gifted
individuals to assist him.

If all his difficulties are

considered and the steps he took to overcome them, then
Bohdan Khmelnytskyi certainly deserves more credit for his
accomplishments than another of his contemporaries in some
what similar situation —

Oliver Cromwell.

One of the greatest tasks before Khmelnytskyi was the
fulfilment

of his chief aim: to build a Rusin state on the

ruins of the medieval Kievan R u s .

This was an extraordinary

task.

Khmelnytskyi was therefore faced with a mass of prob

lems .

He had no trained civil service to carry out the

administration.

He had to rely on two patterns with which

he was familiar: the Kozak military organization and the
Commonwealth's form of government.

But neither of these two

patterns exactly suited for the structure of the new Rusin
state.

The organization of its administration, finances,

justice, police, as well as solutions to the many social
problems, especially those dealing with the serfs, therefore
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rested in his hands.
Despite all these difficulties and lack of precedents
to fall back on, Khmelnytskyi proceeded to carry out his
aim.

Already following his first military successes, a

"separate Commonwealth" began to take shape in the terri
tories under Kozak control.

Khmelnytskyi's immediate concern

was to provide his troops with food and ammunition; but, in
doing t h i s , he also had to organize an effective system of
administration, finances,

justice and police.

In this way

he organized a nucleus of state machinery.
Khmelnytskyi1s chief helpers were the Kozaks.

The

composition of this Rusin stratum wa? radically changed
during the conflict by the mass influx of serfs, burgesses
and nobles into its ranks.

The Kozaks therefore became the

most important group among the Rusin people: their leading
class; their spokesmen; their dominant military force; and
even the state authority in the territory controlled by
them.

By this time the meaning of the Zaporozhian Army was

becoming synonymous with the emerging Rusin state.

Khmel-

nytskyi endeavoured to consolidate the position of the Kozaks
smd to bind the other Rusin social classes with the Kozaks.
Under these circumstances it is no wonder that
Khmelnytskyi commenced to organise a kind of Kozak military
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republic.

This was especially clear after the signing of

the Treaty of Zboriv.

The territory within the boundaries

delineated by the Treaty of Zboriv was divided by him into
sixteen regiments, and each regiment into a number of
hundreds.

The regiments and hundreds functioned both as

military and territorial u n i t s .

In each of these units

administration, legislation, finances, justice and police
functions were carried out by the Kozaks.

The Kozak

general council became the highest popular representative
body.

It shared legislative and executive powers with the

Kozak hetman.
This council played an extremely important part in
the years 1648-1649, and influenced many of Khmelnytskyi's
decisions.

The representatives of the general council

consisted of the secretary general, the quartermaster
general, the judge general and the two adjutants general.
They were the chief military and civilian officers, and they
acted as a sort of permanent cabinet or chief advisers to
Khmelnytskyi.

Each one had specific function or functions

to carry out: the secretary directed Khmelnytskyi1s chancery;
the quartermaster maintained the register of the Kozak Army
and frequently acted as a census taker; t h e .judge dealt with
all matters of justice; and the two adjutants organized
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military councils and participated in the reception of
foreign envoys.
The government consisted of the council of Kozak
officers.

It was this council that was frequently called

into session by Khmelnytskyi,

for it was easier to work with

and influence it than the unruly general council.

The Kozak

officers examined all major military, legislative, adminis
trative, economic and general political matters.

The^also

pronounced on such matters as war and peace, embassies and
diplomatic contacts.

Finally, the office of the Kozak

hetman was vested with great power.

Khmelnytskyi therefore

became the supreme military commander and at the same time
a kind of prime minister and minister of foreign affairs.
At the same time as Khmelnytskyi began to lay foun
dations for the Rusin state, he was undecided whether it
should be part of the Commonwealth or whether it should
lead a separate existence.

He seriously considered a plan

whereby the dual structure of the Polish-Lithuanian state
would be transformed into a trialist state, and in which
the position of the Rusin segment would be both equal and
autonomous.

This transformation was possible only if the

position of the king was changed from a mere primus inter
pares among the nobles to an absolute ruler.
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A strong monarch would be able to guarantee the
existence of an autonomous Rusin state and to protect the
rights of his Rusin subject.

"We pray to God, that Your

Majesty, Our Gracious Lord, may become an autocrat, as
other kings", he wrote to Jan Kazimierz btfore his election,
"and not just as the late predecessors of Your Majesty, who
really were in the bondage [of the nobles]".

2

In February

1649, during his negotiations with the commissioners at
Pereiaslav, Khmelnytskyi pursued the same theme:

"The king

is a king in order to have the liberty to do whatever he
pleases; and [even] to punish and to behead the nobles, the
dukes and the princes.

If a prince disobeys

[the king], off

with his head; if a Kozak disobeys, off with his head as
3
well".

In these words Khmelnytskyi described a monarch

who must be obeyed by all his subjects, regardless of rank
or position, and who must be in a position to effectively
curb

the lawlessness of the magna’tes and of the gentry.

2
.
.
.
B. Khmelnytskyi!s letter to Jan Kazimierz, Zamostia,
November 15, 1648, in Dokumenty Bohdana Khmelnytskoho etc
(Kiev, 1954), p. 80.
Khmelnytskyi addressed Jan Kazimierz
as "Your Majesty" because he assumed the title of "here
ditary King of Swedes, Goths and Vandals" after the death
of his brother, Wladyslaw IV.

3

Journal of W. Miaskowski, Pereiaslav, February 23, 1649,
in Vossoedinenie Ukrainy etc., 3 vols (Moscow, 1954), II,
109.
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Furthermore, Khmelnytskyi sought to insure that the
monarch would be able to guarantee the "rights and liberties"
of his Orthodox Rusin subjects.

Khmelnytskyi1s support for

Jan Kazimierz was only a temporary measure.

By casting his

vote for the candidate of the party of concilliation,
Khmelnytskyi was certain of gaining certain concessions and
time to carry out his plans.

A non-Catholic king would be

more sympathetic to the faith of the Orthodox "Schismatics",
he would be in a better position to resist the pressure of
the Holy See and the Roman Catholic hierarchy of the Common' wealth, and he could be more easily persuaded to abolish the
Uniate Church.

<
For these and other reasons Khmelnytskyi

plotted the dethronment of Jan Kazimierz with Prince Rakoczy
of Transylvania, to whom he promised the Polish throne.
Khmelnytskyi1s envoys made this proposition to Rakoczy as
early as November 1648; then repeated it again in January
and March 1649; and again in September 1649, one month
following the signing of the Treaty of Zboriv.
But the transformation of the Commonwealth into a
trialist state proved to be impossible chiefly because of
the opposition from the nobles and the Catholic hierarchy.
Khmelnytskyi was therefore left with one choice; to cut off
all ties with t^e Commonwealth and to establish a Rusin
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state outside of it.
from the past.

Such a step was a radical departure

Prior to 1648 there was no movement for

national liberation among the Rusin people as a whole.

The

Kozaks, who evolved as national spokesmen for the Rusin
people, clamoured for autonomy only within the state organ
ism of the Commonwealth.

Even the most rebellious elements

among the Kozaks, no matter that they acted independently by
interfering into questions of the neighbouring states or by
receiving foreign envoys and subsudies from the foreign
monarchs, still acknowledged the nominal authority of the
King of Poland and of the government of the Commonwealth.
By pursuing this course of action Khmelnytskyi was therefore
faced with an extraordinary task and with a mass of problems.
Khmelnytskyi saw clearly that, once separated from
the Commonwealth, the Rusin state would be encircled by
rival and unfriendly powers.

Under these circumstances it

could neither wage war nor lead an independent existence
completely on its own resources for a long time.

With this

in mind, Khmelnytskyi resorted to the usual expedient of
political manipulations —

playing off the threatening

powers against one another and forming alliances with those
which were presumably the least dangerous.

'His first most

pressing problem was to secure protection against the
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Commonwealth which would strive to.regain its lost terri
tories .

Khmelnytskyi therefore appealed to Muscovy for

military aid.

But Muscovy, using its" eternal peace" with

the Commonwealth as an excuse, appeared rather reluctant to
be involved in a matter it considered a domestic problem of
the Commonwealth.

In the years 1648-1649 Muscovy remained

neutral and adopted a "wait-and-see" attitude.
Khmelnytski then turned to the Muslim world for
support.

He was successful in concluding a military

alliance with the Tatars.

No matter how costly and how

unpopular this alliance proved to be, its advantages were
great.

Khmelnytskyi was assured that he would not be

attacked from both sides at once.

By accepting the pro

tection of the Turkish sultan, Khmelnytskyi also checked the
potential aggressive actions of both Muscovy and the Common
wealth.

Furthermore, by becoming a vassal of the High Porte,

Khmelnytskyi secured a firm foothold on the Danube.

Here he

planned to establish buffer states out of Moldavia and
Walachia.

By these steps he began to alter the balance of

power in Eastern Europe.
Bohdan Khmelnytskyi realized that the declaration of
independence and the establishment of a Rusin state would
lead his people into a long struggle with the Commonwealth.
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But he had no other choice.

In 1649 he failed to achieve

his two basic aims: to "free all the Rusin people from the
Polish bondage"; and to extend the boundaries of the Rusin
state "as far as Lviv, Kholm and Halych".

Then, on the one

hand, the Rusin people expressed a firm desire for an inde
pendent existence; while on the other hand, there was no
room for an independent Rusin state within the Commonwealth.
These attitudes were clear within the few months
following the Treaty of Zboriv.

The great majority of the

Commonwealth's nobles would not hear any plans about
constitutional changes in their state.

They already gave

an indication how they felt in this matter when they
bitterly fought against "projects of absolutism" during the
reign of King Wladyslaw IV.

Even the smallest changes were

considered radical by them, and as infringment on their
"golden liberties".

These nobles dismissed compromise or

concessions as a solution to the problem; on the contrary,
they were prepared to defend their privileged position to
the utmost.

Every conceivable vile epithet was hurled at

Jerzy Ossolinski because he dared to warn them not to imi
tate the example of the King of Spain, who did not want to
seek compromise with his Dutch "fishermen" and later on was
forced to entitle them "My Gracious Lords" in his letters.
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Ossolinski1s main supporter, Adam Kysil, was likewise "an
individual . . . most unpopular in the Commonwealth".
Furthermore, the Roman Catholic hierarchy was not
in favour of granting too many concessions to the Orthodox
"Schismatics";

and resisted all pressure which was directed

against the abolition of the Uniate Church.

Both of these

groups would never consent to the election of a non-Catholic
king.

The Diet of 1649 (November 22, 1649 to January 17,

1650) echoed these attitudes.

Although it ratified the

Treaty of Zboriv, three major provisions were not carried
out: the Orthodox Metropolitan Bishop of Kiev was humiliated
by being refused a seat in the Senate; the Uniate Church was
not abolished;

and the amnesty was granted only to those

nobles who "unwillingly" took part in the conflict against
the Commonwealth.
Thus, on the one hand, the majority of the Common
wealth's nobles remained obstinate and refused to profit
from the lessons of the two years of bloody struggles.

On

the other hand, the Rusin people had gone too far to be
satisfied with promises.

The serfs were unwilling to accept

the hated regime of landlords.

Moreover, both sides had too

many grievances against each other, for the,two years of
conflict made deep wounds.

It became clear to all that the
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two walls must collide again to resolve issues.
The Treaty of Zboriv did not bring lasting peace;
on the contrary, it proved to be only another armistice.

In

the years that followed the times of fire, sword and blood
shed reappeared in the Commonwealth.

Bohdan Khmelnytsky

again led the Rusin people in their fight for independence.
But by 1651 he felt himself losing ground.

He failed to

achieve his aims, and in the process saw much of the
national strength exhausted.

He had to secure new allies

and to obtain their military aid against the Commonwealth.
Because Muscovy remained non-committal, Khmelnytskyi
was forced to turn to the Muslim world.

But his Tatar-

Turkish orientation brought him fresh disappointments, not
the desired results.

He failed to organize a great coalition

against the Commonwealth; the Tatars continued to pursue
their policy of treachery.
change in his policy.

In 1653 he made a decisive

He dropped his orientation toward the

Muslim world as an ally, and instead he re-established close
contacts with Muscovy.

In 1654 these contacts culminated in

the Treaty of Pereiaslav, by which Khmelnytskyi accepted the
protection of the tsar and all the territories under the
control of the Kozak Army became part of the expanding Mus
covite state.
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APPENDIX I

TREATY OF ZBORIV

1

(Translation with a Commentary)
A Declaration of His Royal Majesty's Grace, given [in res
ponse to ]• the Articles of the Petition of the Zaprozhian

■''The original text of the Treaty of Zboriv has perished.
The following translation is based on copies of this treaty
found in these three sources:
(a). Akty otnosiashchiesia etc., 15 vols (St. Peters
burg, 1861), III, 415-16 [Hereafter cited as Text 1]. The
text of this version of the Treaty of Zboriv is written in
Russin (i.e., old Ukrainian).
It was prepared for the Musco
vite government in 1649. Although this text is the best
composed version of the three versions of the treaty listed
below, it is uncertain that it is a true copy of the original
document.
(b). Akty otnosiashchiesia etc., 15 vols (St. Peters
burg, 1878), X, 455-58.
[Hereafter cited as Text 2 ]. The
text of this version of the Treaty of Zboriv is written in
Muscovite (i.e., old Russian).
It was made from the penal
records (Polish: ksiegi grodzkie) in Kiev. On March 8 , 1650
the keeper of these records copied the charter of King Jan
Kazimierz, issued at Warsaw on January 12, 1650, which con
firmed the articles of the Treaty of Zboriv. The king issued
this charter after the Crown General Diet of 1649 ratified
the Treaty of Zboriv, and this charter contained the full
text of the treaty. This entry in the Kievan penal records
was recopied for the use of the Muscovite government, in
connection with the Kozak-Muscovite Treaty of Pereiaslav
(1654).
(c). J. Jerlicz, Latopisiec etc., 2 vols (Warsaw, 1853),
I, 105-18 [Hereafter cited as Text 3 ] . The text of this
version of the Treaty of Zboriv is written in old Polish
(but modernized somewhat by the editor K. W. Wojcicki). It
237
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2

Army.

1.

His Royal Majesty has preserved for His Zaporo-

zhian Army all [its ] former liberties in accordance with
former charters

[granted to it], and at the same time, for

[ the confirmation of] them, has graciously issued His own
3
charter.
24
Kozaks]

[With regard to] the numbers

[of the registered

in the Army, His Royal Majesty [has given] the fol

lowing instructions: wishing to fulfill the petition of His
subjects and to retain them in His service, [His Royal
Majesty] has consented [to increase the strength of] the
Zaporozhian Army to forty thousand,

4 ■
and has entrusted the

is uncertain where Jerlicz obtained the copy of this treaty.
Since this chronicler spent some time in Kiev and made us of
the Kievan penal records, he most likely copied it from these
records.
2

See the Articles on the Needs of the Zaporozhian Army
addressed to Jan Kazimierz, Zboriv, August 17, 1649, in
Dokumenty Bohdana Khmelnytskoho etc (Kiev, 1961), pp. 128-30.
These eighteen articles were the basis of the Treaty of Zboriv.
3

See the Charter of Jan Kazimierz for the Zaporozhian Army,
Zboriv, August 18, 1650 (s i c ; it should be 1649), in Akty
otnosiashchiesia etc., X, 453-55.
^According to the summaries of the royal chancery, there
were listed 40,447 names of Kozaks in the completed Register.
See S. Oswiecim, Stanislawa Oswiecima Dyaryusz 1643-1651
[The Diary of Stanislaw Oswiecim, 1643-1651], ed. W. Czermak
(Krakow: Akademia Umiejetnosci, 1907), p. 221.
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Hetman with the preparation of th.e Register of His Zaporo
zhian Army.
the Register]

[The names of] the Kozaks will be entered

[into

according to rank, and whoever will qualify

for th i s , on the estates of the nobles, as well as on the
estates of His Royal Majesty,
by the following towns,

[in the territory] designated

[his name] will be accepted into the

Kozak Register: beginning from this side of the Dnieper
[River]

5

at Dymer, Hornostaipol, Korostyshiv, Pavoloch,

Pohrebyshche, Pryluky, Vinnitsa, [and] Bratslav, and thence
from Bratslav to Iampil toward the Dniester [River], also
included will be [the territory] from the Dniester to the
g
Dnieper and also from the other side of the Dnieper,
Oster,

7

at

Chernrhiv, Nxzhyn, Romny [and] as far as the Musco-

vite border and the Dnieper.

8

*

With regard to other towns of

His Royal Majesty and of the nobles,

[located] beyond the

delination described in this article: no Kozak will live in
5

i.e., the right bank of the Dnieper,
i.e., the left bank of the Dnieper.

7

In Text 3 the town of "Ostrog" is listed.
This is either
the mistake of the chronicler or of the editor, for there was
no town of that name on the left bank of the Dnieper.
g
i.e., roughly the territory comprising the areas of the
Palatinates of Kiev, Bratslav and Chernihiv, including
Zaporozhe.
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them; it will be permitted, however, for any one

[living]

in them, who wants to remain a Kozak and who[se name] will
be accepted into the Register, to move with all his posses
sions into Ukraine without any hindrance from his master.
The Register will be drawn up by the Hetman of the Zaporozhian Army.

It will be completed, at the latest, by the

Rusin feast of the New Year

9

[and prepared] in the following
u iil\ f i s t

R tg i& U n . ^ 4 -

way: the Hetman of the Zaporozhian Army^will be enrolled as
[ registered] Kozaks,

[and upon completion] will subscribe

[ it] with his own hand and [stamp it] with the seal of the
Army.

This [procedure] will be required [to be carried out]

in order

[to ascertain]

that all those who became

[regis

tered] Kozaks might enjoy Kozak liberties, and that all
others be subject to [the officials of] the castles of His
Royal Majesty, and those

[living] on the estates of the

nobles, to their own masters.
3.

The

[Hetman's] mace of the Zaporozhian Army will

9

i.e., the beginning of the Orthodox ecclesiastical
calendar, or September first, according to the Gregorian
calendar.
The Register was completed on October 27, 1649.
See W. Lipinski, Stanislaw Michal Krzyczewski etc (Krakow,
1912), p. 324. Kozak envoys presented it to Jan Kazimierz
at a private audience on January 7, 1650.
See Oswiecim, o p .
c i t ., p. 212.
Text 3 has the following additional passage: " . . . New
Year, if God will grant us life till the coming year 1650".
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always retain, in its present boundaries, the town of
Chyhyryn, which has been conferred also on the present
Hetman of the Zaporozhian Army, the n o b l e ^ Bohdan Khmel
nytskyi, by His Royal Majesty,.[who has also] restored him
as His faithful servant and

[as the faithful servant] of the

Commonwealth.
4,

Whatever has taken place by the disposition of

God during the present disorder will pass into oblivion; and
the masters will neither punish nor seek revenge on their
serfs .
5.

His Royal Majesty has pardoned and condoned the

actions of those nobles, both of Greek [Orthodox]
[Catholic]

and Roman

faith, who in whatever capacity, have served in

the Zaporozhian Army.

And if any one of them has his estates

confiscated, whether hereditary or those held by tenure, or
if anyone has been declared infamous, because all of this
has occurred during the present disorder,

[all such proce

edings] will be eradicated by a constitution of the D i e t . ^

•^Khmelnytskyi was entitled a noble of the highest order,
i.e., "of noble birth" (Latin: generosus; Polish: urodzony) .
•^Although this treaty was ratified by the Diet of 1649,
the original article 5 was amended by the Diet of 1650. This
amendment specified that the amnesty, etc.,,would be extended
only to those nobles who were compelled to serve — or served
"unwillingly" — in the Zaporozhian Army.
See Volumina
Legum, 8 vols (Warsaw, 1737), IV, 332-33.
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6.

The Crown Army will not be stationed in the

towns which were assigned to the Kozaks by the Register.
7.

The Jews will not dwell,

[and] be neither

tenants nor leaseholders, in the towns of Ukraine where
Kozak regiments will be stationed.
8.
Union

13

With regard to the abolition

12

of the [Church]

in the Crown [Kingdom] of Poland, as well as in the

Grand Duchy of Lithuania;

also with regard to the safety of

the [Orthodox] Church lands, foundations, belonging to them,
and, as well as the rights of the [Orthodox] Church:

as [all

these matters] will be discussed and resolved by the Most
Reverend Father Metropolitan [Bishop] of Kiev
[Orthodox] clergy at the forthcoming Diet,

15

14

and the

His Royal

12 In Text 3 the word "zamieszanie" (disorder, disturbance,
turmoil, confusion) is used instead of ”zniesienie"
(abolition). This is obviously a mistake of the chronicler
or of the editor, for in the article 3 of the Articles on the
Needs of the Zaporozhian Army addressed to Jan Kazimierz,
Zboriv, August 17, 1649, there is -a specific reference made
to the abolition of the Union.
See Dokumenty Bohdana
Khmelnytskoho etc., p. 128.
13 .
i.e., of the Uniate Church.
■^Sylvestr Kosiv, who was elected the Metropolitan
Bishop of Kiev, following the death of Metropolitan Petro
Mohyla in 1647.
15

Text 1 has the following additional passage: " . . .
forthcoming Diet, — all [these.matters] were supposedly
allowed for [already] upon the request of Father Metropolitan
and the [Orthodox] clergy
.
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Majesty is prepared to honour His promises, so that all
His subjects] will enjoy their rights and liberties.

[of

His

Royal Majesty has [also] consented to grant a seat in the
Senate to the Metropolitan [Bishop] of Kiev.
9.

In accordance with former laws, His Royal

Majesty has promised to distribute all dignities
offices of the Palatinates of Kiev, Bratslav

[and]

[and] Chernihiv

among the resident nobility of the Greek [Orthodox] faith.
10.

Since there are chartered Rusin schools in the

town of Kiev, as well as in other towns of Ukraine, the
Jesuit Fathers will not be established there,
elsewhere.
there, m
11.

All other schools

17

16

but be moved

'
which were in operation

former times, will be preserved entirely.
The Kozaks will not deal in whiskey:

18

[they may

^ i . e . , will not found schools there.
17

In Text 3 this passage reads as follows: "All other
Rusin [my italics] schools" etc; and in Text 2: "All other
[Roman Catholic] churches and schools" etc. The word Rusin
in the former version changes the meaning of the text
completely; while the latter version does not change the
meaning of the text.
-^Articles 8 and 10 were further expanded by more conces
sions to the Orthodox Church.
See the summary of this
charter, which was issued at Warsaw on January 12, 1650, in
M. Hrushevskyi, Istoriia Ukrainy-Rusy, 10 vols (New York,
1956), VIII, 3, 262-63.
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distill it] , but only

[in such quantities]

as to fill their

own needs, and which they may sell wholesale.

The dealing

in mead, beer and other fbeverages] , however, will be in
accordance with the customs.
[Conclusion].
the Diet.

19

These articles will be ratified by

All rancor [will pass]

into oblivion; and at the

present time only concord and love will prevail among the
residents of Ukraine and the Zaporozhian Army of His Royal
Majesty and of the Commonwealth.

Sigillum
Maioris Cancellariae

Jan Kazimierz, by the Grace of God, King
of Poland; Grand Duke of Lithuania, R u s ,
Prussia, Samogitia, Mazovia, Livonia,
Smalensk, Chernihiv; [and the Hereditary
King of Swedes, Goths and Vandals].

^ I t was ratified by the Crown General Diet of 1649 (its
sessions lasted from November 22, 1649 to January 17, 1650).
The Diet of 1650 amended article 5 and ratified this treaty
again.
See Volumina L e g u m , IV, 258, 332-33.
20

This was the full title of the king.
203 et seq.

*

See ibi d ., IV,

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

245

[Dated at Zboriv, August 20, 1 6 4 9 ) . ^

21

Some historians date the Treaty of Zboriv from the time
when its text was completed, i.e., Wednesday, August 18; or
from the event on Thursday, August 19, 1649, when Khmelnyts
kyi swore an oath of fidelity. The final act, however, took
place on Friday morning, August 20, 1649, when Khmelnytskyi
paid homage to Jan Kazimierz and asked for his pardon.
See
the anonymous diary, in Akty otnosiashchiesia etc., Ill, 413;
and W. Miaskowski's letter to Anonymous, Zboriv, August 22,
1649, in Jakuba Michalowskiego etc (Krakow, 1864), p. 438.
NOTE:
For other sources where copies of the Treaty of
Zboriv are found, see Hrushevskyi, op. c i t ., VIII, 3, 217, n.
1; and L. Kubala, Szkice historyczne, 1st s e r . , 5th ed (Lviv,
1923), p. 114, n. 131.
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A P P E N D IX

I I

INDEX OF PERSONS
N O T E ; Dates in brackets indicate the reigns
of kings, sultans, tsars, etc.
Date in paren
thesis indicates the year of appointment to,
or of investment with, an office, a dignity
or a function. This applies only to the
officials of the Polish-Lithuanian Common
wealth .

1.
A listing of the names of persons most frequently
mentioned in this monograph during the years 1648-1649;
Ahmed Pasha:
Turkish Grand Vezir.
Aleksei Mikhailovich:
Tsar of Muscovy [1646-1676].
Arsenev, Fedor Iurevich:
Voevoda of Volnyi Voinov .
Bolkhovskii, Prince Semen Nikitich:
Czaplinski

(Czaplicki), Daniel:

Voevoda of Khotmyzhsk.

Deputy Sheriff of Chyhyryn.

Dolgorukii (Dolgorukov), Prince Iurii Alekseevich:
of Putivl.

Voevoda

Firlej, Andrzej:
Castellan of Belz; Regimentary (1649);
Palatine of Sandomierz (1649); died in 1650.
Gembicki (Gebicki), Piotr:
Bishop of Krakow (1643) .
Giray, Crim:
Crimean Kalga.
Grodzicki, Krzysztof:
"Governor" of Kodak (1640).
Gyorgy II Rakoczy:
Prince of Transylvania [1648-1660].
Ibrahim I:
Islam III:

Sultan of Turkey [1640-1648].
Khan of Crimea [1644-1654].

Jan II Kazimierz:
King of Poland and Grand Duke of Lithuania
[1648-1668], Abdicated in 1668; died in 1672.
246
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Kalinowski, Marcin:
Palatine of Chernihiv; Crown Field
Hetman (1646).
Kazanowski, Adam:
Crown Court Marshal (1643); died in 1649.
Khmelnytskyi, Bohdan Zynovii:
Hetman of the Zaporozhian
Army (officially in 164 9) .
Klimov, Grigorii:
Starodubets.
Kobylskii, Ivan Semenovich: Voevoda of Sevsk.
Koniecpolski, Aleksander:
Crown Ensign;
Regimentary (1648).
Koniecpolski, Krzysztof:
Palatine of Belz.
Kosiv (Kosov), Sylvestr:
Orthodox Metropolitan Bishop of
Kiev (1647) .
Krychevskyi, Stanislav Mykhailo:
Colonel of Chyhyryn
Regiment (1643); died in 1649.
Kryvonis (Kryvonos), Maksym: Kozak colonel; died in 1649.
Kunakov, Grigorii:
Diak.
Kysil, Adam:
Palatine of Bratslav (1648); Palatine of Kiev
(1649) .
Lemckoronski, Stanislaw:
Castellan of Kamianets; Regimentary
(1649); Palatine of Bratslav (1650).
Lcisko, Petronii:
Orthodox Priest from Hoshcha.
Leontev, Zamiatnia Fedorovich:
Voevoda of Sevsk.
Leszczynski, Andrzej:
Bishop of Chelmno (1646); Crown Vice
Chancellor (1645).
Leszczynski, Boguslaw:
General of Great Poland; Marshal
of the Chamber of Deputies (1648, 1649); Crown Treasurer
(1650).
Lubienski, Maciej:
Archbishop of Gniezno and Primate (1641);
Interrex (1648).
Lubomirski, Stanislaw:
Palatine of Krakow (1638); died in
1649.
Meshcherskii, Prince Nikifor Fedorovich:
Voevoda of Briansk.
Miaskowski, Lukasz:
Judge of Podolia.
Miaskowski, Wojciech:
Chamberlin of Lviv; Secretary of
Jan Kazimierz.
Muhammed IV:
Sultan of Turkey [1648-1687].
Nashchokin, Nikifor Nikitich:

Voevoda of Trubchevsk.

Obuchowicz, Teodor Michal:
Chamberlin of M a z y r .
Ossolinski, Jerzy:
Crown Grand Chancellor (1643); died in
1650.
Ostrorog, Michal:
Crown Cup-Bearer; Regimentary (1648).
Pleshcheev, Nikifor Iurevich:

Voevoda of Putivl.
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Potocki, Mikolaj:
Castellan of Krakow (1646); Crown Grand
Hetman (1646).
Potocki, Stanislaw "Rewera":
Palatine of Podolia.
Prozorovskii, Matvei:
Voevoda of Viazma.
Radziwill, Janusz:
Field Hetman of the Grand Duchy of
Lithuania (1646) .
Sapieha, Kazimierz Leon:
Vice Chancellor of the Grand Duchy
of Lithuania (1645) .
Smiarowski, Jakob:
Deputy Sheriff of Cherkasy; died in 1649.
Szemberg (Szemberk), Jacek:
Kozak Commissioner; died in
1648.
Szoldrski, Andrzej:
Bishop of Poznan (1636).
Trubetskoi, Prince Aleksei Nikitich:
Boiarin.
Tyszkiewicz, Janusz:
Palatine of Kiev; died in 1649.
Unkovskii, Grigorii:

Muscovite envoy.

Vasyl IV Lupul (Vasile Lup u ) : Hospodar of Moldavia
[1634-1653].
Velikoganin, Danila: Voevoda of Velikie L u k i .
Waza, Prince Karol Ferdynand:
Bishop of Wroclaw and Plock;
brother of Kings Wladyslaw IV and Jan Kazimierz.
Wladyslaw IV:
King of Poland and Grand Duke of Lithuania
[1632-1648] .
Wisniowiecki, Prince Jeremi:
Palatine of Rus (1646); Regi
mentary (1648, 1649).
Zagriazhskii, Ivan: Voevoda of Viazma.
Zaslawski-Ostrogski, Prince Wladyslaw Dominik:
Palatine of
Sandomierz (1645); Regimentary (1648); Palatine of
Krakow (1649).

2.

Selected authors listed in the bibliography:

Chevalier, Pierre:

French noble;

army officer; writer.

Golinski, Marczyn (Golinski, Marcin): Councillor of
Kazimierz, a town near Krakow: chronicler; compiler of
documents.
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Grondski, Samuel (Gradski, Samuel):
Polish Protestant who
spent much of his life in Transylvania; writer; historian.
Hannower, Natan
kabbalist.

(Hannover, Nathan):

Jewish chronicler;

Jemilowski, Mikolaj:
Polish noble; diarist.
Jerlicz, Joachim:
Rusin noble; a typical "gente Ruthenus,
natione Polonus"; chronicler.
Kochowski, Vespasiano (Kochowski, Wespazjan):
toriographer"; poet.

"Royal his

Le Vasseur, Guillaume , Sieur de Beauplan:
French noble;
army officer; engineer-cartographer in the service of
Polish kings; writer.
Maskiewicz, Boguslaw Kazimierz:
A petty noble from the
Grand Duchy of Lithuania; diarist.
Michalowski, Jakub: Castellan of Biecz; compiler of documents.
Obuchowicz, Kazimierz Filip:
Marshal of the Chamber of
Deputies (1648); Secretary of Lithuania (1649); Palatine
of Smalensk (1653); diarist.
Opalinski, Krzysztof:
Palatine of Poznan (1637); satirist.
Pastorius, Ioachimus (Pastoriusz, Joachim):
Clergyman;
historian; teacher; physician.
Paul of Aleppo:
Archdeacon; secretary to Patriarch Macarius
III of Antioch.
Radziwill, Prince Albrecht Stanislaw:
Chancellor of the
Grand Duchy of Lithuania (1623); diarist.
Rudawski, Wawrzyniec Jan:
Clergyman; doctor of laws;
historian.
Temberski, Stanislaw:
Clergyman; professor and official
historiographer of the University of Krakow.
Twardowski, Samuel:
Soldier; historian; poet.
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APPENDIX III

GLOSSARY OF NAMES AND TERMS

Abbrevi at ions
Bel.
Cze.
Ger.
Lat.
Lit.
Pol.
Rus.
Tur.
Ukr.

Belorussian
Czech
German
Latin
Lithuanian
Polish
Russian
Turkish
Ukrainian

ARCHMANDRITE:
(Rus. Arkhimandrit; tf^r. Arkhymandryt) .
A monk charged with the spiritual supervision of several
Orthodox monasteries, or the superior of a monastery of
special importance.
CASTELLAN:
(Lat. Castellanus; Pol. Kasztelan) . With the
emergence of sheriffs at the end of the thirteenth
century, castellans lost most of their authority and
functions.
In the Commonwealth of the middle of the
seventeenth century, castellans retained certain of
their military functions; other than that, they held
honorary offices for life, which entitled them to seats
in the Senate.
CONSTITUTION:
(Lat. Constitutum; Pol. Konstytucja) . Reso
lution arising from the legislative activity of the
Diet of the Commonwealth appeared as a constitution.
Unlike the conception of a modern constitution, it com
prised even the smallest and most trifling resolution.
From the middle of the sixteenth century, constitutions
originated in the Chamber of Deputies. They were read
before the king and the Senate, approved, and published
immediately after the last session of the Diet.
250
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CROWN:
(Pol. Korona) . One of the two component parts of
the Commonwealth.
Poland proper, as opposed to the
Grand Duchy of Lithuania.
CROWN ARMY:
or regular army (Pol. Wojsko Koronne, or
more properly Wojsko Kwarciane) . One-quarter (Pol.
kwarta) of revenue from royal estates (one-fifth from
1538) was assigned for the upkeep of this army.
It was
formed in 1562-1563 and 1567.
In 1648 its strength was
3,410 men.
DIAK: (Rus.)
Secretary of Central Muscovite government;
immediate superior of clerk. The Secretaries of Council
(Rus. Dumnye Diaki) had high social status.
DIET:
(Pol. Sejm).
Central organ legislating for the whole
Commonwealth.
Several kinds of Diets may be distingui
shed:
1. Crown General Diet (Pol. Sejm Walny Koronny) . It
was composed of "three estates": the king; the Senate (arch
bishops, bishops, palatines, castellans, and other high
officials of the state or m i n i s t e r s a n d the Deputies
(elected representatives from General and Territorial Dietines). As the Chamber of Deputies contained no representa
tives of the towns or of the clergy, it was purely an assembly
of the gentry.
Crown General Diets were held in Warsaw.
Apart from legislation, other functions of these Diets
included: control of finance; levy of taxes; reception of
foreign envoys; formulation of foreign policy; call of
general levy to arms; conferment of ennoblement; and grant
of mercy and amnesty. At times, these Diets sat as judical
bodies.
In addition there were: (a) "Ordinary" Crown General
Diets, which were called into session regularly every two
years and lasted for six weeks; and (b) "Extraordinary"
Crown General D i ets, which were summoned in case of sudden
need and sat for a fortnight.
2. Convocation Diet (Pol. Sejm Konwokacyjny) . It was
summoned into session by the Primate during an interregnum.
Under his presidency the Diet, in fact a "confederation",
had the task of safeguarding the Commonwealth against
internal and external danger, and to prepare for an election
of a new monarch.
3. Election Diet (Pol. Sejm Elekcyjny) . It was summoned
by the primate on a date and to a place (usually near Warsaw)
decided by the Convocation Diet.
Its main task was to elect

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

252

a new monarch.
This body prepared the text of the pacta
conventa. It consisted of the Senate/ the Deputies and of
all the nobles in attendance.
Once the primate received
the consent of all the electors, he then announced the name
of the new king-elect.
4.
Coronation Diet (Pol. Sejm Koronacyjny) . It was
summoned to Krakow, the former capital of Poland. The kingelect first swore to abide by the pacta conventa; he was
then crowned and took the coronation oath. The Coronation
Diet followed, at which all acts of the interregnum were
confirmed.
DIETINES:
(Pol. Sejmiki) . These were assemblies of all the
gentry from a given region.
Several kinds of Dietines
may be distinguished:
1. General Dietines (Pol. Sejmiki Generalne) . These
were assemblies of deputies elected at Territorial Dietines
and senators from certain regions (e.g., Great Poland, Little
Poland, Mazovia, Rusin Lands or Lithuania). They held joint
consultations and deliberations over their positions in the
Crown General Diets.
2.
Territorial Dietines (Pol. Sejmiki Ziemskie) . These
were assemblies of all the gentry from a certain district or
region.
They were summoned by the king (or by the Primate
during an interregnum) . Their chief role was to elect
deputies for the Crown General D i e t s , to draw up instructions
for them and to deal with all local matters. There were the
following kinds of Territorial Dietines:
(a) Pre-Diet (Pol.
Przedsejmowe), which elected deputies to the Crown General
Diets; (b) "Hooded" (Pol. Kapturowe) , which exercised tempo
rary power, determined defense, organized judicature, etc.,
in their districts during an interregnum; (c) Deputation
(Pol. Deputackie) , which selected deputies or judges for the
tribunals; (d) Election (Pol. Elekcyjne) , which elected local
officials; and (e) Report (Pol. Relacyjne) , at which the
deputies gave an account of their activities during the Diets
they attended.
HETMAN:
From the Lat. Capitaneus, and via the Low Ger.
Hoedman, High Ger. Hauptman and the Cze. Hejtman, came
the Pol. form Hetman, Lit. Atmonas or Etmonas and U k r .
Ataman and Hetman. In the Commonwealth *it designated
the ranks of its highest military commanders. There were
two in the Crown and two in the Grand Duchy: Crown Grand
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Hetman and Crown Field Hetman;. Lithuanian Grand Hetman
and Lithuanian Field Hetman.
Prior to 1649 the Kozak
commander was officially called "Elder"; in that year
he was officially named Hetman. Lesser Kozak officers
were also called Ataman or Otaman.
HOSPODAR: (Ukr.) Lord; a title often applied to the princes
or rulers of Moldavia and Walachia.
The Rus. gospodin
is close in derivation.
INTERREGNUM: (Lat.)
In the Commonwealth it was a period
of time which lasted from the death of a king to the
coronation of his successor.
INTERREX: (Lat.)
In the Commonwealth, this office was
held from 1572 by the Primate.
He was therefore the
representative of a king, and wielded power as the head
of the state during an interregnum.
KOZAKS:
(Pol. and Ukr. Kozak; Rus. Kazak) . An occupational
rather than ethnic designation.
The West European form,
Cossack, is the result of Pol. and Ukr. pronunciation of
the Tur. word Kazak , which means robber, disturber of
peace and adventurer.
1. Origin and Evolution:
The so-called Codex Cumanicus
(1303), a lexicon of the language of Polovtsy (Cumans,
Kipchaks), defined "Kozak" as a sentry, guard and escort.
To the Mongols (Tatars), from thirteenth to fifteenth cen
turies, "Kozak" signified a free man, or one who was indepen
dent, as well as an adventurer, vagabond, robber and waylayer.
During the same period "Kozaks" were also known in Crimea.
In
the chronicle of the Genoese town of Soldaia (Sudak), refer
ence was made to a "Kozak", a brig'and, who killed a youth in
the year 1308. The statutes of the towns of Soldaia and
Cembalo (Balaklava) also mention "Kozaks". In the middle of
the fifteenth century they were performing various duties:
some were armed guards of consuls of Kaffa (Theodosia);
others were paid as escorts of caravans; still others were
engaged in brigandage.
At the same time, in Muscovy, the
southern boundaries of the Riazan lands were protected by
settlements of"Riazan Kozaks".
By the middle of the fifteenth century the south-eastern
borderlands (i.e., "Ukraine") of Grand Duchy of Lithuania
began to suffer from the raids of "Tatar Kozaks", who occupied
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Crimea and the northern shores of the Black Sea. The Slavic
population of the Lithuanian borderlands, being in constant
struggle with the Tatars, adopted from them their manner of
warfare, way of life, dress and even their name.
The first
official mention of these "Ukrainian Kozaks" seems to have
been made in 1492.
In that year Khan Mengli Giray of Crimea
complained to the Grand Duke Aleksander of Lithuania that men
from Kaniv and Cherkasy wrecked and plundered his vessel and
siezed ten horses.
In response to this complaint the
Lithuanian ruler promised to call these "Kozaks" into account.
The Muscovites called the Kozaks of the Commonwealth by
another name -- Cherkasy — after a town of that name, which
is often referred to as the "cradle of Kozakdom". In a broad
sense they also applied this name to the population of
Ukraine in general. On the development of Kozaks in the
Polish-Lithuanian state in the sixteenth and the seventeenth
centuries, see Chapter I.
2. Registered Kozaks:
Starting in 1572 a certain number
of Kozaks, varying from time to time, was enrolled for the
service of the Commonwealth.
The names of those accepted
were entered into an official register (i.e., "Registered"),
and they formed special regiments o f 4the regular army.
The
Registered Kozaks received extensive privileges: apart from
pay and uniforms, they were exempt from the jurisdiction of
royal officials and were able to elect their own officers
(this right was taken away for the period 1638-1648).
Since
they were recognized by the government, such rewards as
grants of land and even ennoblement for meritorious service
to the state, were within their reach.
3. Kozak Army:
The official Kozak Army, called His
Royal Majesty's Zaporozhian Army, was composed of Registered
Kozaks. It was divided into regiments which were attached
to designated towns in Ukraine; these into hundreds; and
finally into tens.
In 1638 the 6,000 Registered Kozaks
formed six regiments:
Cherkasy, Pereiaslav, Kaniv, Korsun,
Bila Tserkva and Chyhyryn.
In 1649 over 40,000 Registered
Kozaks formed sixteen regiments: to the six already listed
were added, U m a n , Bratslav, Kalnyk, Kiev, Kropnyvna,
Myrhorod, Poltava, Pryluky, Nizhyn and Chernihiv.
The Kozak
Army was a closed organization and carried out its own
affairs.
Except for the period 1638-1648, it had its own
commander, court, chancery and ordinance officers; these, as
well as all other regimental posts, were elective. The Army
as a whole, under the guidance of the general staff, acted
as an assembly.
Similar internal organization was found at
the Sich.
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LEGATUS NATUS: (Lat.)
A person who is a legate, or a rep
resentative of the Holy See, by his very office.
This
position was held in the Commonwealth by the Primate,
the Archbishop of Gniezno.
MAGDEBURG RIGHTS:
Common Law of Magdeburg (Ger. Magdeburger
Weichbild; Lat. Jus municipale Magdeburgense) was intro
duced into Poland in the thirteenth century by German
immigrants.
It established civil rules, affected urban
administration and social organization.
MANIFESTO:
(Pol. Uniwersal; R u s . and U k r . Universal) . The
announcement of regulations and laws; message or procla
mation of general information.
METROPOLITAN:
(Rus.Metropolit; Ukr. Mytropolyt) . The
title of a bishop in the Orthodox Church, who has juris
diction over bishops of subordinate sees, and who ranks
above the archbishop, but below the patriarch.
In the
Commonwealth, this title belonged to the bishops of Kiev.
PACTA CONVENTA: (Lat.)
A bi-lateral agreement between the
king-elect and his electors, which contained the indivi
dual obligations of the king-elect.
If the king failed
to fulfill the agreed conditions, then his electors had
the right to withold obedience. This was covered by the
articulus de non praestanda oboedientia.. This agreement
was first formulated in 1573 at the election of King
Henri de V a lois.
PALATINE:
(Lat. Palatinus; Pol. Wojewoda) . The title of a
governor of the largest administrative unit of the
Commonwealth; literally leader of.an army. As its
highest-ranking official, he presided over the Election
Dietine, commanded the army (i.e., the mass levy of the
gentry), supervised the towns (weights and measures) and
acted as the judge for the J e w s . He was appointed by
the king for life and by the virtue of his office received
a seat in the Senate.
PALATINATE:
(Pol. Wojewodztwo) .
by the palatine.

A territory administered
«

PRIKAZ: (Rus.)
Muscovy.

Central government department or office in
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1. Posolskii Prikaz; Department of External Affairs;
Foreign Office; or literally, Office of Ambassadors.
2. Razriadnyi Prikaz; Department of Defence; it
concerned itself chiefly with matters of military nature.
PRIMATE:
(Lat. Primus). In 1417 the Archbishop of Gniezno
became "primas regni Poloniae" , a title by which he was
able to exercise jurisdiction over all bishops in the
country.
In 1515 he was also a legatus natus; and from
1572 he exercised the functions of an interrex.
REGIMENTARY:
(Pol. Regimentarz) . A military post created
for replacement of Hetman; a vice-Hetman.
Created for
the first time in 1648, when both the Crown Grand Hetman
and Crown Field Hetman became Tatar prisoners.
SHERIFF:
(Lat.Capitaneus; Pol. and Ukr. Starosta) . This
official was appointed ty the king; he was a local
official bestowed with full powers over the district of
his jurisdiction, with the exception of granting privi
leges or charters. From the beginning of the fourteenth
century there evolved the following:
General Sheriff, a
viceroy in certain large regions (for example, in Great
Poland); Castle Sheriff, with authority over a castle
and surrounding districts; and Non-Castle Sheriff, a
leaseholder of royal estates.
An official ranking below
the Sheriff was called Deputy Sheriff (Pol. Podstarosta;
U k r . Pidstarosta) .
SICH: (Ukr.) (Pol Sicz; Rus. Sech) . A fortified Kozak camp
on one of the islands south of the Dnieper's cataracts.
The first Sich was began ca. 1553 by Prince Dmytro
Vyshnevetskyi, on the Island of Khortytsia; it served as
prototype and model for later structures of this nature.
The Zaporozhian Sich served as a military center for all
Kozaks, and it was moved from island to island as con
ditions demanded.
UKRAINE:
(Pol., Rus. and Ukr. Ukraina) . The name (literally
borderland) is of considerable age. The oldest known
example dates from the middle of the eleventh century.
In reference to the Polish-Lithuanian state, the geo
graphic area of Ukraine underwent frequent changes. From
the sixteenth century, this name was generally applied
to the southern Dnieper region, or the south-eastern
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confines of Grand Duchy of Lithuania.
In 1569 Ukraine
became part of the Province of Little Poland and passed
under the authority of the Crown. This nomenclature
began to appear in official acts (frequently not capital
ized, i.e., "borderland").
It was almost restricted to
geo-topographic use, for the name Ukraine was never used
to designate a political area in the same sense as, for
example, Podolia or Volynia had been.
In a more restric
ted use in the middle of the seventeenth century, Ukraine
encompassed the steppe areas of the Palatinates of Kiev
and Bratslav; in the broadest use, the area comprising
the Palatinates of Kiev, Bratslav and Chernihiv.
UNION OF BREST:
(Bel. and Rus. Brest; Pol. Brzesc; Ukr.
Berest) . As the result of the Union of Brest (1596) the
Orthodox Church within the boundaries of the Commonwealth
(i.e., Kievan Metropolitan See) became the Greek Catholic
or Uniate Church. The Uniates accepted papal supremacy;
they retained the traditional Eastern liturgy, including
the use of Slavonic language, communion of two kinds and
marriage of lower clergy.
The Uniate bishops and priests
were to enjoy the rights and privileges of their Roman
Catholic counterparts.
UNION OF LUBLIN:
In 1569 the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand
Duchy of Lithuania united to form "The Commonwealth of
both Nations" (Lat. Respublica; Pol. Rzeczpospolita) .
The union turned the hitherto purely personal union of
the two countries into something resembling a confedera
tion, similar to that of England and Scotland.
Both
Poland and Lithuania had a common king (who retained his
title of grand duke in Lithuania), Diet, currency and
foreign policy. Each part of t h e .Commonwealth had
separate ministers, armies, treasuries and courts; and
Lithuania retained its judicial codes and its official
language.
At the time of the union Lithuania ceded to
Poland the Palatinates of Podlachia, Volynia, Bratslav
and Kiev.
VOEVODA: (Rus.)
Muscovite military governor of urban district
having judicial, financial and police functions.
VOEVODSTVO: (Rus.)
A Muscovite territory <pr province
administered by voevoda.
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ZAPOROZHE:
(Pol. Zaporoze; Rus. Zaporozhe and Ukr.
Zaporozhzhia or Zaporizhzhia) (Ukr. za = beyond; porohy
= rapids, cataracts, i.e., literally land beyond the
Dnieper's rapids or cataracts).
In the strict use of
this term, it was the steppe area south of the Dnieper's
cataracts, on both banks of the river, to the shores of
the Black Sea.
In a broader use, it comprised the whole
lower drainage basin of the Dnieper: south of Tiasmyn on
its right bank and Orel on its left; and the Vast area
stretching from S, Buh on the west, to the watershed of
Donets on the east.
The Zaporozhian steppe "wilderness"
was called "Wild Plains" or "Wild Fields".
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A U C T O R I S
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Ontario.
Junior Matriculation, 1955.

1943-1955

1955-1959
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Employment:

1960-1963

1965-1967

Other Activities:
1955-1958

Instructed in History, Geography and
English at Notre Dame School and Loretto
High School (now Bishop Macdonell High
School), Guelph, Ontario; September 1960
to June 1963; and at Vincent Massey
Collegiate Institute (now Vincent Massey
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September 1965 to June 1966.
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Windsor, Ontario; from September 1966.
Member of the University of Western
Ontario Contingent of the Canadian
Officers' Training Corps.
Commissioned
as Second-Lieutenant in the Canadian
Army (Supplementary Reserve), 1958.
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